Minister for Justice and Equality v Celmar

JurisdictionIreland
CourtSupreme Court
JudgeO'Donnell Donal J.,MacMenamin J.,Finlay Geoghegan J.
Judgment Date20 February 2019
Neutral Citation[2019] IESCDET 45
Date20 February 2019

[2019] IESCDET 45

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

O'Donnell Donal J.

MacMenamin J.

Finlay Geoghegan J.

IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003 (AS AMENDED) AND IN THE MATTER OF ARTUR DANIEL CELMER (DOB: 25 th day of October 1977)

BETWEEN
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
APPLICANT
AND
ARTUR DANIEL CELMER
RESPONDENT
AND
[BY ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT DATED 02 nd day of October 2018] the irish human rights and equality commission
AMICUS CURIAE
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.4° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

RESULT: The Court grants leave to the Respondent to appeal to this Court directly from the High Court.

REASONS GIVEN:
ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED
COURT: High Court
DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 19 th November, 2018
DATE OF ORDER: 29 th November, 2018
DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 29 th November, 2018
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 10 th December, 2018 AND WAS IN TIME.
Reasons Given
General Considerations
1

1. The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal, having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the Thirty-third Amendment, have now been considered in a large number of determinations, and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESC DET 134, and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v. Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’, direct from the High Court to this Court, can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of this Court in Wansboro v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESC DET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.

2

Furthermore, the application for leave filed, and the respondent's notice are published, along with this determination, subject to any redaction required by law, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.

3

It should be noted that the respondent opposes the grant of leave.

Decision
4

This application arises from the judgment delivered by Donnelly J. on the 19 th November, 2018. She ordered the surrender of the appellant on foot of three European Arrest Warrants. The applicant seeks leave to appeal from this Court. In the High Court, the learned trial judge held that, notwithstanding that there are systemic and general deficiencies in the independence of the judiciary in Poland which effect the judiciary at the level of court where the applicant's court would be heard, such deficiencies would, of themselves, not be sufficient, or in light of other evidence and information before the High Court concerning the applicant, to give rise to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice, such that his surrender should be refused.

5

The application to this Court contends that the Polish government's programme of reform has been effected through the forced retirement of hundreds of judges, and their replacement with other judges chosen by the government. It is said that, at all levels of the court, judges are subject to a significant pressure from the Minister for Justice who has disciplinary powers over them, and who influences how judges are appointed and replaced. It is claimed that, in the context of criminal trials, this influence is particularly pernicious, since the Minister for Justice is also the Public Prosecutor.

6

The applicant claims that in a ‘Reasoned Proposal’ dated the 20 th December, 2017, the European Commission found that the developments in Poland represented a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law referred to in Article 2 TEU, and, in particular, put at serious risk the independence of the judiciary, and the separation of powers in Poland, which are key components of the Rule of Law. The Commission initiated the procedure under Article 7 TEU which allows for the sanctioning of member states.

7

The applicant contends that earlier the learned trial judge, relying on the Commission's findings of generalised systemic deficiencies impacting on the independence of the judiciary found that the Polish legal system was no longer operating under the rule...

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1 cases
  • Minister for Justice & Equality v Celmer
    • Ireland
    • Supreme Court
    • 12 November 2019
    ...Supreme Court by way of “leapfrog” application should be made. By a determination of the Supreme Court on the 20th of February, 2019 ([2019] IESCDET 45), the court granted leave to appeal. Held by O’Donnell J that, on the evidence before the court, and having applied the approach of the CJE......

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