Murphy v Stewart

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Supreme Court
• Judgment Date: 19 December 1973
• Docket Number: [1971. No. 33 P.]
• Date: 19 December 1973

Supreme Court

[1971. No. 33 P.]

Murphy v. Stewart

LAURENCE MURPHY

Plaintiff

and

FRANCIS J. STEWART, DANIEL BROWNE and THE NATIONAL UNION OF VEHICLE BUILDERS

Defendants.

Trade union - Membership - Cesser - Workman wishing to terminate membership of his union - Second trade union refusing to accept workman as member while his union objected to termination of his membership - Whether workman's constitutional rights infringed - Constitution of Ireland, 1937,Article 40, s. 6, sub-s. 1 (iii).

Witness Action.

The first and second defendant were respectively the chairman and secretary of the third defendant, the National Union of Vehicle Builders. The plaintiff was employed by Motor Manufacturers Ltd. and he was a member of the defendant union. The plaintiff wanted to terminate his membership of the defendant union and become a member of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union. The rules of the defendant union did not contain any provisions specifying the conditions for cesser of membership of that union, which was a contravention of the terms of s. 13, sub-s. 1 (a), of the Trade Union Act, 1941. The defendant union and Irish Transport were members of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. The objection of the defendant union to the acceptance by Irish Transport of the plaintiff as a member of that union was brought before the disputes committee of the Congress. The disputes committee relied on clause 47, para. (d), of the constitution of the Congress in ruling that the decision of Irish Transport was contrary to good trade-union practice.

Part III of the Trade Union Act, 1941, provided for the establishment of a trade-union tribunal with power to grant or refuse a determination that a particular trade union (or two or more specified unions) should have the exclusive right to organise workmen of a particular category. Part III also provided that, while such determination remained unrevoked, no other trade union should accept as a new member any workman of that category. In National Union of Railwaymen v. Sullivan1 the Supreme Court held that the main principles of Part III were invalid having regard to the provisions of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, because the Constitution states the right of citizens to form associations and unions in such an emphatic way that it was impossible to harmonise that language with a law which prohibited the forming of associations and unions and which allowed citizens to join only prescribed associations and unions.

Article 40, s. 6, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution provides:—"The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public order and morality . . . (iii) the right of the citizens to form associations and

unions. Laws, however, may be enacted for the regulation and control in the public interest of the exercise of the foregoing right." Article 40, s. 6, sub-s. 2, provides:—"Laws regulating the manner in which the right of forming associations and unions and the right of free assembly may be exercised shall contain no political, religious or class discrimination."

The plaintiff issued a plenary summons on the 4th January, 1971, claiming a declaration that the refusal of the defendant union to consent to the plaintiff's application for membership of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union constituted an infringement of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, and was ultra vires the defendant union; the plaintiff also sought an order directing the defendants to consent to his said application.

The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court from the judgment and order of the High Court.

The rules of the defendant trade union, in contravention of statute, did not contain any provisions specifying the conditions for cesser of membership of that union. The plaintiff workman was a member of the defendant union but he wanted to become a member of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union. Notwithstanding the objection of the defendant union, the plaintiff was accepted as a member by Irish Transport. The defendant union brought the matter before the disputes committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and that committee ruled that the action of Irish Transport was contrary to good trade-union practice, and recommended that the plaintiff be restored to membership of the defendant union; the plaintiff was so restored. Subsequently, Irish Transport again requested the defendant union to give its consent to the plaintiff terminating his membership of the defendant union. When that consent was refused, Irish Transport refused to accept the plaintiff's further application for membership of that union. The plaintiff brought an action in the High Court in which he sought an order declaring that the refusal of the defendant union to consent to the plaintiff becoming a member of Irish Transport was an infringement of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Held by Murnaghan J., in granting the order, 1, that the provisions of clause 47 (d) of the constitution of the Congress, restricting the enrolment by one trade union of a member of another union, were not binding on the plaintiff merely by reason of his membership of a union affiliated to the Congress so as to constitute a waiver of his right to terminate his membership of the defendant union or his right to apply for membership of Irish Transport.

