Meagher v Woods

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Ms. Justice Baker
• Judgment Date: 03 July 2015
• Neutral Citation: [2015] IEHC 464
• Judgment citation (vLex): [2015] 7 JIC 0307
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [2015 No. 12 C.A.],[2015 No. 12 CA]
• Date: 03 July 2015

[2015] IEHC 464

High Court

Baker J.

[2015 No. 12 CA]

James Meagher and Adrian Trueick,

Plaintiffs

and

Patrick Joseph (orse. P.J.) Woods and Danny Woods,

Defendants

Miriam O'Regan S.C. (with her Paul McNally) for the first defendant.

Aillil O'Reilly for the plaintiffs.

Cur. adv. vult.

Cases mentioned in this report:-

Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v. Finnegan [2015] IEHC 304, (Unreported, High Court, Murphy J., 20th May, 2015).

Blackall v. Grehan [1995] 3 I.R. 208.

Connor v. O'Brien [1925] 2 I.R. 24; (1924) 58 I.L.T.R. 161.

Gledhill v. Hunter (1880) 14 Ch. D. 492.

Harrington v. Judge Murphy [1989] I.R. 207.

Hosie v. Lawless [1927] I.R. 464.

Howard v. Howard (1892) 30 L.R. Ir. 340.

Mulvey v. Flanagan [1936] Ir. Jur. Rep. 40.

Tuite v. Cullen [1914] 1 I.R. 60.

Courts — Jurisdiction — Circuit Court — Real property — Rateable valuation — Ejectment proceedings — Proceedings concerning multiple premises — Combined rateable valuation exceeding statutory limit of Circuit Court — Time at which rateable valuation to be assessed — Whether rateable valuation in proceedings concerning multiple premises to be assessed cumulatively or separately — Whether jurisdiction to be determined on basis of separate or combined assessment of rateable valuations — Whether rateable valuation to be assessed at commencement or determination of proceedings — Whether Circuit Court having jurisdiction where combined rateable valuation of properties exceeding statutory limit — Whether purposive interpretation appropriate where no ambiguity in statute.

Practice and procedure — Amendment of proceedings — Division of proceedings — Whether appropriate to divide proceedings at appeal stage — Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 (No. 39), s.22(1) and Third Schedule — Courts Act 1980 (No. 11), s. 2(1)(d) — Valuation Act 2001 (No. 13), ss. 14, 15 and 17 — Interpretation Act 2005 (No. 23), ss. 18 and 21 and Part 1 of Schedule.

Appeal from the Circuit Court

The facts have been summarised in the headnote and are more fully set out in the judgment of Baker J., infra.

On the 30th October, 2013, the plaintiff issued a civil bill for possession in the northern circuit county of Monaghan. An amended version of the civil bill for possession was subsequently delivered on the 18th November, 2014, pursuant to an order of the Circuit Court (His Honour Judge O'Hagan) on the 7th October, 2014.

On the 23rd January, 2015, the Circuit Court (His Honour Judge O'Hagan) granted the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs.

By notice of appeal filed on the 26th January, 2015, the first defendant appealed against the order of the Circuit Court to the High Court.

The appeal was heard by the High Court (Baker J.) on the 5th May, and the 9th June, 2015.

Section 22 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 and the Third Schedule thereto, as amended, provides that the Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction, absent the consent of the parties, to hear and determine an action for ejectment where the rateable valuation of the land in question exceeds €253.94, or €254.

Section 17(1) of the Valuation Act 2001 provides that “where a valuation falls to be made under this Act of relevant properties, each separate relevant property shall be valued separately and entered as a separate item in the relevant valuation list”.

Section 21 of the Interpretation Act 2005 read in conjunction with Part 1 of the Schedule to that Act assigns the following meaning to the term “rateable valuation”: “the valuation under the Valuation Act 2001 of the property concerned”.

The plaintiffs were receivers who sought possession of properties, the subject of two security instruments under which they had been appointed. The civil bill for possession referred to the two parcels of land and pleaded in the plural that their rateable valuations did not exceed €254.

The Circuit Court determined that it had jurisdiction in relation to the matter, granted the plaintiffs' application and made an order for possession in respect of the premises referred to in the civil bill.

The first defendant appealed to the High Court, claiming that the combined rateable valuations of the premises of which possession had been ordered exceeded the statutory limit of €254, and that the the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to make the orders for possession.

