Rylands v. Fletcher Revitalised
| Author | Richard Shields |
| Position | Junior Sophister Law student, Trinity College, Dublin |
| Pages | 124-142 |
LIABILITY
WITHOUT
FAULT
RYLANDS
V.
FLETCHER
REVITALISED
RICHARD
SHIELDS*
Introduction
The rule
in
Rylands
v.
Fletcher'
is
now over
130
years old.
Its
recent
history
has
been
characterized
by
the
remarkable
lack
of
success with
which
it
has been
pleaded
in
the
courts.
2
Three
reasons
may be
identified
for this.
First,
the
impact
of
foreseeability
considerations
restricts
the
range
of
situations
to
which the
rule
may
apply.
3
Second, the
requirement
of
"escape"
from
the
defendant's
property.
4
Third, the
attractiveness
of
the
rule
has
been
weakened
by
the
degree
of
conceptual
confusion
that
surrounds
the
notion
of
"non-natural
user".
5
It
will
be
suggested
in
this
article
that
should
these
issues
prove
amenable
to
clarification,
then
a
new
vitality
will
be
brought
to the
rule. The
article will
also
examine
the
justification
for
a
strict
liability
regime
in
any
circumstances
and
outline
the potential
applications
of
the
rule.
The
Constituent
Elements
of the
Tort
It
may
first
be helpful
to
lay
out
the
traditional
definition
of
the
tort.
Under
the
rule
in
Rylands
v.
Fletcher,
a
person
shall be
liable who
for
his
own
purposes
brings
onto,
collects,
or
keeps
on
his
land
something
likely
to
do
Junior
Sophister
Law
student,
Trinity College,
Dublin.
'LR
(1868);
Affg
LR
I
Ex 265
(1866).
2
Most
recently
in
Superquinn
v.
Bray
UDC
Unreported,
High
Court,
18
February
1998,
Laffoy
J.
See
also
Cambridge
Water
Co.
v.
Eastern
Counties
Leather
Plc.
264;
53;
53.
'Infra,
at
126-9.
Infra,
at
129.
Infra,
at
129-33.©
1999
Richard
Shields
and
Dublin
University
Law Society
Rylands
v.
Fletcher
Revitalised
mischief
if
it
escapes.
Upon
escape,
he
is
liable
for
all
"natural
consequences"
thereof.
6
A
number
of
defences
exist.
7
First,
liability
is
contingent
on
the
defendant's
use
of
his
land
being classified
as
"non-natural".
8
Second,
should the escape be
due
to the
plaintiff's
default,
the
defendant
will
not
be
liable.
9
Third, should
the
escape
be
due
to the
malicious
act
of
a
third party
without
any
fault
on
the
part
of
the
defendant,
the defendant
will
not
be
liable.'
Fourth,
the
defendant
may "excuse
himself
by showing
that
the
escape was
the consequence
of
vis
major,
or the act
of
God"."
The
Limitations
of
the
Rule
Foreseeability
The
utility
of
the
rule
to
the
potential
litigant
is
limited
by
its
partial
dependence on
a test
of
foreseeability.
Considerations
of
foreseeability
are
evident
in
both
the
primafacie
imposition
of
liability
and the
scope
of
the
defences
available
under
the
rule.
Blackburn
J.
originally
formulated
the
rule
as
being
directed towards
something
that
would
"naturally
do
mischief
if
it
escapes".
2
The effect
of
this
has
been
stated
as
follows:
The
escape
of
a
dangerous thing
does
not
found
an
action unless
the
defendant
knew
of,
or
could
reasonably
have
foreseen,
the
type
of
damage that would
arise
if
it
escaped
and
upon which
the claim
is
based.
3
6
Fletcher
v.
Rylands
LR
I
Ex
265
(1866), at 278:
The
standard
rules
of
remoteness
apply.
See
Overseas
Tankship
(UK)
Ltd.
V.
Morts Dock
and
Engineering
Co.
Ltd
(The Wagon
Mound
No.1)
[1961]
AC 388
(PC).
'
Further
defences
include
consent
of
the
plaintiff,
default
or
special
sensitivity
of
the
plaintiff
and
statutory
authority.
See
McMahon
and
Binchy,
Irish
Law
Of
Torts
(2"d
Ed.,
Butterworths,
1989),
at
489-92.
'Supra,
fn
1,
at 338.
9
Supra,
fn
6,
at
279.
'0
Goldman
v.
Hargrave
645;
513;
[1966]
2
All
ER;
Rickards
v.
Lothian
263.
"Supra,
fn
6,
at
279-80
per
Blackburn
J.
I
2
lbid.,
at
279.
Charlesworth
and
Percy,
Charlesworth
and
Percy
on
Negligence
(90
Ed.,
Sweet
and
Maxwell,
1997), at
893.
1999]
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