Ryanair Designated Activity Company and Another v The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission and Another [No. 3]

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr Justice Max Barrett
• Judgment Date: 20 November 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 639
• Docket Number: [2024 No. 1487 HP]

Between:

Ryanair DAC

Ryanair Holdings Plc (each and both referred to hereafter as ‘Ryanair’)

Plaintiffs

and

The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (referred to hereafter as the ‘CCPC’)

Defendant

[2025] IEHC 639

[2024 No. 1487 HP]

THE HIGH COURT

Statement of claim – Strike out – Competition Act 2002 s. 15AAA(2) – Defendant seeking to strike out pleas – Whether the defendant's literal interpretation of s. 15AAA(2) of the Competition Act 2002 was overly simplistic

Facts: The defendant, the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (the CCPC), sought an order pursuant to O. 24, r. 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court directing that paras. 20-27 of the statement of claim of the plaintiffs, Ryanair DAC and Ryanair Holdings plc (Ryanair), be struck out. The pleas remaining for determination comprised a challenge to a decision of the CCPC and allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Italy’s Autorità Garante Della Concorrenza e Del Mercato (the AGCM). Ryanair sought an order of certiorari in respect of the CCPC’s decision to provide assistance to the AGCM at or about the time of the search of Ryanair’s corporate offices in Dublin. The CCPC’s decision was the subject of the challenge advanced in paras. 20-27. Ryanair contended that the CCPC’s literal interpretation of s. 15AAA(2) of the Competition Act 2002 failed to engage with case law recognising that public law challenges may be pursued by plenary proceedings, particularly where the time limits applicable to judicial review had been complied with in the plenary process. Ryanair submitted that: “It is also relevant for the Court to note that the challenge in CRH Plc, Irish Cement Ltd v. Competition and Consumer Protection Commission [2018] 1 IR 521; [2017] IESC 34 was brought by way of plenary action, with no objection of form apparently being raised.” Ryanair contended that it had complied with the steps that would have been required had it initiated judicial review proceedings, and queried why it should be precluded from pursuing the plenary action.

Held by Barrett J that the AGCM was not a party to the proceedings, and its acts could not be impugned in this forum. In his view, there is a clear rationale underpinning the enactment of s.15AAA(2), namely the promotion of finality in litigation. He did not accept that he should depart from the plain wording of statute in order to afford a party who was in breach of statutory requirements the opportunity to pursue a form of action which statute expressly excludes, and to do so outside the prescribed timeframe. He did not accept that it is “unusual and artificial” that a party should be precluded from commencing proceedings in a form and at a time that contravenes the express terms of the legislation; such preclusion is consistent with the language and purpose of the statutory scheme. He held that s. 15AAA(2) prescribes the manner in which a challenge the subject of that provision must be brought, and Ryanair had not proceeded accordingly. He held that Ryanair did not enjoy any form of de facto compliance with O. 84 RSC: the leave required under that Order was never sought or obtained. He found that Ryanair had not complied with the requirements applicable to a judicial review application; but even if it had, the failure to proceed in the manner expressly mandated by statute would, of itself, constitute a sufficient basis for striking out the impugned pleas.

Barrett J directed that paras. 20-27 of the statement of claim be struck out.

Application granted.

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Max Barrett delivered on 20 ^th November 2025 .

1 . By notice of motion dated 26 ^th September 2024, the CCPC seeks, inter alia, an order pursuant to O.24, r.28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, directing that paragraphs 20–27 (and/or the relevant portions thereof) of the statement of claim delivered on 24 ^th September 2024 be struck out. It appears from the oral submissions advanced on behalf of the CCPC that the relief initially sought in respect of paragraph 43 is no longer pursued. For the reasons set out in this judgment, the impugned paragraphs 20–27 will be struck out in their entirety; those paragraphs are reproduced in Appendix A.

2 . The fact that this motion has been brought can have come as no surprise to Ryanair, as the issue forming the subject matter of the present application is expressly raised in the CCPC's defence.

3 . This application is one of three heard over the course of a three-day hearing. Judgment in the first of those applications issued on 18 November, and the background facts set out therein constitute the factual backdrop to the present application as well.

4 . The pleas remaining for determination comprise: (i) a challenge to a decision of the CCPC, and (ii) allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the AGCM.

5 . I propose to address item (ii) first. The AGCM is not a party to these proceedings, and its acts cannot be impugned in this forum. That position is all the more compelling where, as here, the criticisms directed at the AGCM amount, in substance, to a collateral attack upon the CCPC, Ryanair contending in effect that an alleged impropriety on the part of the AGCM has tainted the actions of the CCPC.

6 . Turning to item (i), the issue that arises is that Ryanair seeks, by way of plenary summons, an order of certiorari in respect of the CCPC's decision to provide assistance to the AGCM at or about the time of the search of Ryanair's corporate offices in Dublin.

7 . The statutory position is unequivocal. Section 15AAA(2) of the Competition Act 2002 provides as follows:

“ The validity of a decision made or an act done by a competent authority (including an authorised officer and an adjudication officer) in the performance of a function under Parts 2C to 2G…shall not be questioned other than – (a) by way of an application for judicial review under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts…and in accordance with this section, or (b) in...