Ryan v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Ms. Justice Dunne
• Judgment Date: 19 March 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] IESC 8
• Court: Supreme Court
• Docket Number: [Supreme Court Record No. 2018/121],[S.C. No. 121 of 2018]
• Date: 19 March 2020

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40.4.2 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND

BETWEEN

PATRICK RYAN

APPLICANT/APPELLANT

AND

THE GOVERNOR OF MOUNTJOY PRISON

RESPONDENT

[2020] IESC 8

Clarke C.J.

McKechnie J.

Dunne J.

Charleton J.

Irvine J.

[Supreme Court Record No. 2018/121]

THE SUPREME COURT

Unlawful detention – Abuse of process – Fair procedures – Appellant seeking an inquiry pursuant to the provisions of Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution – Whether it was permissible to dismiss the application on the grounds that the application constituted an abuse of process

Facts: In proceedings concerning an application for an inquiry pursuant to the provisions of Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution, an issue arose as to whether it was permissible to dismiss the application on the grounds that the application constituted an abuse of process or whether the Court was limited solely to the question of whether the detention of the applicant/appellant, Mr Ryan, was in accordance with law. In addition, the appellant was given leave in the Determination of the Supreme Court to argue a second point, namely that the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that, notwithstanding some blurring of the lines between the exercise of the District Court’s civil and criminal jurisdictions, there was no unfairness to the appellant in the conduct of the proceedings giving rise to his detention, despite the complaints of his not being informed of the criminal charge against him, not being asked how he wished to plead, there being no hearing of the charge, there being no evidence led to support the charge, there being no opportunity to challenge the evidence relied on in support of the charge, there being no opportunity given to him to adduce evidence in his defence and the existence of a situation where the District Court Judge who convicted and sentenced him was the alleged victim of the crime the appellant had committed, in breach of the “nemo judex in causa sua” principle.

Held by the Supreme Court (Dunne J) that while there was no doubt that the way in which these proceedings were initiated and the sequence of swearing of affidavits which were not factually correct constituted an abuse of process, once the inquiry is initiated the Court must carry out such an inquiry. Dunne J held that it could not be the case that a person who is found to be in unlawful detention can continue to be held in unlawful detention simply by reason of their abuse of the process leading to that conclusion. Dunne J held that there may be issues in regard to the costs of proceedings where a party has initiated such proceedings in circumstances which amount to an abuse of process but it is not appropriate or permissible to continue the unlawful detention of the individual as a form of sanction to deal with abuse of the process concerned. Regarding the procedure that ought to be followed by a court when confronted by contempt in the face of the court, Dunne J found that the law had benefitted significantly from the judgments of the Court delivered by O’Donnell J in the cases of Tracey v District Judge McCarthy [2019] IESC 14 and Walsh v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESC 15. Dunne J held that what the court must always do is ensure that fair procedures are provided to the individual or individuals concerned. Dunne J held that, in this case, it was manifestly clear that the Court bent over backwards to be patient and attempted to encourage and persuade Mr Ryan to co-operate with the Court in the context of the civil proceedings before the Court and also warned him as to the manner in which he was conducting himself before the Court and the consequences that could flow from his behaviour; Mr Ryan was offered every opportunity to deal with the matter appropriately and did not do so. Dunne J noted that Mr Ryan was offered the opportunity to obtain legal advice if necessary with the benefit of legal aid and he did not take that opportunity. Dunne J noted that the case was adjourned on at least one occasion in order to facilitate him in co-operating with the court and he did not do so. Dunne J held that there was no denial of fair procedures to Mr Ryan.

Dunne J held that the case would be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Judgment of Ms. Justice Dunne delivered on the 19th day of March 2020

Introduction

1 The issue that arises for consideration in this case is whether it is permissible to dismiss an application for an inquiry pursuant to Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution on the grounds that the application constitutes an abuse of process or whether the Court is limited solely to the question of whether the detention of the applicant is in accordance with law. In addition, the appellant was given leave in the Determination of this Court to argue a second point, namely that the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that, notwithstanding some blurring of the lines between the exercise of the District Court's civil and criminal jurisdictions, there was no unfairness to the appellant in the conduct of the proceedings giving rise to his detention, despite the complaints of his not being informed of the criminal charge against him, not being asked how he wished to plead, there being no hearing of the charge, there being no evidence led to support the charge, there being no opportunity to challenge the evidence relied on in support of the charge, there being no opportunity given to him to adduce evidence in his defence and the existence of a situation where the District Court Judge who convicted and sentenced him was the alleged victim of the crime the appellant had committed, in breach of the “nemo judex in causa sua” principle.

The Nature of the Proceedings

2 These proceedings concern an application for an inquiry pursuant to the provisions of Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution which commenced at the direction of Noonan J. on 24th February, 2017. Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution states:

“Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court or any judge thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, the High Court and any and every judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall forthwith enquire into the said complaint and may order the person in whose custody such person is detained to produce the body of such person before the High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his detention, and the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being produced before that Court and after giving the person in whose custody he is detained an opportunity of justifying the detention, order the release of such person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in accordance with the law.”

3 The remedy provided by Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution is the successor to the old writ of habeas corpus and is contained in the section of the Constitution which deals with fundamental rights. The scope of Article 40.4.2 extends beyond the situation of an individual who is detained following a decision of a court but it is not necessary to consider all of the circumstances in which an inquiry pursuant to Article 40.4.2 can be initiated for the purposes of this case. It is relevant to note the terms in which Article 40.4.2 is expressed. As can be seen, once a complaint is made in relation to a person whom it is alleged is being unlawfully detained, the High Court is obliged (“shall forthwith”) to immediately embark on an inquiry into the complaint that the individual concerned is unlawfully detained. The importance of the remedy provided for in Article 40.4.2 flows from Article 40.4.1 of the Constitution which states that:

“No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.”

4 It can be seen therefore that Article 40.4.2 provides a speedy mechanism to ensure that if a complaint is made as to the lawfulness of an individual's detention, the matter can be inquired into and if it is found that the individual concerned is unlawfully detained then the person concerned will be released immediately.

5 Given the fact that an application for an inquiry pursuant to Article 40.4.2 is made in circumstances where it is alleged that an individual is being unlawfully detained, it is not surprising that such applications are often made as a matter of urgency and this can lead to a situation in which the commencement of such an application is not the subject of strict requirements in relation to the procedures to be followed. This was noted by Finlay C.J. in the case of McGlinchey v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison [1988] I.R. 671 (hereinafter “ McGlinchey”) at page 701 saying of such an application, it is:

“… not subject to any special rules, and deals only with the question of the legality of the detention of the person who applies. It is given such a simple and uncomplicated procedure because it deals with an essential and vital matter, the liberty of the individual. It is therefore important that it should not be debased by being used for purposes for which it was not intended.”

Likewise, Charleton J. in Kane v. The Governor of the Midlands Prison [2012] IEHC 511 commented at paragraph 2:

“… The Constitution is a law in itself as well as being the fundamental law of Ireland. The entitlement to this procedure is not to be adjusted or abridged by any form of rule which undermines the swift and direct right of anyone within the State to challenge the legality of any apparent case of wrongful imprisonment or detention. Therefore, on such an application the High Court may adopt such procedures as are suitable to a proper enquiry into the issue of lawfulness of detention. Quite often, the prison authorities will proceed to indicate why it is claimed detention is lawful and such justification may be challenged by contrary evidence, by submission or by cross-examination. If other procedures better...