Rutledge v Fingal County Council

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Humphreys J.
• Judgment Date: 17 April 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] IEHC 223
• Docket Number: [H.JR.2025.0001383]

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 50, 50A AND 50B OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2000

Between

Simon Rutledge

Applicant

and

Fingal County Council

Respondent

[2026] IEHC 223

[H.JR.2025.0001383]

THE HIGH COURT

PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT

Judicial review – Enforcement notice – Fair procedures – Applicant seeking an order of certiorari quashing the enforcement notice issued by the respondent – Whether there was a breach of fair procedures

Facts: The applicant, Mr Rutledge, applied to the High Court seeking: (1) an order of certiorari quashing the enforcement notice issued by the respondent, Fingal County Council (the council), on 23 July 2025 in respect of lands at The White House, Newpark, The Ward, County Dublin; (2) a declaration that the lands had been used and operated as a carpark for a period in excess of 7 years; (3) such declaration(s) as to the legal rights and/or legal position of the applicant and (if and insofar as legally permissible and appropriate) persons similarly situated and/or of the legal duties and/or legal position of the respondent as the court considered appropriate; (4) an interlocutory order staying the enforcement of the enforcement notice and preventing the respondent from taking any steps on foot of the enforcement notice; (5) a declaration that the protective costs provisions contained in s. 50B of the Planning and Development Act 2000 and/or s. 3 of the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011, and/or Order 99 and/or s. 169 of Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, as interpreted in light of Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention, applied to the proceedings; (6) such interlocutory relief as the court may order, including interlocutory relief as defined by the Practice Direction applicable to the List; (7) such further or other order; (8) liberty to apply; and (9) an order in respect of the costs of the proceedings. The core grounds of challenge were as follows: (1) alleged non-compliance with time-limit; (2) alleged lack of fair procedures; (3) alleged failure to consider submissions; (4) alleged lack of reasons; and (5) alleged exempted development.

Held by Humphreys J that: (i) it is settled law that the applicant must have discharged the onus of proof to establish all facts necessary for relief; (ii) the applicant had not demonstrated any inadequacy in the reasons given by the council, breach of fair procedures, lack of reasonable expedition or other infirmity; (iii) it is settled law that, apart from autonomous-type obligations, material capable of sustaining the point must have been properly before the decision-taker at the relevant time such as to give rise to a duty to consider it; (iv) the applicant had not demonstrated any infirmity in the notice, in the context of the limited nature of his submissions to the council; (v) it is settled law that the applicant’s point must be workable; and (vi) it would be unworkable to uphold an interpretation that required elaborate procedures at the warning letter or enforcement notice stage or that failure to act expeditiously would render the notice invalid, or that time-limits are jurisdictional or that required the applicant to dictate that there be an elaborate investigation, or that required complex factual questions to be determined in the context of judicial review, especially when there are normally in practice alternative procedures that would allow the facts to be more conveniently interrogated.

Humphreys J ordered that the proceedings be dismissed and that there be no order as to the applicant’s costs.

Proceedings dismissed.

Date of impugned decision: 23 July 2025

Date proceedings commenced: 16 September 2025

Date of main hearing: 25 March 2026

Date draft judgment circulated: 9 April 2026

JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Friday the 17th day of April 2026

1 . “[T]he onus of proof must lie on an applicant for judicial review”: Donnelly J. (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring) in ( [2026] IESC 22 Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 March 2026) at para. 96. While I appreciate the perspective of the applicant as a landowner apparently attempting to provide a service for which there is presumably some public demand, and the very considerable expenditure of imagination and effort made to present the case on his behalf, the legal question here is whether the applicant has overcome the onus to show an infirmity in the enforcement notice challenged here.

Geographical context

2 . The development consists of car parking at The White House Public House near Dublin airport (entrance at: https://maps.app.goo.gl/5TZdti8U2ovJNbfH7). The pub is currently closed, and the evidence is of an airport park-and-ride facility being operated from the lands. That is not something covered by any planning permission, and existing permissions at the development site are conditioned to prevent such a development. The applicant's essential case is that car parking is protected by the seven-year rule and that other works are exempted development.

