Minister for Justice and Equality v Lisauskas

Court:Supreme Court
Judge:O'Donnell J., McKechnie J., Finlay Geoghegan J.
Judgment Date:15 Mar 2018
Jurisdiction:Ireland
Neutral Citation:[2018] IESCDET 43

[2018] IESCDET 43

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

O'Donnell J.

McKechnie J.

Finlay Geoghegan J.

IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003 (AS AMENDED

BETWEEN
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
APPLICANT
AND
THOMAS LISAUSKAS
RESPONDENT

Supreme Court – Determination – Appellate function – Application for leave to appeal from Court of Appeal

The respondent had applied under art 34.5.3 of the Constitution seeking leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal against the order made for his surrender under s. 16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003.

The Court was prepared to grant leave to appeal to the respondent. The Court was satisfied that the issue of whether a prosecuting authority was a valid judicial authority for the 2003 Act was of sufficient importance to grant leave to appeal.

Application allowed.

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES
RESULT: The Court grants leave to the respondent to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal pursuant to Article 34.5.3 of the Constitution.
ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED
COURT: Court of Appeal
DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 20 th October, 2017
DATE OF ORDER: 3 rd Novembber, 2017
DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 10th November, 2017
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON the 13th November, 2017 AND WAS IN TIME.
Jurisdiction
1

This determination relates to an application by the respondent in the underlying proceedings seeking his surrender to the Lithuania pursuant to s.16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 as amended. The respondent seeks leave pursuant to Article 34.5.3 of the Constitution to appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal made on the 3rd November, 2017 dismissing the appeal from the High Court which had made an order for his surrender.

2

As is clear from the terms of the Constitution and many determinations made by this Court since the enactment of the Thirty Third Amendment it is necessary, in order for this Court to grant leave, that it be established that the decision sought to be appealed either involves a matter of general public importance or that it is otherwise in the interest of justice necessary that there be an appeal to this Court.

3

The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.

4

The Court considers it desirable to point out that a determination of the Court on an application for leave, while it is final and conclusive so far as the parties are concerned, is a decision in relation to that application only. The issue is whether the questions raised, and the facts underpinning them, meet the constitutional...

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