P S v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)
• Judge: Ms Justice Costello
• Judgment Date: 26 August 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] IECA 184
• Docket Number: [2026 No. 178]

Between

P. S.

Applicant/Appellant

and

The International Protection Appeals Tribunal, The Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration, Ireland and The Attorney General

Repsondents

[2026] IECA 184

The President

[2026 No. 178]

[JR 2025 No 1303]

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

[approved]

[no redaction needed]

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Costello delivered on the 26 ^th day of August 2026

1 . The appellant's application for judicial review was dismissed by the High Court (O'Regan J) in a reserved judgment of 27 ^th April 2026 ( [2026] IEHC 238). The appellant has appealed and, pending the determination of the appeal, he seeks an interlocutory injunction restraining the second named respondent (“the Minister”) from taking any steps to deport the appellant to his country of origin, Georgia.

Principles Applicable

2 . Before considering the facts and arguments in this case, it is useful to set them in the context of the applicable principles. As is well known and accepted, the principles to be applied whether to grant a stay or an interlocutory injunction, in the context of judicial review proceedings (particularly in the area of immigration cases generally) were set out by Clarke J (as he then was) in Okunade v Minister for Justice [2012] 3 IR 152 at para. 104 as follows:

“(a) the court should first determine whether the applicant has established an arguable case; if not the application must be refused, but if so then;

(b) the court should consider where the greatest risk of injustice would lie. But in doing so the court should:-

(i) give all appropriate weight to the orderly implementation of measures which are prima facie valid;

(ii) give such weight as may be appropriate (if any) to any public interest in the orderly operation of the particular scheme in which the measure under challenge was made; and

(iii) give appropriate weight (if any) to any additional factors arising on the facts of the individual case which would heighten the risk to the public interest of the specific measure under challenge not being implemented pending resolution of the proceedings;

but also,

(iv) give all due weight to the consequences for the applicant of being required to comply with the measure under challenge in circumstances where that measure may be found to be unlawful.

(c) in addition, the court should, in those limited cases where it may be relevant, have regard to whether damages are available and would be an adequate remedy and also whether damages could be an adequate remedy arising from an undertaking as to damages; and,

(d) in addition, and subject to the issues arising on the judicial review not involving detailed investigation of fact or complex questions of law, the court can place all due weight on the strength or weakness of the applicant's case.”

3 . Clarke J went on to emphasize that “ significant weight needs to be attached to the implementation of decisions made in the immigration process which are prima facie valid” and noted that there is “a high weight on the need to respect orders and decisions made [in the immigration and asylum process] unless and until they are found to be unlawful”. At para. 110, he observed:

“ The default position is, therefore, that an applicant will not be entitled to a stay or an injunction. However, it may be that, on the facts of any individual case, there are further factors that can properly be taken into account on either side.”

4 . Thus, the onus is on the applicant to establish factors which can tilt the balance in favour of the stay or injunction sought. Of particular relevance, of course, is the risk to which an applicant may be exposed by reason of a deportation order. This was addressed at paras. 111–112 by Clarke J as follows:

“… if an applicant can demonstrate that deportation, even on a temporary basis, would cause more than what one might describe as the ordinary disruption in being removed from a country in which the relevant applicant wished to live, such as a particular risk to the individual or a specific risk of irremediable damage then such factors, if sufficiently weighty, could readily tilt the balance in favour of the grant of an injunction or a stay.

…

the right to be protected from being deported to a situation where one is placed in significant danger is an important or fundamental right can hardly be doubted. However, regard has to be had, on the facts of any individual case, to the basis put forward for the suggestion that there is a real risk of harm should the person concerned be deported. Where, as will frequently be the case, such a person has had the opportunity to have the facts underlying their claim to such a risk analysed by a series of administrative and judicial bodies, then the court will, as the trial judge in this case was, be in a much better position to form a judgment on the question of whether there is a real risk of serious harm should a deportation order be implemented.”

5 . Clarke J said that the question for determination is whether there is a “ credible basis for suggesting that a real risk of significant harm would attach to the applicant on deportation”. If that is the case, then “ it would require very weighty considerations indeed to displace the balance of justice on the facts of that case”.

