People v Douglas
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | McWilliam J. |
| Judgment Date | 01 January 1985 |
| Neutral Citation | 1984 WJSC-CCA 1161 |
| Court | Court of Criminal Appeal |
| Date | 01 January 1985 |
1984 WJSC-HC 1161
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice McWilliam
Mr. Justice Barron
Subject Headings:
EVIDENCE: mens rea
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT delivered on the 21st day of May1984by McWilliam J.
On 11th March, 1983 the Appellants were convicted in the Special Criminal Court of shooting with intent to commit murder contrary to section 14 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. They were also convicted of robbery, possession of firearms with intent to endanger life and using firearms for the purpose of resisting arrest, but this appeal only relates to the conviction on the charge of shooting with intent to commit murder.
It was argued on behalf of the Appellants that it was necessary for the prosecution to establish an intention on their part to commit murder and it was submitted that passages in thejudgment of the Special Criminal Court show that that Court did not consider the matter on a proper basis. It was submitted that the Court placed reliance on the following propositions, that is to say:- (1) if someone had actually been killed, the Appellants would have been guilty of murder and, therefore, were guilty of an intent to murder; (2) that it was sufficient to establish an intent to murder to show that it must have been apparent to the Appellants that the natural consequence of the shooting would be to cause the death or serious personal injury of one or more of the guards; (3) that an act done with reckless disregard of the risk of killing is done with intent to murder; (4) that it is not necessary to establish an intent to kill that that should be the desired outcome of what was done but that it is sufficient if it is a likely outcome; and (5) that the act was done with reckless disregard of thatoutcome.
The complete passage of the judgment on which this submission is based is as follows:- The evidence shows that fire was opened on the Garda Renault car before it had stopped and three shots struck the front part of the car, shots any one of which, two of which at least with a slight variation of aim,might have killed the driver of the car. We are satisfied that those who fired these shots would have been guilty of the crime of murder had any member of the Gardai who were in the car been in fact killed. There is no doubt in our mind that these were aimed shots. The charge of shooting with intent to commit murder is satisfied when the shots were fired with that intent because it must have been apparent that the natural consequence of the shooting would be to cause death or serious personal injury to one or more of the guards in the car and secondly, the person who fired the shots did so with reckless disregard of the risk of killing a guard and in the legal sense, he had the intent to commit murder. It is not necessary to constitute the intent to kill that that should be the desired outcome of what was done. It is sufficient if it is a likely outcome and that the act is done with reckless disregard of that outcome.
Section 14 of the Act of 1861 provides as follows:
"Whosoever ......... shall shoot at any person ....... with tent to commit murder shall, whether any bodily injury be effected or not, be guilty of a felony."
Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1964, provides asfollows:-
(1) Where a person kills another unlawfully the killing shall not be murder unless the accused person intended to kill, or cause serious injury to, some person, whether the person actually killed or not.
(2) The accused person shall be presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his conduct; but this presumption may be rebutted.
In each case intent is a necessary constituent of the offence, but section 14 provides that there must be an intent to commit murder whereas section 4 provides that it is sufficient if there is an intent to cause serious injury.
This leads to an anomalous situation which has been discussed in a number of English cases, in that where a person shoots at another intending to cause only serious injury to that other person and that other person dies the offence of murder has been committed, whereas, if that other person does not die, the offence of shooting with intent to commit murder has not been committed. See Rex v. Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 141; Reg. .v. Mohan 60 Cr. App. R. 272, (1975) 2 W.L.R.859.
Anomalous or not, the words of section 14 "shoot at a personwith intent to commit murder" specifically require proof of an...
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