Re Temple and Lyons's Contract; and The Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Barton, J.
• Judgment Date: 12 July 1911
• Court: Chancery Division (Ireland)
• Docket Number: (1911. No. 417.)
• Date: 12 July 1911

In re Temple and Lyons's Contract; and the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874.

Barton, J.

(1911. No. 417.)

CASES

DETERMINITD BY

THE CHANCERY DIVISION

OF

THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN IRELAND.

AND BY

THE IRISH LAND COMMISSION,

AND ON APPEAL THEREFROM IN

THE COURT OF APPEAL.

1912.

Vendor and purchaser — Fee-farm grant — Land Law (Ireland) Acts — Redemption of Rent Act, 1891 — Fixing of fair rent — Realty or personalty.

T., being sui juris, and being absolutely entitled to the grantee's interest under a perpetuity grant, served an originating notice under the Redemption of Rent (Ireland) Act, 1891, in pursuance of which a fair rent was fixed by the Irish Land Commission upon the lands. He afterwards died intestate.

Held, that T.'s interest in the land became on the fixing of the fair rent, and was at his death personal estate.

Vendor and Purchaser Summons.

This was an application on the part of Charles Temple of Mullanahinch, county Monaghan, the vendor, for an order declaring that the vendor as heir-at-law of John Temple, deceased — who was assignee of the grantee of the premises granted by a perpetuity grant of 1st February, 1875, and on which said premises the said John Temple had had a fair rent fixed under the provisions of the Redemption of Rent Act, 1891, by order of the Irish Land Commissioners, dated 13th July, 1907—could make good title to the said premises to the purchaser without the concurrence of, or a conveyance from, the personal representative of the said John Temple, deceased. On the 2nd March, 1911, the vendor put up for sale by public auction certain lands in Kilnahalter and Mullinahinch, county Monaghan, containing 25a. 32p. statute measure; and said lands were then purchased by Mr. James Alexander Lyons for £2,150. The title to the said lands commenced with a grant in perpetuity dated 1st February, 1875, made by Rev. Hope Masterton Waddell to Susan M'Adam, whose interest subsequently became vested in John Temple. The said John Temple, on September 26th, 1904, served an originating notice under the Redemption of Rent (Ireland) Act, 1891, for the fixing of a fair rent upon the lands comprised in this grant, and by order of the Land Commission, dated July 13th, 1907, the reserved rent of £34 14s. 11d. was reduced to £25 4s. On behalf of the purchaser a requisition was furnished to the vendor, requiring the personal representative of John Temple, deceased, to join in the conveyance; but the vendor, who was personal representative as well as heir-at-law, refused to comply.

Calvert, for the vendor:—

There has been no conversion of the fee-simple estate into personalty. The Redemption of Rent Act only deems the fee-farm grantee to be a tenant from year to year for the purpose of having a fair rent fixed; for every other purpose, the fee-simple estate still exists. Nothing has occurred which could take the fee-simple estate out of the fee-farm grantee. The fee-simple estate still exists as regards the liability for tithe rentcharge: Irish Land Commission v. Brown (1); Irish Land Commission v. Magorian (2); and there is no reason why it should not exist for the purposes of devolution. The decision in Ledwith v. Ross (3) is right, and should be followed.

Littledale, K.C., for the purchaser:—

The decision in De Vesci v. O'Connell (4) does not alter or extend the law as laid down in Hill v. East and West India Dock Co. (5) and Ex parte Walton; In re Levy (6), which were cited and relied upon in Irish Land Commission v. Brown (1). No injury or injustice is done here. The interests of the heir-at-law cannot influence the Court. Nemo est hæres viventis. In re Ruttledge's Estate (7) is not an authority against the proposition that by voluntarily fixing a fair rent under section 1 of the Redemption of Rent Act, 1891, John Temple, fee-farm grantee, who was predecessor in title of the vendor, altered the quality of his estate or interest in the lands. The interests of third parties are in no way damnified here. The decision in Ruttledge's Estate (7) (see per Madden, J., at p. 456, in Irish Land Commission v. Magorian (2)) is not inconsistent with that of Porter, M.R., in M'Evoy v. M'Evoy (8)

in which In re Ruttledge's Estate (1) was cited. The decisions of the Vice-Chancellor in In re Gray; Gray v. Gray (2) and In re Parke; Munster Bank v. Parke (3), and of the Master of the Rolls in M'Evoy v. M'Evoy (4), have been considered as settling the practice in the Chancery Division. No...