Nolan and Others v Dildar Ltd and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Michael Twomey
• Judgment Date: 29 October 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 575
• Docket Number: RECORD NUMBER 2017/6193P

Between:

Ann Nolan, Elizabeth Nolan, Richard Nolan, Patricia Nolan, Joan Nolan, Sally Nolan and Quest Capital Trustees Limited

Plaintiffs

and

Dildar Limited, Ciaran Desmond, Colm S. McGuire, Derv Alm. O'Halloran Formerly Trading under the Style and Title of McGuire Desmond Solicitors, A Firm, John Millett, Pinnacle Pensioner Trustees Limited, Dildar Limited, John Millett Independent Financial Advisors Limited, Dillon Kenny, Darren Kenny, and Paul Kenny

Defendants

[2025] IEHC 575

RECORD NUMBER 2017/6193P

COMMMERCIAL COURT

THE HIGH COURT

Strike out – Points of defence – Damages – Defendants seeking an order striking out various pleas made by the plaintiffs – Whether the pleas were irrelevant

Facts: The first and seventh defendants, Dildar IOM and Dildar Ireland (Dildar), sought an order under Order 19 Rule 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts striking out various pleas made by the plaintiffs, the Nolans. The pleas were contained in the Nolans’ points of defence in response to Dildar’s points of claim. The pleadings related to a court-ordered inquiry into the amount of damages to be paid to Dildar, which inquiry was to be held at a future date by the High Court. The points of claim issued by Dildar outlined the basis for its claim that it should be paid €20,822,000 in damages. The points of defence issued by the Nolans disputed the basis for Dildar’s claim for that amount of damages. The issue before the High Court was that Dildar claimed that four pleas which were contained in Nolans’ points of defence (paras. 10, 25(d), 25(b)(8) and 43) were irrelevant or that they related to issues which were dealt with in a trial before McDonald J and so should be struck out.

Held by Twomey J that, having considered the conflicting claims that surrounded the ownership of the Nemo Rangers property (the site) and of the corporate owner of the site, the Court could not say that it was ‘clear’ that the pleading in para. 10 was irrelevant and that it should be struck out. Regarding the pleading in para. 25(d) alleging that Dildar was involved in unlawful acts as part of the transaction involving the site and that any damages should reflect that fact (reference having been made to the wrongful actions of Mr Millett and Mr Desmond), since Mr Millett and Mr Desmond were agents of the Kenny family and/or Dildar, the Court could not say that it was ‘clear’ that the pleading regarding the illegality of those actions and their impact upon an assessment of damages was irrelevant and that it should be struck out. In light of the unusual and conflicting facts surrounding the beneficial ownership of the site, the beneficial ownership of the corporate entity holding title, the conflicting planning applications and the claims of ownership made by the Kenny family, the Court could not say that it was ‘clear’ that the pleading at para. 25(b)(8), regarding whether Dildar IOM would have got funding in the context of the financial track record of the Kenny family with NAMA, was irrelevant. Regarding the pleading at para. 43, Twomey J held that just because a finding is made by a judge in a previous case does not mean that finding is not relevant in a later case, and in this instance relevant to an assessment of damages in favour of a party who was alleged to have been the principal and/or the beneficiary of the wrongful actions of an agent.

Twomey J found that it was not clear that any of the disputed pleas were irrelevant or otherwise not permitted, and so the Court refused to strike them out.

Application refused.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Michael Twomey delivered on the 29 ^th day of October, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1 The first defendant (“ Dildar IOM”) and the seventh defendant (“ Dildar Ireland”), which for ease of reference are referred collectively as “ Dildar”, are seeking an order under Order 19 Rule 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts striking out various pleas made by the plaintiffs (the “ Nolans”). The pleas are contained in the Nolans' Points of Defence in response to Dildar's Points of Claim. These pleadings relate to a court-ordered inquiry into the amount of damages to be paid to Dildar, which inquiry is to be held at a future date by the High Court.

2 The Points of Claim were issued by Dildar arising from the decision of McDonald J. in Nolan & Ors v Dildar & Ors [2024] IEHC 4 and his Order dated 20 February 2024, which decision was upheld in its entirety by the Court of Appeal ( Nolan & Ors v Dildar & Ors [2024] IECA 298). Definitions used in this judgment have the same meaning as those in McDonald J.'s judgment, unless the context otherwise requires.

