P.P. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Another, v.S. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Another

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Alexander Owens
• Judgment Date: 04 March 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 134
• Docket Number: [2023 No. 981 JR]

Between:

P. P.

Applicant

and

The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and The Minister for Justice

Respondents

Between:

V. S.

Applicant

and

The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and The Minister for Justice

Respondents

[2025] IEHC 134

[2023 No. 981 JR]

[2023 No. 982 JR]

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

International protection – Judicial review – Risk of suffering serious harm – Applicants seeking international protection – Whether the first respondent erred in law in the manner in which it determined that the applicants had not submitted any serious grounds for considering Georgia not to be a safe country of origin

Facts: The applicants, Georgian nationals, left Georgia and came to Ireland. When they arrived in Ireland they applied for international protection. The first respondent, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), concluded that the applicants were not refugees or entitled to subsidiary protection and that there were not substantial grounds for believing that if they were returned to Georgia they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm. The applicants complained that the Tribunal’s decisions were inadequately reasoned and did not conform with judicial guidance set out in N.U. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 87. The applicants applied to the High Court for judicial review. The applications raised an issue of whether the Tribunal erred in law in the manner in which it determined that they had “not submitted any serious grounds for considering [Georgia] not to be a safe country of origin in [their] particular circumstances and in terms of [their] eligibility for international protection”.

Held by Owens J that he was obliged to conduct a thorough review of the reasons which led the Tribunal to reject the applications as unfounded, citing Hogan J in R.A. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297 at para. 63 and Phelan J in E.S. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 613 at para. 35. Owens J rejected a submission that the Tribunal was not entitled to consider whether or not the applicants had sufficiently demonstrated that Georgia did not provide adequate protection to them in making those determinations. Owens J held that the Tribunal was obliged to explain why it decided that claims by the applicants that police in Georgia operated in collusion with gangs of money-lending extortionists were not “serious grounds for considering” that Georgia was not “safe” for them; it did not provide a reasoned conclusion on that issue. Owens J held that the Tribunal erred by omitting to demonstrate in its reasoning that it gave due consideration to whether allegations by the applicants of police collusion with extortion gangs provided “any serious grounds for considering”, and also by treating those allegations as unsubstantiated in the case of the applicant in the proceedings bearing record number 2023 982 JR because she did not point to any specific corrupt relationship between her extortionists and local police.

Owens J held that the decisions would be set aside and that the applications of the applicants for international protection declarations would be remitted for reconsideration.

Applications granted.

JUDGMENT of The Hon. Mr. Justice Alexander Owens delivered on the 4th day March 2025

1 These applications for judicial review raise an issue of whether the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) erred in law in the manner in which determined that P.P. and V.S. had “ not submitted any serious grounds for considering [Georgia] not to be a safe country of origin in [their] particular circumstances and in terms of [their] eligibility for international protection.” As a result of these determinations, the Tribunal refused to recommend that P.P. and V.S. be given international protection declarations.

2 I am satisfied that P.P. and V.S. have provided good and sufficient reasons to justify me in extending the period for bringing these applications.

3 I reject a submission that the Tribunal was not entitled to consider whether or not P.P. and V.S. had sufficiently demonstrated that Georgia did not provide adequate protection to them in making these determinations.

4 The Tribunal was obliged to explain why it decided that claims by P.P. and V.S. that police in Georgia operated in collusion with gangs of money-lending extortionists were not “ serious grounds for considering” that Georgia was not “ safe” for them. It did not provide a reasoned conclusion on this issue.

5 It follows that these decisions will be set aside and that the applications of P.P. and V.S. for international protection declarations will be remitted for reconsideration.

6 I am treating this ground as within the first sentence of para. 2 (a) of the grounds on which P.P. and V.S. were given leave to apply for judicial review.

7 A publication of the UNHCR entitled “ Background Note on Safe Country Concept and Refugee Status” provides useful guidance on the safe country concept in international protection. The UN Refugee Agency expresses a concern that this concept can be misused to raise “ a presumption of non-refugee status which they must, with difficulty, rebut.” A further concern arises where this concept “ is applied, in effect as an automatic bar to refugee status, without resort to procedures. Where, however, an eligibility procedure still applies and where the concept is used in a procedural sense to assign certain applications to expedited or accelerated procedures (e.g. for manifestly unfounded cases), or where its use has an evidentiary function. For example, giving rise to a presumption of non-status rebuttable in eligibility procedures, the above concerns are much diminished.”

8 Provisions in directives of the European Union and Irish legislation giving domestic effect to those directives have been framed in light of these concerns. These provisions restrict the circumstances in which the so-called presumption that a designated safe country of origin is safe can apply.

9 This presumption only applies where, on examination, an application for protection discloses absence of serious grounds for considering that the country of origin is unsafe for that applicant in context of that applicant's eligibility for protection.

10 Section 33 of the International Protection Act 2015 (the 2015 Act) provides as follows: “A country that has been designated under section 72 as a safe country of origin shall, for the purposes of the assessment of an application for international protection, be considered to be a safe country of origin in relation to a particular applicant only where— (a) the country is the country of origin of the applicant, and (b) the applicant has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his or her particular circumstances and in terms of his or her eligibility for international protection.”

11 Section 33 of the 2015 Act transposes para. 1 of Article 31 of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (the Asylum Procedures Directive) into Irish law. The three final words of s.33 extend the safe country of origin rules to applications for subsidiary protection.

12 Recital (21) of the Asylum Procedures Directive states as follows:

“ The designation of a third country as a safe country of origin for the purposes of this Directive cannot establish an absolute guarantee of safety for nationals of that country. By its very nature, the assessment underlying the designation can only take into account the general civil, legal and political circumstances in that country and whether actors of persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are subject to sanction in practice when found liable in the country concerned. For this reason, it is important that, where an applicant shows that there are serious reasons to consider the country not to be safe in his/her particular circumstances, the designation of the country as safe can no longer be considered relevant for him/her.”

13 Article 31 of the Asylum Procedures Directive provides as follows:

“1. A third country designated as a safe country of origin in accordance with either Article 29 or 30 may, after an individual examination of the application, be considered as a safe country of origin for a particular applicant for asylum only if:

(a) He /she has the nationality of that country; or

(b) He/she is a stateless person and was formerly habitually resident in that country;

and he/she has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his/her particular circumstances and in terms of his/her qualification as a refugee in accordance with Directive 2004/83/EC.

2. Member States shall, in accordance with paragraph 1, consider the application for asylum as unfounded where the third country is designated as safe pursuant to Article 29.

3. Member States shall lay down in national legislation further rules and modalities for the application of the safe country of origin concept.”

14 Paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the Asylum Procedures Directive refers to Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (the Asylum Qualification Directive). It follows that s.33 of the 2015 Act must be interpreted in light of any relevant provisions of the Asylum Qualification Directive and in a manner consistent with Article 31 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.

15 The effect of s.33 of the 2015 Act on applications for...