R.B.(Bangladesh) v The Minister for Justice and Equality

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys
• Judgment Date: 24 April 2018
• Neutral Citation: [2018] IEHC 336
• Docket Number: [2012 No. 566 J.R.]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 24 April 2018

BETWEEN

R.B. (BANGLADESH)

APPLICANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, IRELAND

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RESPONDENTS

[2018] IEHC 336

[2012 No. 566 J.R.]

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial Review – Asylum - Deportation - Subsidiary protection - Credibility - Order of certiorari - Consideration of relevant facts - Refugees Appeals Tribunal - European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations 2006

Facts: The applicant was originally from Bangladesh. He applied for asylum upon entering Ireland in November 2010. His application and subsequent appeal were refused. An application for subsidiary protection was also refused by the first named respondent and a deportation order was ultimately made in May 2012. The applicant obtained a partial grant of leave following an application for leave to apply for judicial review and an interim injunction was made to allow him to remain within Ireland until the conclusion of that case. The applicant failed to lodge a Notice of Motion and subsequently married a Polish national in January 2013. As a consequence, the applicant's deportation order was revoked and a five-year permission was granted for him to reside in the State. The applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review on grounds that had not been dealt with when the application was originally brought. Some of these grounds were permitted.

The applicant sought an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the first named respondent in refusing to allow his application for subsidiary protection. It was argued that all relevant facts under art. 4 of the Qualification Directive were not considered. It was also argued that the first named respondent did not properly deal with matters that were raised disputing the Refugee Appeals Tribunal findings. Finally, the applicant argued that the first named respondent had relied more on the applicant's original application for asylum instead of his subsidiary protection claim.

Held by Humphreys J. that the application would be dismissed. The first named respondent's decision clearly stated that all relevant facts had been considered before a decision was made on whether to grant subsidiary protection or not. The decision specifically stated that all matters under reg. 5 (1)(a) of the European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations 2006 would be considered notwithstanding the first named respondent's view that the applicant was not credible. In regards to the applicant's second complaint, it was determined that the first named respondent did not have to deal with each point raised by the applicant in his application as he was entitled to adopt the findings of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal if it seemed they were reasoned and logical. Finally, it was decided that it was reasonable for the first named respondent to have linked his decision to the original application for asylum because this application was interlinked to the application for subsidiary protection. The first named respondent had not acted unreasonably in approaching the application in the manner that he did.

Application refused.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys delivered on the 24th day of April, 2018

1 The applicant sought asylum in the State in November, 2010 and, following the refusal of his application by the Refugee Applications Commissioner, he appealed to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, where he was again unsuccessful in April, 2011.

2 On 19th May, 2011 he applied for leave to remain and for subsidiary protection. The latter application was refused on 11th May, 2012 and a deportation order made on 17th May, 2012.

3 The statement of grounds in the present proceedings was filed on 20th June, 2012. On 12th September, 2012, O'Keeffe J. granted leave for relief 1 on a single ground, formulated by the court, in the form of a legalistic point which has since been rejected in other proceedings regarding enmeshment of the subsidiary protection and deportation processes. An interim injunction was also granted. The applicant's counsel says that it was understood that the balance of the leave application was adjourned to be sought later. The applicant failed to issue a notice of motion on foot of the grant of partial leave.

4 In January, 2013, the applicant married a Polish national. On 16th August, 2013, the deportation order was revoked because of that marriage, and a five-year permission granted to the applicant to reside in the State until 15th August, 2018. In April, 2015, the applicant's Bangladeshi passport was renewed. In August, 2017 the applicant's wife was granted an Irish passport. On 11th September, 2017 the applicant applied for Irish citizenship. As regards the fortunate occurrence of a marriage to an EU national, I can record that while, as part of Operation Vantage, a substantial number of applications for residence cards have been investigated by the EU Treaty Rights section of the first named respondent's Department, it so far appears that an entirely comprehensive approach has not been taken and one might certainly think that consideration could be given to a more comprehensive review in that regard.

5 On 23rd October, 2017 I granted leave on certain of the remaining reliefs and grounds that had not been dealt with by O'Keeffe J. In doing so I was satisfied with the applicant's counsel's explanation that it was intended by O'Keeffe J. to adjourn the remaining elements of the leave application even though the order does not in fact say that. I granted leave to seek reliefs 4 and 5 (leave for relief 1 having already been granted). I also gave leave on grounds 16 to 21 and additional grounds 23 to 27, allowing an amendment in that regard. I also directed that the extended grounds will also apply in relation to relief 1. The limited reliefs and grounds granted represent the fact that what I gave on the 23rd October, 2017 was what was applied for on behalf of the applicant on the day. His lawyers did not press certain matters on that occasion. The order does not say anything explicit about extension of time for issue of the notice of motion for substantive relief, but that was the effect of it. The leave order was not in fact perfected until after the commencement of the present hearing on 20th April, 2018. When at the hearing it became clear that the order had not been perfected, I gave appropriate directions in that regard and I adjourned the balance of the hearing.

6 On 16th March, 2018 the applicant applied for a permanent residence on...