6 . In CC v Minister for Justice [2016] 2 IR 680, the Supreme Court held that the principles in Okunade apply to applications for a stay or an injunction pending the hearing of an appeal.

7 . Section 33 of the International Protection Act 2015 provides:

“ 33. A country that has been designated under section 72 as a safe country of origin shall, for the purposes of the assessment of an application for international protection, be considered to be a safe country of origin in relation to a particular applicant only where –

• (a) the country is the country of origin of the applicant, and

• (b) the applicant has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his or her particular circumstances and in terms of his or her eligibility for international protection.”

Georgia has been designated as a safe country of origin by the Minister under s. 72 of the Act of 2015.

Chronology of the appellant's case

8 . 2011: The appellant joined the Georgian Armed Forces, and after six months training, he became a member of the Special Forces.

28th to 29th August 2012: Lopota Valley incident near the Georgian/Russian Federation Border involving Chechens. The appellant is one of the Georgian solders and he is pictured carrying a body, thus revealing his involvement in the incident.

2012 to 2022: The appellant served in the Georgian Armed Forces between 2011 and 2022, and in his spare time, cultivated his small farm in the border region of Russian occupied Georgia.

2013: Videos of the soldiers involved in the Lopota Valley incident, showing the appellant, are released by the Georgian government and circulate on social media.

November 2020: Three soldiers attempt to kidnap him on his farm near the border.

Spring 2021: There is a further attempt to kidnap the appellant on his farm.

May or June 2021: The appellant is the subject of an attempted honeytrap by a Russian woman in a local bar.

September and December 2021: The appellant is followed on two occasions driving home.

March 2022: The appellant left Georgia and travelled to Ireland via Poland, Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom.

11 ^th April 2022: The appellant applied for international protection (“IP”) and completed his first questionnaire.

November 2022: Appellant interviewed by IP officer.

January 2023: Appellant reinterviewed by IP officer.

11 ^th January 2023: International Protection Office (“IPO”) denied the appellant international protection or subsidiary protection.

10 ^th March 2023: Section 49 report issued.

14 ^th March 2023: Section 49 report given to the appellant.

2023: Appellant appeals the decision of the IPO to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT”).

18 ^th July 2023: Oral hearing by IPAT of his appeal.

26 ^th July 2023: IPAT affirms the decision of IPO.

19 ^th March 2024: The appellant was refused permission to remain and was given the option of voluntarily returning to Georgia.

2 ^nd May 2024: The Minister issued a letter enclosing a Deportation Order and a Section 50 Report.

2024: Appellant made an application pursuant to s. 22 of the 2015 Act to renew his application, on the basis of new evidence/information relating to events in Georgia occurring after his departure.

24 ^th September 2024: Appellant's s. 22 application granted.

27 ^th December 2024: Appellant re-entered the international protection process and completed a second international protection Questionnaire.

10 ^th January 2025: The Minister issues a Revocation of Deportation Order, pursuant to s. 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999 revoking the order of 2 ^nd May 2024.

4 ^th April 2025: Appellant interviewed by the IPO for the third time.

9 ^th May 2025: Decision of IPO to decline to grant him protection issued, pursuant to s. 39 of the Act of 2015.

1 ^st July 2025: Letter enclosing Section 49 Report, dated 6 ^th June 2025, furnished to appellant.

8 ^th July 2025: Appellant applies for legal aid to appeal the decision of the IPO.

14 ^th July 2025: Appellant informed of the name of the solicitor assigned to represent him under the Legal Aid Board Scheme.

15 ^th July 2025: Appellant attended the office of this solicitor. They had a disagreement and in the event the solicitor did not act for the appellant.

28 ^th July 2025: Appellant attended and instructed his current solicitor on a private basis.

30 ^th July 2025: The solicitor lodged an application for an extension of time within which to appeal, under the provisions of Regulation 4(5) of the 2017 Regulations.

31 ^st July 2025: Application to extend time refused by IPAT.

27 ^th August 2025: A letter...