McGuinness v Armstrong Patents

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judgment Date: 31 July 1980
• Docket Number: [1975 No. 2057 P.]
• Date: 31 July 1980

McGuinness v. Armstrong Patents

Mary McGuinness

Plaintiff

and

Armstrong Patents Limited, Third defendant

[1975 No. 2057 P.]

High Court

Limitation of actions - Negligence - Personal injuries - Added defendant - Computation of limitation period - Service of summons - Rules of the Superior Courts, 1962 (S.I. No. 72), Or. 15, r. 13 - Interpretation Act, 1937 (No. 38), s. 11 - Statute of Limitations, 1957 (No. 6), s. 11.

The plaintiff suffered personal injuries on the 21st June, 1972, when a motor car, in which she was a passenger, crashed after one of its wheels became detached from the vehicle. The plaintiff issued and served on two defendants a summons in which she claimed damages from them and alleged that her injuries had been caused by their negligence. The plaintiff was then informed that the accident had been caused by the failure of a part of the car which had been manufactured by the third defendant, a company registered outside the jurisdiction. Having obtained leave to add the third defendant as a party, the plaintiff on the 23rd June, 1975, issued a concurrent summons in which she claimed damages from the third defendant and alleged that her injuries had been caused by the negligence of the third defendant. Notice of the issue of the concurrent summons was not served on the third defendant until after the 23rd June, 1975. In its defence the third defendant pleaded that the plaintiffs action against the third defendant was statute barred.

Section 11, sub-s. 2(b), of the Statute of 1957, states that the plaintiffs action against the third defendant should not be brought "after the expiration of three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued." The issue based on the Statute of 1957 and raised in the defence of the third defendant was tried in the High Court by a judge as a separate issue. The 21st and 22nd June, 1975, were dies non judiciarii and, at the trial of the issue, the third defendant conceded that the plaintiff's claim against the third defendant would not be statute barred if (a) the claim had not become barred before the 21st June, 1975, and (b) the issue of the concurrent summons on the 23rd June, 1975, had been the commencement of the plaintiffs action against the third defendant for the purposes of the Statute of 1957.

Held by McMahon J., in deciding that the plaintiff's action against the third defendant was statute barred, 1, that the period allowed by s. 11, sub-s. 2(b), of the Statute of 1957 was a period of time "reckoned from a particular day" within the meaning of s. 11(h) of the Interpretation Act, 1937, and that by the express terms of that section the 21st June, 1972, must be deemed to be included in the period of three years allowed by s. 11, sub-s. 2(b), of the Statute of 1957.

2. That the provisions of Order 15, r. 13, state that a proceeding against a party added as a defendant shall be deemed to have begun "only on the service of such summons or notice" and that, accordingly, even if the period allowed by the Statute of 1957 had not expired with the 20th June, 1975, the plaintiff's action against the third defendant could not be treated as if it had been brought against that defendant on the 23rd June, 1975.

Cases mentioned in this report:—

¹ Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co....