Held by the High Court (Baker J.), in allowing the appeal, 1, that the Act of 1961 could not be read as conferring jurisdiction on the Circuit Court when the combined rateable valuation of the lands in respect of which relief was sought exceeded the sum of €254. The test of jurisdiction had to be made in respect of the lands in the suit taken together, and not in respect of individually identified parcels that were contained in the suit.

2. That the fact that the Act of 1961 provided that the jurisdiction of the court was one to hear and determine the proceedings reflected an obligation that the jurisdiction be in existence at the date of the determination of the dispute by the proceedings. The correct date at which the rateable valuation was to be tested was the date of the making of the Circuit Court order.

Harrington v. Judge Murphy [1989] I.R. 207 approved.

3. That the combined effects of s.17 of the Valuation Act 2001 and s.21 of the Interpretation Act 2005 did not mean that in all enactments the expression “rateable valuation” was to be understood as creating a separate test of jurisdiction in respect of each individual part of a premises for the purposes of giving jurisdiction to a court of limited jurisdiction. The purpose of s. 17 was to mandate the fixing of a unit of valuation in respect of each separately identifable property, and required the valuation of separate properties where they could be shown to be separate for the purposes of valuation. To conclude otherwise would be to hold that the Oireachtas intended, by virtue of the Act of 2005, to make a very substantial change to the operation of the jurisdictional test under the Act of 1961.

Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v. Finnegan [2015] IEHC 304, (Unreported, High Court, Murphy J., 20th May, 2015) considered.

4. That if properties were separately valued because they were separate “relevant properties” in respect of which a valuation had been made, then the Circuit Court jurisdiction as identified in the Act of 1961 was to be tested against the rateable valuation of the relevant property. If there was one relevant property in respect of which the proceedings were brought, no problem arose if the rateable valuation of that property was under the statutory limit. If there were several such properties, then each property valued separately was to be treated as an individual and separate property for the purposes of the Act of 1961.

5. That it was wrong in principle for the High Court hearing a Circuit Court appeal to seek to establish jurisdiction by a notional division of the proceedings so as to constitute two separate appeals; this would have had the undesirable effect that two appeals would have arisen from one judgment, with the consequent administrative confusion that could cause.

6. That if a plaintiff sought to establish title and claimed possession in the same proceedings, the action would be treated as an action for the recovery of land and the declaration of title would be regarded as supplemental or consequential relief.

Gledhill v. Hunter (1880) 14 Ch. D. 492 and Howard v. Howard(1892) 30 L.R. Ir. 340 followed.

7. That there was nothing in the Act of 1961 that gave rise to ambiguity or absurdity which required the court to adopt a purposive interpretation of that Act.

Obiter dicta: 1. That there was distinction between an ad hoc informal class of assessment, and a true rateable valuation which was made as a result of an assessment by the Valuation Office under the Valuation Act 2001. The definition of “rateable valuation” under s. 21 of the Interpretation Act 2005 had the effect that no informal or other ad hoc assessment was to be understood by the expression “rateable valuation” in any enactment.

Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v. Finnegan [2015] IEHC 304, (Unreported, High Court, Murphy J., 20th May, 2015) approved.

2. That, the expression “rateable valuation” in the Third Schedule of the Act of 1961 referred to the rateable valuation of each separate relevant property concerned.

Baker J. 3rd July, 2015

[1] The Circuit Court made an order for possession of four separately rated premises in the county of Monaghan on the 23rd January, 2015. The question in this appeal is whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the application or the proceedings having regard to the fact that the combined rateable valuation of the four separate premises exceeded the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. The plaintiffs argue that, as the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to determine the application in respect of each individual premises the subject matter of the proceedings, it is irrelevant to that jurisdiction that the combined rateable valuation is in excess of the monetary jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. The second defendant was not represented in the appeal, and the first defendant argues that the Circuit Court jurisdiction is confined to determining proceedings in respect of real property where the rateable valuation of the premises the subject matter of the proceedings, taken as a whole, is under the statutory jurisdictional limit.

[2] It was agreed by counsel for the parties that I should hear and determine the jurisdictional question first, namely whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the proceedings and/or to make the possession order. Certain other questions arise in the appeal and will come to be determined in the light of my decision on the question of jurisdiction.

Background facts

[3] The plaintiffs are receivers appointed by Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd. (“the Bank”) under two security instruments, the first a charge of...