Simpson v Governor of Mountjoy Prison
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice John MacMenamin |
| Judgment Date | 31 July 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] IESC 52 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Docket Number | [Appeal No. 2017/170],[S.C. No. 17 of 2017] |
| Date | 31 July 2020 |
AND
[2020] IESC 52
Clarke C.J.
O'Donnell J.
McKechnie J.
MacMenamin J.
O'Malley J.
[Appeal No. 2017/170]
[High Court Record No. 2014/6642P]
THE SUPREME COURT
Costs – Declaratory relief – Damages – Appellant seeking costs – Whether the appellant was entitled to the costs of the hearing in the High Court
Facts: The Supreme Court, on the 14th November, 2019, [2019] IESC 81, held that, as a result of the conditions under which he had been detained, the appellant, Mr Simpson, was entitled to a declaration under Article 40.3 of the Constitution of Ireland, and an award in damages of €7,500. The Court invited separate submissions on costs. As it was accepted by all parties that it was necessary that the principles applicable in this category of case be authoritatively determined, the respondents, the Governor of Mountjoy Prison, the Irish Prison Service, the Minister for Justice and Equality, Ireland and the Attorney General, properly acknowledged that the appellant was entitled to the costs of the appeal. What remained in question were the costs of the 30-day High Court hearing where, despite granting a declaration that the appellant’s constitutional right to privacy had been infringed, the trial judge (White J) declined to award him any costs as a result of the extent to which he had lied and exaggerated in his testimony. Counsel for the appellant submitted to the Supreme Court that his client was nonetheless entitled to almost all the costs of the hearing in the High Court. He made allowance for 4 days where he accepted his client’s case was rejected by White J.
Held by MacMenamin J that the directly relevant material fell under three headings: first, the appellant’s physical conditions of detention; second, his claim that he had sustained personal physical and psychological injuries; and third, allegations of harsh regime and ill-treatment. MacMenamin J held that this case could not be characterised as an outright abuse of court process. He found that parts of the claim were ultimately indisputable, the cause was not a fabrication and a significant number of legal and procedural issues were determined in the appellant’s favour. MacMenamin J held that, when disentangled, the evidence actually found to be true did warrant the form of constitutional vindication which the Court held appropriate. He also held that there was dishonesty in the first category, exaggeration at minimum in the second category, and a high degree of untruthfulness in the third aspect of the claim. MacMenamin J held that the fact that, hypothetically, the appellant might end up owing obligations to his lawyers was entirely due to his own decisions, and conduct.
MacMenamin J held that a cumulative approach was justified. Having weighed all the features together and borne in mind that the appellant received a declaration and, ultimately, limited damages, MacMenamin J held that the balance must remain substantially weighted against him. Having measured all the features, MacMenamin J held that a most just and proportionate response should be that the appellant be awarded 33⅓% of the costs of the High Court proceedings, together with 33⅓% of the reserved costs of these proceedings; the consequences of this was that at taxation there should be an identification of what might have been the total costs and reserved costs when taxed, and the appellant should receive 33⅓% of that figure.
Costs awarded to appellant.
On the 14th November, 2019, this Court delivered its judgments in this appeal ( [2019] IESC 81), holding that, as a result of the conditions under which he had been detained, the appellant was entitled to a declaration under Article 40.3 of the Constitution of Ireland, and an award in damages of €7,500. The Court invited separate submissions on costs. The purpose of this judgment is to deal with that question. As it was accepted by all parties that it was necessary that the principles applicable in this category of case be authoritatively determined, the respondents have now properly acknowledged that the appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeal.
What remains in question, then, are the costs of the 30-day High Court hearing where, despite granting a declaration that the appellant's constitutional right to privacy had been infringed, the trial judge (White J.) declined to award him any costs as a result of the extent to which he had lied and exaggerated in his testimony. Counsel for the appellant submits to this Court that his client is nonetheless entitled almost all the costs of the hearing in the High Court. He makes allowance for 4 days where he accepts his client's case was rejected by White J.
