Ononkewagbe v Governor of the Dochas Centre
 IEHC 243
THE HIGH COURT
[2016 No. 846 S.S.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION AND IN THE MATTER OF AN ENQUIRY PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Constitution – Art. 40 of the Constitution – S. 5 of the Immigration Act, 1999 – Non-compliance with deportation orders – Imprisonment – Award of costs – s. 14 (2) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 – O. 99 of the Rules of Superior Courts – Departure from rule
The Applicants are foreign aliens who had been the subject matter of deportation orders dated 28th November, 2008, which were not complied with. Ultimately, on 26th July, 2016, the first Applicant was arrested in her home at the Mosney Accommodation Centre, County Meath pursuant to s. 5 of the Immigration Act, 1999 as substituted and amended by s. 78 of the International Protection Act, 2015 for the purposes of giving effect to the deportation orders. The first Applicant packed bags for herself and her daughter, the second Applicant. She complied with her mother's requests to get dressed and go with her to Dublin Airport. Shortly before the time for boarding the aircraft on which they were to be flown out of the State the Applicants were requested to board the plane, however, they refused to cooperate further with the deportation process as a consequence of which the first Applicant was arrested and incarcerated in the Dochas Centre at Mountjoy and the second Applicant was taken into care by the second Respondent.
It was against this background that the Applicants instituted these proceedings under Article 40 of the Constitution for an enquiry into the lawfulness of their detention and in respect of which the judgment of the Court was delivered on 10th August, 2016, on foot of which the detention of the Applicants was found to be lawful.
Each of the parties have sought orders for their costs in respect of which written and oral submissions have been made and considered by the Court. It is not considered necessary to repeat or summarise these for the purposes of this judgment. Suffice it to say that the Respondents point of departure on their applications was that having regard to the well settled principles applicable to the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction to make an award for the costs of the proceedings there were no good or sufficient reasons or special circumstances which would warrant a departure by the Court from the general rule that costs should follow the event.
Additionally, the Respondents contend that as the Applicants chose not to apply at the commencement of the proceedings for legal aid under the Custody Issues Scheme for which, given the nature of the proceedings and their limited financial circumstances, it is likely they would have qualified, they ran the risk that in the event they were unsuccessful they would be exposed to costs orders in favour of the Respondents in addition to having to meet their own costs whereas under the Scheme such risk would have been avoided.
The kernel of the central controversy between the parties is concerned with whether or not there are special circumstances or factors in this case which warrant the Court in departing from the ordinary rule that costs follow the event.
Not surprisingly the Applicants take issue with the submissions of the Respondents and in their turn submit that there are such special circumstances in this case, that these are evident from the judgment delivered by the Court and that they found the basis upon which the Court's discretion could and should be exercised by making an award for some or all of their costs.
The jurisdiction of the Court to make an order for costs in civil proceedings is to be found in s. 14 (2) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961, the Civil Liability and Courts Acts and in the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986, as amended. Order 99 Rule (1) (4) of the RSC provides that costs shall follow the event unless the Court orders otherwise, accordingly, the provision recognises that the Court retains a discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction which in turn is governed by what are now well established principles.
Having regard to the authorities opened to the Court on the subject I see no reason to depart from the view of the law concerning the ambit of the discretion which I expressed in The Minister for Health , where at para. 5 of the judgment it is stated:
'There is no hard and fixed rule or principle which determines the ambit of the Court's discretion and in particular there is no overriding principle which directs that it must be exercised in favour of an...
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