Quinn v Burke

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: K. B. Div.
• Judgment Date: 28 June 1905
• Court: King's Bench Division (Ireland)
• Date: 28 June 1905

Quinn

and

Burke (1).

K. B. Div.

CASES

DETERMINED BY

THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION

OF

THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN IRELAND,

AND ON APPEAL THEREFROM IN

THE COURT OF APPEAL,

AND BY

THE COURT FOR CROWN CASES RESERVED.

1906.

Licensing law — Licensing (Ireland) Act, 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c. 18), sect. 2, sub-sect. 2 — Hotel — Right of sale to the public — “Public bar.”

The authority to sell intoxicating liquors conferred by a license, under sect. 2, sub-sect. 2, of the Licensing Act, 1902, is not the same as that which belonged, before the Act, to an hotel license issued under the provisions of the Inland Revenue Act, 1880. Unless the house has, and continues to have, no “public bar,” and answers, and continues to answer, the other descriptions of an hotel contained in the section, the license is no protection to the holder during its currency.

With respect to such a license, where the house answers the description specified, there is no prohibition against sales to the general public—that is to say, to persons who are neither travellers nor lodgers in the house.

The meaning of the expression “public bar” considered.

This was a case stated by Mr. Mahony, Divisional Magistrate for the city of Dublin, for the opinion of the Court upon certain questions arising on the Licensing Act, 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c. 18), s. 2, sub-s. 2.

The case set forth that the defendant was charged in three summonses with having on the 19th February, 1st April, and 9th April, 1905, at 38 and 39 Parkgate-street, sold by retail, at a public bar in the premises, in contravention of terms of her license, intoxicating liquor, without being duly licensed to sell the same by retail. At the hearing of each of these complaints it was proved on the part of the complainant that the defendant was the holder of a license granted for an hotel, pursuant to the 2 Edw. 7, c. 18, s. 2, sub-s. 2, and that the defendant's trade was principally carried on in three rooms (marked “A,” “B,” and “C” on the accompanying plan), one of these rooms fronting Parkgate-street, and another being at the rear of the premises. Between these two rooms there was a third room (marked “C” on the map), part of which was cut off by a partition and glass-screen

behind which intoxicating liquors were stored, and from which such liquors were handed out to an attendant to be given to the customer. This glass-screen was provided with a movable panel and door which could be opened when drink was to be handed out. The three rooms contained chairs, tables, and lounges. Upstairs there were a sufficient number of bedrooms to comply with the provisions of the Act. No customer had been served directly at the enclosure in room “C,” all drinks being given to an attendant who handed them to the customers. On each of the occasions referred to in the summonses several persons residing in the city of Dublin, some of them in the immediate neighbourhood of the defendant's shop, were found drinking intoxicating liquors in these rooms. These persons were not travellers or lodgers in the defendant's hotel; and the intoxicating liquors had been sold to them by the defendant.

No witness was called for the defence, but defendant's counsel put in, and relied upon, the license issued to the defendant by the Inland Revenue Authorities, and also a certificate that she had paid the sum of 10s. as required by the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 68, s. 12.

The defendant admitted that all persons coming in and asking for drink were supplied.

Counsel for the complainant contended that the defendant had on her premises a public bar within the meaning of 2 Edw. 7, c. 18, s. 2, sub-s. 2, and that the license issued under the authority of that section did not authorise the sale of drink to persons not being travellers or lodgers in the hotel. For the defendant, it was contended that the summonses disclosed no offence, that there was no evidence to support the offence as charged in the summonses, and that the words “public bar” referred to a physical structure analogous to a publichouse counter, at which persons stand and take drink, and that no such structure existed on the defendant's premises. It was further contended on behalf of the defendant that the license issued to her was not a new kind of license, and was in fact the license known as a publican's license, and carried the same rights at least as an hotel license issued under the Inland Revenue Act, 1880, sect. 43.

The magistrate was of opinion that the license was in fact a new kind of license, and he held that it was not legal for the defendant to sell intoxicating liquor to persons not being travellers or lodgers in the hotel. He was further of opinion that the words “public bar” in the section did not refer exclusively to a physical structure of the kind referred to by defendant's counsel, and he held that on the defendant's premises, as constructed and used, a public bar did exist. He also held that the summons did disclose an offence, and that there was evidence to support it.

The cases referred to were Stephens v. Empson (1) and Quin v. Murray (2).

Cur. adv. vult.

T. M. Healy, K.C., and James O'Connor, for the defendant.

D. S. Henry, K.C., Cecil Atkinson, for the complainant.

Palles, C.B.:—

Mr. Mahony appears to have based his decision upon the following passage contained in my judgment in The King v. Justices of Dublin (3), in reference to these premises:—

“The effect...