O'S v Residential Institutions Redress Board

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: O'Donnell J.,MacMenamin J.,Dunne J.
• Judgment Date: 30 November 2017
• Neutral Citation: [2017] IESCDET 127
• Court: Supreme Court
• Date: 30 November 2017

[2017] IESCDET 127

SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

O'Donnell J.

MacMenamin J.

Dunne J.

BETWEEN

M O'S

APPLICANT

AND

THE RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS REDRESS BOARD

THE SUPERIOR COURTS RULES COMMITTEE

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

RESPONDENTS

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.4° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

Result: The Court extends time for the bringing of this application and grants leave to appeal.

Reasons Given:

1 The applicant seeks leave to appeal to this Court pursuant to the provisions of Article 34.5.4 of the Constitution which permit of an appeal direct from the High Court to this Court, where there are exceptional circumstances, and the appeal involves a point of law of general public importance or where it is in the interest of justice that an appeal should be brought to this Court.

2 The criteria upon which the Court will grant leapfrog leave have been discussed in a number of determinations most notably Fox v Mahon [2015] IESC Det 2, Barlow v The Minister for Agriculture Food and the Marine [2015] IESC Det 8, Crayden Fishing Company Limited v Sea Fisheries Protection Authority & ors [2016] IESC Det 77, and In re the Adoption Act 2010 s.49(2), and In the matter of JB a minor and KB a minor CB and PB and the Attorney General [2017] IESC Det 25.

3 In this case the High Court (McDermott J) delivered a judgment on the 24th of April 2017 concerning the jurisdiction of the first named respondent to extend time for the making of an application for redress under s.8(2) of the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002. The case also concerns the validity of the provisions of Order 84 Rule 21(3)(b)(i) and (ii) which reduced the period within which an application for certiorari might be made from six months to three months and also provided that time could not be extended unless the application established a good and sufficient reason for extension and that the circumstances that resulted in the failure to make the application within the three month period were outside the applicant's control and could not reasonably have been anticipated by him or her.

4 On the 21st of January 2008, the applicant made an application for redress in respect of his treatment at an industrial school. The statutory period under s.8(1) of the 2002 Act had expired on the 15th December 2005, and therefore if the application was to be entertained it was necessary for him to secure an extension of time pursuant to s.8(2). On the 9th of January 2012, the respondent Board delivered a ruling in which it refused his application for an extension of time. He did not seek to challenge that decision at the time. On the 26th of June 2014, the applicant requested a consideration of the decision. By letter of the 28th of July 2014, the solicitor to the Board responded and indicated that the chairman was satisfied the Board had exhausted its statutory function. By further letter of the 24th of November 2015, the applicant wrote to the Board requesting that it review its decision in the light...