Roberto Alamazani v A Judge of the District Court

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty
• Judgment Date: 25 November 2024
• Neutral Citation: [2024] IEHC 673
• Docket Number: JR 2024 No.595

Between

Roberto Alamazani

Applicant

and

A Judge of the District Court

Respondent

[2024] IEHC 673

JR 2024 No.595

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial review – Leave – Bias – Applicant seeking leave for judicial review – Whether the respondent was biased

Facts: The applicant, Mr Alamazani, applied to the High Court seeking to quash an order of the District Court that Dublin City Council be granted possession of a property in which he had been a tenant since 2020. He had three main grounds: first, that he had made a complaint about the respondent, the Judge, who should, accordingly, have recused herself; second, that he was not permitted to make his case in court; and third, the property which was the subject matter of the case was not fit to live in and he should not have been required to pay rent. He claimed he was entitled to a refund of rent paid. Those who seek leave to review judicial decisions must demonstrate arguable grounds for the remedy sought (G v DPP [1994] 1 IR 374); the Judge argued that there were no arguable grounds for leave in the case.

Held by Gearty J that there was no evidential basis for an argument that the Judge was biased. Gearty J found that the applicant had not adduced any evidence of an application to the Judge to recuse herself. If he had not made such an application, setting out his grounds for recusal, it was difficult for the High Court, in judicial review proceedings, to find that he had good grounds for such an argument; it showed a failure to use an alternative remedy. The fundamental claim in the case appeared to Gearty J to be untenable: the applicant argued that his unwillingness to accept the tenancy was sufficient grounds to take possession of the property, refuse to pay rent, fail to fully defend the District Court proceedings, complain about the Judge and then apply for judicial review to quash the possession order made. Gearty J noted that he did not appear to want possession, but he wanted a refund. She held that if he continued to pay rent, he was entitled to possession; not having paid rent, the landlord was entitled to begin possession proceedings and when the applicant failed to appear after being notified of the hearing date, once the arrears of rent had been proven, the Judge was entitled to make the order sought. Gearty J found that the argument that the Judge did not allow the applicant to adduce an inspector’s report in respect of the property was difficult to reconcile with the known facts of the case. Gearty J noted that it was set out in the body of the District Court order that the applicant had been served with notice of the proceedings and that he did not appear on the date that the order was made; not only was his failure to appear not contradicted, but he did not offer any reason as to why he had not attended in court that day. Regarding the applicant’s submission that the premises was not fit for habitation hence he should receive a refund in respect of the money he did pay, Gearty J noted that there was no evidence offered of rent or any deposit paid by him; there was no evidence in respect of the state of the property and its defects, if any.

Gearty J refused leave to pursue the judicial review proceedings.

Leave refused.

Judgment of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered on the 25 ^th of November, 2024

1. Introduction

1.1 The Applicant seeks to quash an order of the District Court that Dublin City Council be granted possession of a property in which he has been a tenant since 2020. He has three main grounds: first, that he has made a complaint about the judge who should, accordingly, have recused herself; second, that he was not permitted to make his case in court; third, the property which is the subject matter of this case was not fit to live in and he should not have been required to pay rent. He claims he is entitled to a refund of rent paid.

1.2 The Applicant did not appeal the decision of the District Judge. The Respondent was present at the leave stage as the Applicant notified the Respondent of his intention to apply for leave, at the direction of the Court made on 1st May. He was granted an adjournment by Bolger J. on 31st July on the basis that he had made an application for legal aid. He was permitted, by Bradley J., to submit further documentation in support of his application as he wanted to seek a stay on execution of the Order. He submitted documents on the 10th and 11th of October, which documents included the original District Court Order.

1.3 When the matter came before this Court, the Respondent applied to strike out the case and the Applicant sought a further adjournment in order to obtain legal advice and to join the City Council as a Respondent. This judgment issues, therefore, at an early stage of the proceedings: at the leave stage, but where the matter has already been listed in July, in October and in November, without any progress being made in the litigation.

1.4 The Applicant has submitted a handwritten letter, dated 18th January 2020, addressed to the City Council, in which he outlines his dissatisfaction with the premises. It begins: I do not want this flat and I request a full refund of money paid. Even if taken at its height, and ignoring that it was not on affidavit, this letter does not reveal any argument that could be the basis for a judicial review case against the Judge who heard the evidence that he had stopped paying rent and granted a possession order to the Council.

2. Leave to seek Judicial Review and Alternative Remedies

2.1 Those who seek leave to review judicial decisions must demonstrate arguable grounds for the remedy sought: G v. DPP [1994] 1 IR 374. The Respondent argues that there are no arguable grounds for leave in this case.

2.2 On the 15th April 2024, the Respondent Judge made an order for possession of the property in question under section 12 of the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 2014. This order commenced on the 15th of June 2024 and execution of the order of possession must take place on or before the 15th of January, 2025. The Respondent also gave the City Council a decree in the sum of €13,663.85 in respect of arrears of rent due up to 15th April 2024.

2.3 When I asked the Applicant why he had not appealed the District Court order for re-possession, he replied that his only route was judicial review and, later in the same hearing, that he had chosen, instead, to come to the High Court. As with most cases before the District Court, there is a full appeal to the Circuit Court. This option is referred to within section 12 itself, which provides for a hearing of possession cases otherwise than in public in the District Court or, on appeal, in the Circuit Court.

2.4 It is well established that the remedy of judicial review is one that is available only when other remedies have been exhausted. As set out by Murray J. in Chubb European Group v. HIA [2020] IECA 91, if there is an alternative remedy, relief should be refused unless that remedy is not adequate, or it is in the interests of justice to allow leave instead. On this ground alone, the Applicant has chosen the wrong remedy and his application must be struck out unless there is a reason why judicial review is in the interests of justice. Where a lack...