Scully v Coucal

JurisdictionIreland
CourtSupreme Court
JudgeMr. Justice Gerard Hogan,Mr. Justice Brian Murray
Judgment Date27 November 2025
Neutral Citation[2025] IESC 51
Docket NumberS:AP:IE:2024:000088

In the Matter of Regulation No. 1215/2012 and Order 42A Rule 23(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts and S.I. No. 9/2016

Between/
Michael Scully
Respondent
and
Coucal Limited (No.2)
Appellant

[2025] IESC 51

O'Donnell C.J.

O'Malley J.

Woulfe J.

Hogan J.

Murray J.

S:AP:IE:2024:000088

AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH

THE SUPREME COURT

Recognition of judgment – Secondment – Brussels I (recast) – Appellant seeking the recognition of a Polish judgment in the State – Whether the secondment of a judge to the Polish Court of Appeal was invalid

Facts: The appellant, Coucal Ltd, was an Irish company established by some 63 investors, the majority - if not all - of whom were Irish citizens resident in the State. They contended that they were the victims of certain wrongdoings in Poland perpetrated by the respondent, Mr Scully, an Irish resident. The appeal centred on whether the assignment of a claim by the investors to Coucal Ltd which was valid under Polish law either so savours of champerty or was one which otherwise permitted the assignment of a bare cause of action to an unconnected third party such that the Irish courts would be justified in refusing to recognise or enforce the ensuing Polish judgment on the ground that the case came within the manifest public policy exception in Article 45(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (Brussels I (recast)). The first judgment ([2025] IESC 20) rejected the argument that the recognition of the Polish judgment should be refused on the ground that to do so would be manifestly contrary to public policy in the State within the meaning of Article 45(1)(a) of Brussels I (recast). This was the second judgment which the Supreme Court was required to deliver in the appeal. Mr Scully’s objection was based on the ground that the secondment of Judge Strączyńska to the Polish Court of Appeal pursuant to Article 77 of the Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts of 27 July 2001 was invalid given that the secondment procedure provided thereby was per se contrary to Article 19(1) TEU.

Held by Hogan J that it was clear from the decision of the Court of Justice in TB [Daka] (Joined Cases C-422/23, C-455/23, C-459/23, C-486/23 and C-493/23, EU:C:2025:592)that the secondment procedure was unobjectionable, at least in civil cases of this kind. He found that there was no evidence that the secondment engaged any potential interest of the Polish State and, unlike cases such as Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19 WB (EU:2021:931), there was no suggestion that the selection by lot of Judge Strączyńska to sit on that particular panel of the Polish Court of Appeal in a civil matter could realistically give rise to any concerns that she was subject to external control or that her judicial independence was in any way jeopardised. Hogan J held that the judgment of the Court of Justice in TB [Daka] had made it clear that the secondment of a judge to a higher court pursuant to Article 77 of the Polish Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts is not in itself contrary to the requirements of EU law. This, however, was the very objection advanced by Mr Scully to the recognition of the Polish judgment, and Hogan J considered that this ground of objection had been rendered acte clair by that judgment.

Hogan J declared that the judgment of the Polish Court of Appeal was entitled to recognition in the State, and rejected any arguments based on public policy contained in Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I (recast).

Judgment of Polish Court of Appeal recognised in State.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Gerard Hogan delivered on the 27th day of November 2025

Part I – Introduction
1

. This is the second judgment which this Court is required to deliver in this particular appeal, the first judgment having been delivered on 26 th May 2025: see Scully v. Coucal Ltd. [2025] IESC 20. The underlying question in both instances is whether a judgment of a Polish court delivered in favour of Coucal Ltd. is entitled to recognition in this State.

2

. In the first judgment this Court rejected the argument that the recognition of the Polish judgment should be refused on the ground that to do so would be manifestly contrary to public policy in the State within the meaning of Article 45(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (“ Brussels I (recast)”). The public policy argument which had been advanced for the purposes of the first judgment was that the individual investors in a particular project had assigned their causes of action to Coucal in a manner which was said to be champertous, and thus unenforceable by reference to Irish law.

