People (Attorney General) v McGlynn

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Supreme Court
• Judgment Date: 24 July 1967
• Date: 24 July 1967

The People (Attorney General) v. McGlynn.

THE PEOPLE (At the Suit of THE ATTORNEY GENERAL)

and

MICHAEL McGLYNN (1)

Supreme Court.

Constitution of Ireland - Case Stated - Consultative case stated under statute by judge for determination of a question of law by the Supreme Court - Whether statute repugnant to Constitution - Statute - Interpretation - Whether enactment authorised consultative case to be stated during course of criminal trial by jury - Courts of Justice Act, 1947 (No. 20 of 1947), s. 16 - Constitution of Ireland, Article 34, section 4, sub-s. 3.

The accused was charged in the Circuit Court with having committed certain criminal offences and he pleaded not guilty to the charges. A jury was empanelled to try the issues and tho accused was given in charge of the jury. At the conclusion of the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution and of the accused, and before the jury's verdict, the Circuit judge stated a consultative case under s. 16 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1947, referring a question of law to the Supreme Court for its determination, and directed that the prosecution should bear the costs of the case stated. Sect. 16 of the Act of 1947 empowers the Circuit judge to state such case in certain matters "pending before him."At the hearing of the case the Supreme Court raised the question of whether or not s. 16 of the Act of 1947 was repugnant to the provisions of Article 34, section 4, sub-s. 3, of the Constitution which state that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction (subject as therein) from all decisions of the High Court and from decisions of other courts as may be prescribed by law.

Held by the Supreme Court ( Ó Dálaigh ó dálaigh C.J., Haugh, Walsh Budd and FitzGerald JJ.), 1, that the provisions of s. 16 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1947, were not repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution.

2. That the Court must decline to entertain the case stated, as s. 16 of the Act of 1947 did not confer jurisdiction on the Circuit judge to state such case (or to make the costs order) during a criminal trial by jury after the accused had been given in charge of the jury and before the jury had delivered their verdict.

Case Stated.

On the 16th July, 1966, the President of the Circuit Court referred, by Case Stated, a question of law to the Supreme Court for determination under s. 16 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1947. The case was in the following terms:—

"I, Barra Ó Briain ó briain, President of the Circuit Court and the Judge thereof duly assigned to the South-Western Circuit, do hereby refer, under and by virtue of Section 16 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1947, and in pursuance of an application in that behalf made by Counsel for the accused prior to my charging the jury, by way of Case Stated, for the determination of the Supreme Court the questions of law hereinafter set out:—

1. Michael McGlynn, the accused in the title hereof, was duly arraigned before me, sitting at Killarney in the County of Kerry on the 16th day of June, 1966, on the following charges:—

First Count:—Possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life contrary to Section 15 of the Firearms Act, 1925.

Particulars:—Michael McGlynn on the 6th day of August, 1965, in the County of Kerry had in his possession a firearm, to wit, a double-barrelled breachloading shotgun and ten cartridges for the same with intent to endanger life.

Second Count:—Possession of firearms contrary to Section 2 of the Firearms Act, 1925.

Particulars:—Michael McGlynn on the 6th day of August, 1965, in the County of Kerry had in his possession a firearm, to wit, a double-barrelled breachloading shotgun and ten cartridges for the same without holding a firearm certificate therefor.

Third Count:—Garage breaking and larceny contrary to Section 26 (1) of the Larceny Act, 1916.

Particulars:—Michael McGlynn on the 31st day of July, 1965, at Castleisland in the County of Kerry, broke and entered the garage of P. McElligott & Sons, Limited, and stole two gallons of petrol and a padlock, the property of the said P. McElligott & Sons, Limited, in the said garage.

Fourth Count:—Housebreaking and larceny contrary to Section 26 (1) of the Larceny Act, 1916.

Particulars:—Michael McGlynn between the 1st day of August, 1965, and the 6th day of August, 1965, at Mallow in the County of Cork, broke and entered the dwellinghouse of the Reverend Frederick H. Garrett and stole a shotgun, 12 cartridges, 30 rounds of .22 ammunition, a safety razor two safety-razor blades, a quarter ounce of cigarette tobacco and four shillings in cash, all to the total value of £31 2s. 4d., the property of the said Reverend Frederick H. Garrett in the said dwellinghouse.

2. The said Michael McGlynn having pleaded "Not Guilty"to all the said counts, a jury was empanelled to try the case and the accused was duly given in charge.

3. The prosecution, having called all their witnesses, closed their case. The only witness called by the defence was a qualified psychiatrist. He was examined and cross-examined, but no objection was taken to the admission of his evidence or any part thereof. The defence closed their case.

4. Counsel for the accused (before he addressed the jury) asked me to rule that the McNaughton Rules do not now set out fully and adequately the law applicable to the defence of insanity made by the accused in this case. He submitted that I should direct, and that he might address, the jury on the basis of the principles set out in a recent judgment of the United States Federal Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) and delivered by Federal Judge Irving R. Kaufman in the case of The People v. Freeman on 28th February, 1966. Counsel for the prosecution submitted that the accused must be presumed to have been sane from the 31st July to the 6th August, 1965, unless he could bring himself within the McNaughton Rules.

5. I inclined to the view that decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal and the rulings and practice of the Central Criminal Court and of the Circuit Court bound me to hold that the McNaughton Rules state fully the legal principles at present applicable to the defence of the accused. If I did not feel so bound I would charge the jury, and permit Counsel to address the jury in this case, to the effect that the law is in harmony with modern medical science and in general on the principles adumbrated in the judgment in the Freeman Case,as quoted to me.

6. Counsel for the accused, in these circumstances, applied to me to refer these questions to the Supreme Court by way of Case Stated pursuant to Section 16 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1947. Counsel for the prosecution submitted that this application at that stage was either premature or late. He furthermore argued that I did not have jurisdiction to refer these questions, in this case, to the Supreme Court.

7. It being my opinion that I had such jurisdiction and that the questions of law involved were of considerable public importance, I granted the application of the defence and adjourned the further hearing of this trial to the Michaelmas Sittings to be held on 22nd November next before me at Killarney. I did so on the terms that the costs of this Case Stated shall be borne by the prosecution in any event.

8. Notes of the evidence, submissions of counsel, and my rulings are set out in the appendix hereunder and form part of this Case Stated.

The questions of law which I refer for the determination of the Supreme Court in this Case Stated are:—

(a) Whether, at a trial upon indictment in which the issue is properly raised by the defence that the accused is not responsible by reason of his having been insane at the time the crime, or crimes, charged were alleged to have been committed, it is appropriate and sufficient for the trial judge to direct and instruct the jury in the terms of the answers of the judges in McNaughton's Case.

(b) If the answer to Question (b) be in the negative, what are the principles of law which I, as the trial judge in this case, should now state for the instruction and guidance of the jury, as being applicable to the issue of insanity raised in defence of the accused?

This 16th day of June, 1966.

Signed:—Barra Ó Briain ó briain,

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