Permanent TSB Plc formerly Irish Life and Permanent Plc v Walsh
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr Justice Max Barrett |
| Judgment Date | 31 January 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] IEHC 45 |
| Docket Number | RECORD NO. 2018/15CA |
| Court | High Court |
| Date | 31 January 2019 |
[2019] IEHC 45
THE HIGH COURT
Barrett J.
RECORD NO. 2018/15CA
Banking and finance – Possession order – Promissory estoppel – Defendant seeking to appeal against possession order – Whether agreement was reached whereby payment of €18,604 would extinguish the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff in respect of the loans in issue
Facts: The Circuit Court, on 18.01.2018, granted a possession order in respect of the County Dublin home of the defendant, Mr Walsh. He appealed to the High Court against same. An event of significance to these proceedings was a meeting that took place in March 2012, at a hotel in Bray, between Mr Walsh and a Mr Keenan of the plaintiff, Permanent TSB. Mr Keenan brought to that meeting a form which, Mr Walsh averred, “[Mr Keenan] informed me summarised…my indebtedness to the bank”. The form clearly indicated that the amount outstanding on both accounts was €18,604. The plaintiff claimed that the form referred only to the €38,000 loan account. At issue was whether agreement was reached at the meeting whereby payment of €18,604 would extinguish Mr Walsh’s liability to Permanent TSB in respect of the loans in issue. Mr Walsh averred that “it was…stated to me by Mr Keenan that nothing further would happen if I paid the €18,604”. In his later affidavit evidence, Mr Walsh averred that “[T]here is objective evidence of such an agreement in the clear and unambiguous terms of document drafted by the Mortgage Manager of the Plaintiff Bank [i.e. Mr Keenan]; the repayments made on a monthly basis [after the meeting] in the sum of €453.21, the listing of two account numbers; and the ‘Outstanding Mortgage Balance’ of €18,604.00 which was fully paid”. Mr Walsh’s own later letters to the plaintiff were not consistent with his contention that the alleged agreement was concluded.
Held by Barrett J that, supposing there was an agreement between the plaintiff and Mr Walsh whereby the plaintiff agreed it would take less than was owing to it in settlement of the liabilities outstanding between it and Mr Walsh, the plaintiff rightly contended that thanks to Pinnel’s Case (1602) 5 Co. rep. 117a any such agreement (which the plaintiff denied) would be unenforceable. Barrett J held that the effect of Pinnel’s Case was that if a liquidated sum is owed by A to B, a promise by B to take a lesser sum in satisfaction of the larger debt will not bind B; that this is the position at law greatly undermined Mr Walsh’s case. Concerning the possibility of promissory estoppel, the court recalled Griffin J’s observation in Doran v Thompson [1978] I.R. 223, 230 that “Where one party has, by…words or conduct, made to the other a clear and unambiguous promise or assurance…intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on…and the other party has acted on it by altering his position to his detriment, it is well settled that the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to their previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made”. The court did not consider that the existence of the requisite “clear and unambiguous promise” had been established. Barrett J held that even if it had been, the loan was to reduce Mr Walsh’s outgoings generally and there was nothing to indicate that this was not going to be done in any event; if it reduced outgoing payments, benefitting Mr Walsh financially, the court struggled in any event to see how detriment presented.
Barrett J held that the court would not interfere with the Circuit Court decision.
Appeal dismissed.
By amended civil bill dated 22.12.2014, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, as follows:
By letter dated 29 May 2001, the Plaintiff agreed to make a loan facility available to the Defendant….
2.2 On or about 11 July 2001, the Defendant acknowledged in writing…acceptance of the Plaintiff's letter of approval.
2.3 On or about 15 August 2001 the sum of £150,000…was advanced by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in pursuance of the letter of approval and the General Mortgage Loan Approval conditions.
2.4 By way of security…the Plaintiff relies on the deed of mortgage and charge executed by the Defendant on 18 November 1991 (“the Mortgage”) over ALL THAT AND THOSE…(“the Mortgaged Property”)….
2.6 In breach of the terms of the Mortgage and of the letter of approval and the General Mortgage Loan Approval conditions: (i) on or about 09 September 2009 and on various dates thereafter, the Defendants failed to make repayments of principal and/or interest as they fell due; (ii) the Defendant defaulted in making payment of the monthly principal and/or interest, with the arrears amounting to €125,989.40 as at 09 December 2014; (iii)...
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