3 The background to this matter is that an interlocutory injunction had been granted to the Nolans on 26 July 2017 pending the trial of the action, which trial commenced on 3 May 2022. The injunction restrained Dildar IOM, the legal owner of the Nemo Rangers property (the “ Site”), from disposing of those lands.

4 At the end of a very long and exceptionally complicated litigation (as evidenced by the fact that it involved a staggering 69 interlocutory orders before the trial even commenced), McDonald J. delivered a detailed and comprehensive judgment on 10 January 2024. In that judgment, McDonald J. discharged the interlocutory injunction, and he ordered an inquiry into the damages sustained by Dildar. The entitlement to damages arises because of the undertaking which had been given by the Nolans in order to secure that injunction. In that undertaking the Nolans undertook to be liable for any damages suffered by Dildar, in the event that at the trial of the action it transpired that the interlocutory injunction should not have been granted, which is what occurred.

5 Thus, the effect of McDonald J.'s judgment is that there has to be an inquiry into the level of damages the Nolans must pay Dildar for the loss suffered by Dildar IOM in not being able to sell or develop the property between 26 July 2017 (when the injunction was granted) and 20 February 2024 (when the Order, providing for the lifting of the injunction, was perfected).

6 The Points of Claim issued by the Dildar outline the basis for its claim that it should be paid €20,822,000 in damages. The Points of Defence issued by the Nolans dispute the basis for Dildar's claim for this amount of damages.

7 The issue before this Court is that Dildar claims that four pleas which are contained in Nolans' Points of Defence are irrelevant or that they relate to issues which were dealt with in the trial before McDonald J. and so should be struck out.

8 In the application before this Court, the Nolans point out that the lands were purchased in September 2013 for €2,828,192.79 with a view to being developed into housing. However, they completely reject Dildar's claim that Dildar has lost anything close to €20,822,000 by not being allowed to develop the lands during the relevant period, particularly when the price of property has risen considerably in that period and when Dildar's own experts say that it would have cost €50,056,814 to develop the Site.

9 More specifically, the Nolans say that the disputed pleas in the Points of Defence are highly relevant to the likelihood of Dildar IOM getting funding and so being able to develop the Site in the first place. They also claim that, insofar as some of the issues raised in their pleas (regarding the unlawful actions of agents acting for the defendants) were dealt with at the trial, that does not mean that those issues are not relevant to any inquiry into what was the actual loss suffered by Dildar.

THE LAW APPLICABLE TO STRIKING OUT PLEADINGS

10 In determining whether to strike out pleadings, it is clear from the judgment of Clarke J. in Ryanair v Bravofly [2009] IEHC 41 at para. 5.2 that:

‘A court should not lightly exclude matters from pleadings where there is at least some reasonable possibility that the material pleaded could be relevant. Matters should only be excluded where it is clear that such pleading is irrelevant.’

11 The pleas which are sought to be struck out in this case relate to the enforcement of an undertaking. For this reason, it is also relevant to note that in Caldwell v Tracey [2010] IEHC 533at para. 37 Laffoy J. quoted from Lloyd L.J.'s judgment in Financiera Avenida SA v. Shiblaq [1991] TLR 3. She quoted the following extract:

‘Two questions arise whenever there is an application by a defendant to enforce a cross-undertaking in damages. The first question is whether the undertaking ought to be enforced at all. This depends on the circumstances in which the injunction was obtained, the success or otherwise of the plaintiff at the trial, the subsequent conduct of the defendant and all the other circumstances of the case. It is essentially a question of discretion. The discretion is usually exercised by the trial judge since he is bound to know more of the facts of the case than anyone else.

If the first question is answered in favour of the defendant, the second question is whether the defendant has suffered any damage by reason of the granting of the injunction.’ (Emphasis added)

Thus, when this Court is considering whether to strike out pleas on the basis that they are, or are not, relevant to the assessment of damages, that relevance is determined by all the circumstances of the case. Having made that determination, it should only strike them out if it is clear that they are not relevant.

The trial judge is normally the judge doing the assessment of damages

12 There is another point which is important to bear in mind, which is clear from the Financiera case. It is that, as noted by Lloyd L.J., the trial judge who heard all the evidence in a case is normally the one deciding on the level of damages to be paid (as a result of an undertaking as to damages) and indeed would normally be the one deciding whether pleas are relevant or not to that decision on the level of damages.

13 However, in...