Singh v District Justice Ruane

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Barron
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1990
• Neutral Citation: 1989 WJSC-HC 2403
• Docket Number: No. 45/1989,[1989 No. 45 J.R.]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 01 January 1990

1989 WJSC-HC 2403

No. 45/1989

SINGH v. RUANE

JUDICIAL REVIEW

INDER SINGH

APPLICANT

v.

DISTRICT JUSTICE JARLATH RUANE AND THE MINISTER FORLABOUR

RESPONDENTS

1 Judgment of Mr. Justice Barrondelivered on the 27th day of June 1989

2 The Applicant was charged with having committed anoffence under the provisions of Section 10 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1969. The matter came on for hearing on the 18th November 1988 before the first named Respondent. The Applicant's defence was that, if any offence had been committed, it had been committed by a limited company of which he was the Managing Director, and not by him personally.

3 When the prosecution case was concluded, the Applicant sought to call a witness to produce the certificate of incorporation of the relevant company. The first named Respondent refused to allow this witness to give evidence unless the Applicant himself first gave evidence. The Applicant refused to assent to this course. No evidence at all was adduced on behalf of the Applicant and he was convicted of the offencecharged.

4 The Applicant now seeks to have this conviction quashed. The first named Respondent has not appeared in these proceedings but the second named Respondent has appeared and consents to the making of the Order. He however submits that the matter should be remitted to the District Court. This aspect of the matter is contested by the Applicant.

5 The Applicant submits that the first named Respondent had jurisdiction to hear the matter and that what occurred was an error in the conduct of the proceedings and that therefore an Order of Certiorari will amount to an acquittal. He relies upon a passage from the judgment of Walsh J. in the State (Tynan) .v. Keane 1968 I.R. 348 at p. 355 asfollows:

"It is also well established that a plea of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit cannot be established if it be based upon anadjuciationwhich was in excess of jurisdiction or without jurisdiction, because such an adjudication is no adjudication at all. That however is something essentially different from the quashing on certiorari of an improper conviction by a tribun al of competent jurisidiction. Such quashing would amount to an acquittal. Similarly an improper acquittal by a Court of competent jurisdiction would not be subject to being quashed on certiorari. In both these latter instances the accused person would have been inperil in that he was before a tribunal which might have subjected him to lawful imprisonment or other lawful...