McGreene v Hibernian Taxi Company

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 20 December 1931
• Date: 20 December 1931
• Court: Supreme Court (Irish Free State)

Supreme Court.

M'Greene v. Hibernian Taxi Co.

GERTRUDE M'GREENE

Plaintiff

and

HIBERNIAN TAXI COMPANY. Defendants (1)

Negligence - Personal injuries - Verdict against weight of evidence - Practice - New trial.

Application, on behalf of the defendants, for an order that the verdict of the jury and judgment entered thereon, dated 28th January, 1930, should be set aside, and judgment entered for the defendants, or, in the alternative, a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff claimed damages for personal injuries and loss sustained by her owing to the negligence of the defendants, their servants, and agents, in the care, driving, and management of a motor omnibus, the property of the defendants, on the public highway. The defendants denied negligence on their part, and pleaded negligence, and contributory negligence, on the part of the plaintiff.

The action was tried before Sullivan P. with a jury, and the questions put to the jury, with their answers, were as follows:—

"1. Was the bus stopped when the plaintiff attempted to enter it?" Answer—"Yes."

"2. If the answer to the first question be 'Yes,' was the bus started while the plaintiff was entering it?" Answer—"Yes."

"3. Were the defendants' servants negligent?"Answer—"Yes."

"4. Were the injuries to the plaintiff caused by such negligence?" Answer—"Yes."

Upon these findings judgment was given for the plaintiff for the sum of £1,500, the amount of damages assessed by the jury.

The further facts of the case and the material portions of the evidence are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Kennedy C.J.

The grounds of the application to the Supreme Court were: 1, that the verdict was against the evidence; 2, that the verdict was against the weight of evidence; 3, that the evidence was such that no reasonable jury, viewing it as a whole, ought to have found a verdict against the defendants; 4, that no reasonable jury upon the evidence given at the trial, and having regard to the charge given to them by the Judge, ought to have found a verdict against the defendants; 5, that the evidence given at the trial established that there was no negligence on the part of the defendants, and that they were entitled to a verdict and judgment in their favour; and 6, that the trial was unsatisfactory.

The plaintiff obtained a verdict for damages for severe personal injuries occasioned to her by the negligence of the defendants. The only witness as to the facts, on behalf of the plaintiff, was the plaintiff herself; and her evidence was, on material points, in conflict with the evidence of seven witnesses for the defence, of whom three at least were disinterested and independent witnesses, and only two were directly interested witnesses.

Held, the case was a propel one for the exercise of the jurisdiction to order a new trial, particularly as the sufferings of the plaintiff subsequent to the occurrence might have affected her recollection.

Per Kennedy C.J. and FitzGibbon J.: The jurisdiction to set aside a verdict as being against the weight of evidence has been recognised by the Oireachtas in the provision of sect. 96 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, as to appeals from the Circuit Court in an action tried by a Judge and jury, or from a judgment founded on the verdict of a jury in a civil case; and the provision of sect. 95 of that Act, by which unanimity on the part of the jury is no longer required for a verdict, renders it more necessary than hitherto that the Court should maintain the jurisdiction.

Cur. adv. vult.

Kennedy C.J. :—

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages in respect of the injuries sustained by her on the afternoon of the 2nd May, 1928, at Temple Hill, Blackrock, in the County of Dublin, when, as she was in the act of boarding an omnibus, the property of the defendant company, she was thrown to the ground, as she alleges, by the negligence of the defendant company's servants, and the omnibus passed over her. There is no doubt but that the plaintiff came to the ground at the time and place alleged, and that the omnibus, carrying thirty-three or thirty-four passengers, was driven over her prostrate body. There is no doubt of the dreadful physical injuries which the plaintiff suffered. She was then a fully-trained and qualified nursing sister, with certificates of superior qualification in different branches of nursing, twenty-three and a half years of age, employed on the staff of the British Ministry of Pensions Hospital at Blackrock, County Dublin. It is certain that most of her training now goes for nothing, and that she can only practise her calling in some minor department. It is certain that her life has been robbed of the happiness and comfort which she would in the natural course contemplate as its normal prospect. The medical evidence excites intense sympathy with the plaintiff, however the accident may have happened, and compels admiration of the surgical and medical skill which has so far overcome her injuries. It is admitted that, if she be entitled to damages from the defendant company, the sum of £1,500 awarded her by the jury is very moderate indeed. The issue of fact, upon which the plaintiff's claim must stand or fall, was found to be a single question of apparently simple character. The entrance to the particular omnibus is at the front of the

