R.M. v Conneely

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty
• Judgment Date: 18 February 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 92
• Docket Number: Record No. H.JR.2023.001323

Between:

R.M.

Applicant

and

Máire Conneely, Judge of the District Court

Respondent

[2025] IEHC 92

Record No. H.JR.2023.001323

THE HIGH COURT

Bias – Prohibition – Leave applications – Applicant seeking leave to seek the reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus – Whether there was sufficient evidence of bias such as to justify the relief sought

Facts: The applicant alleged bias on the part of the respondent, a District Judge hearing a family law case. The core of his complaint was that the Judge showed bias against him generally and, in a specific example, by handing legislation to a lawyer for his opponent during her application to lift the in camera rule. That application was made to allow that lawyer to defend herself, by reference to the otherwise private details of the case, in a High Court action in which he accused the lawyer of professional negligence. The applicant sought leave to quash the order lifting the in camera rule and to quash the respondent’s refusal to recuse herself after repeated requests that she recuse herself for various other reasons. The applicant also sought an order preventing the Judge from hearing future applications and compelling her to “produce an Order” that would allow him to appeal her decision in respect of the in camera rule. Finally, the applicant complained of delays in the hearing of the judicial review application. His application was filed in 2023 and sought to challenge an order made on 14 November 2023. He told the High Court (Gearty J) that he was directed to await an appeal which, he submitted, never took place. The applicant first appeared before the High Court in the judicial review ex parte list on 26 November 2024 at which point the only named respondent was his former wife. Having been directed to join the Judge as a respondent given the allegations of mala fides made, the applicant did so, and the matter was before the High Court as a preliminary application for leave to seek the reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Held by Gearty J that the Supreme Court had reviewed the law regarding bias in Kelly v U.C.D. [2025] IESC 6. She noted that several potential factors were suggested which might create an apprehension of bias namely: where a judge has an interest (direct or indirect) in the case, has made a prior public commitment to the position of a party relating to the merits of the case, where a judge has connections with a party or witness whose credibility is at issue, or with a lawyer in the case, or where the judge has extraneous information not acquired from the evidence in the case. Gearty J noted that the law in relation to leave applications was well established: G v D.P.P. [1994] 1 I.R. 374. She noted that the applicant needed to show that he had an arguable case, or some prospect of success in his argument that the Judge was biased and could not give the matter an impartial decision by reference only to the facts and law. Gearty J refused the application as the applicant’s argument had no prospect of success in that his description of events had not established any apprehension of unfair bias on the part of the Judge and the events could not create an apprehension of bias in the mind of a reasonable person. Gearty J held that neither the repeated recusal applications nor the main issue of which he complained had been shown to have had any connection with the respondent’s decision in the case, which was one she was entitled to make on the facts before her.

Gearty J refused leave to pursue the reliefs set out in the statement of grounds.

Leave refused.

Judgment of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered on 18 ^th February, 2025

1. Introduction and Summary

1.1 The Applicant alleges bias on the part of a District Judge hearing a family law case. The core of his complaint is that the Judge showed bias against him generally and, in a specific example, by handing legislation to a lawyer for his opponent during her application to lift the in camera rule. That application was made to allow that lawyer to defend herself, by reference to the otherwise private details of the case, in a High Court action in which he accuses the lawyer of professional negligence.

1.2 The Applicant seeks leave to quash the order lifting the in camera rule and to quash the Respondent's refusal to recuse herself after repeated requests that she recuse herself for various other reasons. The Applicant also seeks an order preventing this judge from hearing future applications and compelling her to “produce an Order” that would allow him to appeal her decision in respect of the in camera rule.

1.3 There is insufficient evidence of bias in this case such as to justify the relief sought. The appropriate remedy for this Applicant is to appeal the impugned order.

1.4 Finally, the Applicant has complained also of delays in the hearing of this judicial review application. His application was filed in 2023 and sought to challenge an order made on 14 ^th November 2023. He told me that he was directed to await an appeal which, he submitted, never took place. The Applicant first appeared before this Court in the Judicial Review ex parte list on 26 ^th November 2024 at which point the only named Respondent was his former wife. Having been directed to join the Judge as a Respondent given the allegations of mala fides made, the Applicant did so, and the matter is now before the Court as a preliminary application for leave to seek the reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus as described above.

2. Alternative Remedies

2.1 The Applicant has at least one appeal pending in the Circuit Court. He complains that the Respondent, who has been dealing with his case in recent months, does not give him time to appeal, nor does she issue orders sufficiently quickly to allow an appeal. This is no bar to an appeal of a District Court order which can be appealed to the Circuit Court and in respect of which the Applicant is entitled to a de novo hearing.

2.2 The Supreme Court in State (Roche) v Delap [1980] I.R. 170 refused to grant an order of certiorari even though it accepted that the impugned order in that case was bad on its face. It did so because the applicant had an appeal pending in the Circuit Court. This Applicant is in a similar situation. He seeks to judicially review a case in which at least one appeal is outstanding. As noted, this was why his case was adjourned previously in this Court, as an appeal was pending.

2.3 Nonetheless, and given the claim of bias, I will consider this issue as it is argued that judicial review is the more appropriate remedy here. This is only correct if there is evidence of unfair bias which vitiates the impugned decision.

3. The Law regarding Bias and Leave Applications

3.1 The Supreme Court has reviewed the law regarding bias in Kelly v U.C.D. [2025] IESC 6. In his judgment, O'Donnell C.J. emphasises the importance of an impartial tribunal, describing it as “ the personal entitlement of the parties and a basic requirement of the administration of justice guaranteed to citizens” by the Constitution. He notes that within this context, judges are required to hear cases assigned to them, judges are not entitled to choose parties and parties are not entitled to choose judges. The test for bias is confirmed, at paragraph 2, as follows: “ where the reasonable and informed onlooker would have a reasonable apprehension that the judge would not be able to give the matter an impartial hearing and decision by reference only to the facts and law.”

3.2 Several potential factors are suggested which might create an apprehension of bias namely: where a judge has an interest (direct or indirect) in the case, has made a prior public commitment to the position of a party relating to the merits of the case, where a judge has connections with a party or witness whose credibility is at issue, or with a lawyer in the case, or where the judge has extraneous information not acquired from the evidence in the case. While this list is not exhaustive, it is a useful checklist against which facts can be assessed.

3.3 O'Donnell C.J. notes: “ The test for disqualification is sensitive and may be triggered by matters which are some distance from any actual bias or predisposition”, reciting the various reasons why this must be so, bolstering the role of the impartial tribunal in ensuring public confidence in our system of justice.

3.4 Notwithstanding this reaffirmation of the importance of confidence in the impartiality of our...