2. That the refusal of the defendant union was an infringement of the plaintiff's constitutional right to join the union of his choice.

On appeal by the defendants it was

Held by the Supreme Court ( Ó Dálaigh ó dálaigh C.J., Walsh, Budd, FitzGerald and Butler JJ.), in allowing the appeal, 1, that, while the plaintiff had a right to apply for membership of Irish Transport, the fact that the plaintiff had not become a member of that union was due solely to the refusal of that union to accept him as such member while the defendant union maintained its objection.

2. That the defendant union, in exercising its right to refuse to give the required consent, had not infringed any constitutional right of the plaintiff.

3. That the plaintiff had not waived any of his rights.

Cur. adv. vult.

Murnaghan J.:—

The facts in this case are not seriously in dispute. It is, however, important that I should set them out specifically. The defendant union, which is a British-based trade union, is the holder of a negotiation licence granted under Part II of the Trade Union Act, 1941, and is affiliated to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (the Congress) The Rules of the defendant union do not comply with the requirements, contained in s. 13, sub-s. 1 (a), of the Act of 1941, that such rules shall include "provisions specifying the conditions of . . . cesser of membership . . . by persons resident within the State" save and in so far as provision is made in rule 28, sub-rr. 2, 3, 4 and 15, and rule 31, sub-r. 8, and rule 46 for the expulsion of a member. Provision is made in rule 43, sub-r. 4, for the attendance of delegates at the Congress. This is the only rule of the defendant union, as far as I am aware, which contains any reference to the Congress. There is no reference to the constitution of the Congress in the said rules.

The plaintiff became a member of the defendant union in or about the year 1958, at which time he was employed by Messrs. Lincoln & Nolan. Shortly thereafter he went to work for Motor Manufacturers Ltd. at Naas Road where he is still employed. His employers carry on the business of motor assembly. There are approximately five firms engaged in the business of motor assembly in Dublin, and approximately the same number of trade unions catering for workers engaged in this particular industry. The latter include the defendant union, the Marine Port and General Workers Union (hereinafter referred to as Marine Port) and the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (hereinafter referred to as Irish Transport).

Due to certain problems in Motor Manufacturers Ltd. which arose in the early part of 1970 and prior thereto, with which I am not really concerned, the plaintiff and others became dissatisfied with the defendant union and ultimately decided to discontinue their membership of that union and to become a member of one of the other unions catering for the motor assembly industry. In the present circumstances, the defendant union did and do represent practically all, if not all, of the workmen employed in the business of motor assembly carried on by Motor Manufacturers Ltd. I say "in the present circumstances" because the defendant union still regards the plaintiff, and the others who are of a like mind as him, as members of the defendant union. The plaintiff, to retain his job, has perforce to accept this position.

The plaintiff and his co-workers, to a total of 111 individuals, applied to Marine Port for membership. On the 6th April, 1970, the branch secretary of Marine Port wrote to the Irish organiser of the defendant union, enclosing a list of those members of that union who had applied for membership of Marine Port, asking if the defendant union had any objection to their transfer. On the 11th April, 1970, the Irish organiser of the defendant union wrote to the branch secretary of Marine Port as follows:— ". . . we are objecting to the transfers of these members to your union on the grounds that this union has successfully catered for our people working in this shop and in the motor-assembly industry as a whole. If the workers concerned can advance a bona fide reason as to why they wish to join your union we are prepared to have another look at the matter." As a result of this letter, Marine Port did not accept the applications of the plaintiff and the others for membership.

The plaintiff and his co-workers, this time to a total of 145, then applied to Irish Transport for a transfer to that union and on the 14th May, 1970, that application was notified to the Irish organiser of the...