3

. The judgment debtor, Mr. Scully, had in fact advanced a second argument in respect of the recognition of the Polish judgment, namely, that one of the judges on the panel of the Polish Court of Appeal who had delivered judgment (Judge Anna Straczynska) had herself been assigned for a temporary period to that Court from a lower court by the Polish Minister for Justice pursuant to Article 77 of the Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts of 27 July 2001. As it happens, it appears that Judge Straczynska has been the subject of some five secondments to the Polish Court of Appeal. The first four secondments were each for a six-month period, and the latest secondment appears to have been for an indefinite period: see paragraphs 11 and 12 of the affidavit of Professor Gutowski of 22 nd December 2021.

4

. It is now said that this assignment – and the Polish law which underpins it – is both void and inapplicable as a matter of EU law, for reasons I will presently explain. If this argument is correct, then this would raise serious questions as to whether the Polish judgment was entitled to recognition in this State.

5

. Following this decision of the Polish Court of Appeal, Mr. Scully appealed in cassation (i.e., essentially on a point of law) to the Polish Supreme Court. A three-judge panel (including a Judge JG) was appointed to hear the appeal. In September 2023, Mr. Scully filed an objection to the presence of Judge JG in accordance with a procedure provided for by Article 29 of the Law on the Supreme Court of 8 December 2017. This objection ultimately gave rise to a reference from the Polish Supreme Court to the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 267 TFEU. I will return presently to this issue.

6

. Before proceeding further, it is necessary once again to explain the background to the present appeal. Coucal Ltd. is an Irish company which was established by some 63 investors, the majority – if not, indeed, all – of whom are Irish citizens who are resident in this State. They contend that they were the victims of certain wrongdoings in Poland which they say were perpetrated by Mr. Michael Scully, an Irish resident. The first appeal centred on whether the assignment of a claim by the investors to Coucal, which was valid under Polish law, either so savours of champerty or was one which otherwise permitted the assignment of a bare cause of action to an unconnected third party, such that the Irish courts would be justified in refusing to recognise or enforce the ensuing Polish judgment on the ground that the case comes within the manifest public policy exception in Article 45(1)(a) of Brussels I (recast). As I have just explained, this particular argument was rejected in the first judgment that this Court delivered. We can now proceed to consider the rule of law issue.

Background
7

. It appears that around 2006, Mr. Scully approached a group of 78 investors to invest in the purchase of land and the construction of a shopping centre in Opole, Poland. The investors invested considerable sums in the form of share capital in a Polish special purpose vehicle (SPV) which undertook the construction project. The shopping centre opened in March 2009. In July 2009, Mr. Scully informed the investors that their intended exit strategy of refinancing the SPV's loans to allow the investors to exit the investment with a profit was no longer feasible due to the global financial crisis.

8

. At the end of November 2010, Mr. Scully apparently informed the investors of an offer by another company, Alterco SA, to swap the shares in the SPV with D series shares in Alterco. It seems that he maintained that this would offer a significant profit and diversification opportunity. It is said that he wrote further in December 2010 to express serious concerns about the financial situation of the shopping centre. No in-depth analysis or explanation was given at the time. The investors agreed to Alterco's offer in March 2011. They proceeded to grant Mr. Scully powers of attorney to effect the necessary transactions on their behalf. Unbeknownst (it is said) to the investors, Mr. Scully had, however, entered into a joint venture with Alterco pursuant to which he was to arrange for the acquisition of these shares in the SPV. The transactions entered into by Mr. Scully are said to have been highly unfavourable to the investors as they resulted in them losing the entire value of their investment.

9

. Following the establishment of Coucal, the investors entered individual assignment agreements to assign their causes of action as against Mr. Scully to Coucal. These assignments were executed under Polish law, and it is accepted that these were valid assignments under that law. The company was established, and individual assignment agreements were devised, for the express purpose of enabling the company to take action against the respondent in Poland on the investors' behalf. The details of the assignments are set out in the first judgment.

10

. In August...

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