Facts

3 . The applicant is a businessman and owner of lands at The White House, Newpark, The Ward, Co. Dublin.

4 . The applicant has previously operated a public house known as The White House Public House from these lands.

5 . On 21 February 1985, retention planning permission was granted by An Bord Pleanála under ref. Z.A. 757 in respect of the site the subject of these proceedings for development consisting of the retention of a racetrack, the development of lands for use as a raceway with ancillary car parking and the erection of a spectator stand and toilet facilities. The lands outlined on the submitted site layout include the trotting track and the car park to the rear of The White House Hotel.

6 . Permission ref. Z.A. 757 was subject to conditions which included Condition 2:

“The use of the track shall be confined to use as a racetrack for harness racing organised by or on behalf of the Irish Standard Bred Horse Owner's Association and no use for any other purpose for which planning permission is required shall be established on the site without a prior grant of permission by the planning authority, or by An Bord Pleanála on appeal.

Reason: To limit the use of the site to that stated in the relevant application in the interests of proper planning control.”

7 . On 29 July 1988, an application was made for retention of the spectator stand as a haybarn and it was granted permission on 29 September 1988. That permission related to the structure only and not the trotting ring/track.

8 . The applicant claims he has, for a number of years, operated a car park from the lands to the rear of The White House Public House. The land used for the operation of this car park includes a former “trotting ring”. The surface of the trotting ring was originally lime sand and the applicant added aggregate sand in 2023/24.

9 . The applicant claims that in or about 2009, an airport parking service began operating from the lands under the name “Park and Fly Dublin”. That service enabled customers travelling through Dublin Airport to park their vehicles at the lands and transport to and from Dublin Airport was arranged from the premises.

10 . In 2012/2013, the applicant procured the development of a website to allow customers to book online to avail of carparking on the site.

11 . In September 2016, the applicant applied for planning permission to the council (reg. ref. F16A/0388) for an extension to the north and east of the existing White House Hotel.

12 . By letter dated 17 November 2016, the applicant confirmed to the respondent that the park-and-fly facility was no longer in operation at The White House.

13 . On 10 April 2017, the respondent granted permission for the proposed development, subject to conditions including that the area “within the applicant's ownership/control shall only be used for hotel-related uses and shall not be used as ‘park and fly’ parking (that is, parking which is not directly ancillary to the use of accommodation in the hotel by the drivers/occupants of such car)”.

14 . Development was not commenced or implemented under this permission.

15 . On 9 January 2020, the respondent issued a warning letter in respect of a camping and caravan park being operated at the applicant's lands. A response was issued by the applicant by letter dated 5 February 2020. No further enforcement action was taken by the respondent in respect of the letter of 9 January 2020.

16 . In March 2020, the applicant applied for planning permission to infill the trotting ring and reinstate it to market gardening (reg. ref. FW20A/0038) but this was refused on 30 June 2020.

17 . In May 2021, the applicant applied again (reg. ref. FW21A/0089) to infill the trotting ring and reinstate it to market gardening but this was also refused on 22 March 2022.

18 . On 25 November 2021, the applicant sought to extend the duration of permission granted under reg. ref. F16A/0388. A letter enclosed with the application stated that the applicant “wishes to request that the planning permission be extended for a further 5 years in order for him to proceed with the development”. The application for an extension of duration was refused on 13 January 2022.

19 . In May 2022, the applicant applied (reg. ref. FW22A/0090), once again, to infill the trotting ring and reinstate it to market gardening and this was granted permission on 28 February 2023. Development has not yet commenced under this permission.

20 . In September 2022, the applicant applied for permission (reg. ref. FW22A/0195) to extend the existing hotel, bar and restaurant adjacent to the trotting ring to include 50 additional rooms and 88 car parking spaces and was granted permission for that on 13 June 2023. Condition 3 of the said permission requires that “[a]ll car parking spaces within the application site boundary shall only be used for use associated with the existing...