This judgment is to be read in conjunction with the judgments of this Court already handed down. It seeks to outline the legal principles now to be considered; examines a number of key features of the High Court case itself; and then applies those legal principles in addressing the application for costs. Finally, there are some more general observations arising from the case.
An application for costs is often a routine matter determined on first principles. Here it may be of more significance. There are 1,500 other prison condition cases pending in the courts system. There may well be other claims giving rise to awards of damages. Whether the claimants may already have duties or debts due in law either to individuals harmed by their criminal activities, or to society in general, is a matter outside the scope of this judgment.
There has been some description of this case as a “slopping-out” case. I think that description is misleading. In fact, the claim concerned a range of features which led the Court to the conclusion that there had been an infringement of rights and duties derived from Article 40.3 of the Constitution. These concern a range of issues of which in-cell sanitation was but one factor, albeit an important one.
The Court held that the award of damages was necessary because the conditions to which the appellant, a “protection prisoner”, was exposed fell seriously below those to be expected in an Irish prison in the year 2013. The State respondents (“the State”) were in breach of their duties to uphold those standards in practice. The appellant's rights were infringed to a degree which required a constitutional vindication greater than the declaration alone which was granted in the High Court.
The High Court judgment, delivered by a highly experienced judge, was careful, meticulous and detailed. When there were aspects of the appellant's detention regime to be criticised, White J. did so in no uncertain terms. When it came to considering issues in dispute, he carefully distilled and sifted the evidence and reached clear conclusions on each of the issues before him. This balanced approach provides a strong basis for the consideration which follows.
As is clear, both from his main High Court judgment and his subsequent ruling on costs, White J. found this appellant to be a very unreliable witness. But there is a danger here in arguing from the particular to the general. Prisoners, or former prisoners, who bring cases concerning very sub-standard conditions are entitled to a fair hearing, just as the appellant received. Each case deserves to be treated on its own merits. Litigants are constitutionally entitled to have access to the courts; issues of credibility arise in a wide variety of cases - not any one in particular.
The appellant was fortunate to have the services of legal representatives prepared to take on this case in circumstances where there was no guarantee of remuneration. It is worth making the point that both sides shared the common view that, because of its nature and its potential precedential effect, this case warranted a level of legal representation unusual by current-day standards. It is now necessary to consider some specific features of the High Court judgment.
Consideration must start with the findings of facts which, in turn, grounded the remedy as ultimately determined by this Court. For most of his imprisonment, the appellant was kept in a cell for up to 23 hours a day with another inmate on a restricted regime with no in-cell sanitation. On some occasions, he was one of three prisoners confined to a single cell. All these features were breaches of the standards for accommodation laid down by the Inspector of Prisons for protection prisoners. White J. criticised the fact that the prison authorities had not adverted to the extent to which such prisoners continued to be placed in, and ultimately filled the entirety of, the D1 landing in Mountjoy Prison. He observed that the possibility of alternative accommodation in the prison had not been sufficiently considered, that the appellant's out-of-cell time was severely restricted, and that the appellant was denied access to any form of education or work while detained in the D wing. These were all findings of fact, or inferences firmly based on evidence (see, Hay v. O'Grady [1992] 1 I.R. 210).
The judge criticised the fact that the prison authorities had not taken steps to ameliorate the toileting arrangements for protection prisoners on the Dl wing, and that no satisfactory explanation had been proffered as to why mobile toilets had not been deployed. He drew attention to the fact that misleading assurances on sanitation issues had been given to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. He expressed concern that the Prison Service left it to the Governor...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
A v The Minister for Justice and Equality
...threshold for such an appeal was not a decisive factor in deciding an application for costs (Simpson v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2020] IESC 52). The court held that it was necessary to determine the issue of the constitutionality and compatibility of the impugned section and resolve the ......