vehicle near the driver. The plaintiff's case was that she mounted the step at the entrance of the omnibus while the vehicle was stationary, standing at a recognised stopping-place for the purpose of taking up and letting down passengers, and that she was precipitated to the ground by reason of the omnibus being restarted suddenly, and without warning, before she had safely boarded it. The case of the defendant company was that, when the plaintiff attempted to enter the omnibus, it had been already restarted, and was in motion and gaining speed, and that it was for that reason that the plaintiff failed to mount it, and fell to the ground.

The action was tried on the 27th and 28th of January of the present year by the President of the High Court and a jury. The questions submitted to the jury were, and were answered, as follows:—[Reads questions and answers.]

Upon these findings judgment was given for the plaintiff for the sum of £1,500, the amount of damages assessed by the jury.

The defendants moved this Court to set aside the verdict and judgment, and to enter judgment for the defendants; or, alternatively, to order a new trial of the action, on the grounds that the verdict was against the evidence, and against the weight of evidence, and

"3. That the evidence was such that no reasonable jury, viewing it as a whole, ought to have found a verdict against the defendants:

4. That no reasonable jury, upon the evidence given at the trial, and having regard to the charge given to them by the learned Judge, ought to have found a verdict against the defendants:

5. That the evidence given at the trial established that there was no negligence on the part of the defendants, and that they were entitled to a verdict and judgment in their favour."

There was a further ground stated, viz., that the trial was unsatisfactory; but that was not put forward in argument. The case fought upon this appeal has been that the findings in answer to the first, second, and third questions were against the evidence, or so greatly against the weight of the evidence that the verdict should not be allowed to stand. The suggestion is, of course, that the jurors allowed their reason to be overwhelmed by compassion for the pitiable state of the plaintiff.

Of the six witnesses called in support of the plaintiff's case, one was an engineer, to prove a map and measurements of the place of accident; three were surgeons, testifying to her injuries; one was a Civic Guard, who was on point duty near the scene of the accident, but, having his back turned in that direction, did not see it happen; and the sixth was the plaintiff, who gave the only evidence of the facts and alleged negligence of the defendants' servants, upon which she relied as constituting her cause of action. Her account was that she came along Stradbrook Road on the right-hand side until she reached the corner at Temple Hill, where she stopped, and waited for an omnibus into the city. The defendants' omnibus after a time came along Stradbrook Road, and, at a regular stopping-place at the left-hand side, where the road opens into Temple Hill, it stopped to set down and take up passengers. She walked across the road behind the bus, went down alongside it towards the driver's end, where the entrance is situate, and, the bus being still stationary, she caught the brass handrail at the entrance with her right hand, stepped with her right foot on the step, but before she could bring her left foot on to the step, the bus suddenly, and without warning, started in motion, so that she swung back. She continued to hold on with her right hand and right foot for a moment, trying to pull herself to the entrance door, until with the increasing speed of the bus it became too much for her, and she dropped off, fell face downwards on the road, and the rear wheel of the bus passed over her back. The plaintiff stated that she had seen only one person, a lady, get down from the bus when it stopped, and that this lady had moved away before she (the plaintiff) reached the step. She said that there was no one else at the corner where she had stood waiting. The medical evidence as to the plaintiff's condition immediately after the accident was that "she was suffering from intense shock. She was almost quite pulseless, and appeared to us to be moribund . . . We could do nothing at that time in regard to a detailed examination because the girl was too bad . . . I thought she was dying. She recovered from that condition during the course of eight or ten days" (Sir William Wheeler). "I found her practically moribund. She was pulseless, and suffering...