Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Faherty J,Burns J
• Judgment Date: 18 November 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IECA 229
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)
• Docket Number: [2023 No. 196]

Between

Piotr Skoczylas

Applicant/Appellant

and

The Minister for Finance

Respondent

[2025] IECA 229

The President

Faherty J

Burns J

[2023 No. 196]

[2021 No. 341 MCA]

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

Costs – Adjudication – Jurisdiction – Appellant seeking to review a judgment of the Court of Appeal – Whether the application engaged the exceptional jurisdiction

Facts: The appellant, Mr Skoczylas, was awarded costs in proceedings he and others, including Scotchstone Capital Fund Ltd, brought to set aside a direction order made by the respondent, the Minister for Finance, on 26 July 2011 pursuant to s. 9 of the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010. The appellant sought to have those costs adjudicated or taxed. On 18 January 2021, the Legal Costs Adjudicator (LCA) gave directions regarding the application for adjudication pending before him. He directed that the issue of whether the Scotchstone LLP (SCLLP) costs claimed by the appellant were captured by the court orders was to be determined as a preliminary issue. The parties were to provide written submissions confined to that issue and “any material either party wishes to rely on” was to be lodged in physical format at a given date. The LCA gave his interim determination on 2 June 2021 and the appellant applied for consideration of the decision and for a determination under s. 160(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. The LCA delivered his ruling on the consideration on 15 November 2021. The appellant sought a review of the consideration of the adjudicator in accordance with s. 161(4). In a judgment delivered on 17 January 2023, the High Court refused the appellant’s claim. The appellant appealed the decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal. By a judgment delivered on 30 July 2024, the Court dismissed the appeal. The appellant applied to review the judgment and subsequent rulings of the Court.

Held by the Court that the premise of the application was false: there was no error within the meaning of the jurisprudence in either para. 76 of the principal judgment or in the stay judgment. The Court held that there was no error in the correction ruling in refusing to correct the alleged error; it followed that there was no basis for the appellant’s contentions that the Court deliberately contrived a falsehood or refused to right a wrong for entirely improper motives. The Court held that there was no malicious or otherwise improper action by the Court in delivering the stay judgment or the correction ruling. The Court held that the application fell below the threshold required to engage the exceptional jurisdiction. The Court held that, in effect, the application was brought, not to correct alleged errors, but for the purpose of revisiting the merits of elements of the decisions of the Court with which the appellant did not agree; this was impermissible. The Court held that under the Constitution where a party is dissatisfied with the outcome of an appeal in the Court the appropriate course of action is not to bring multiple applications aimed at changing or reversing its judgment(s). The Court held that the principal judgment was final and conclusive, save in the event the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

The Court refused the application.

Application refused.

[approved]

[no redaction needed]

RULING of the Court delivered on the 18 ^th day of November 2025

1 . The Court heard the appeal from the judgment of the High Court (Owens J) dated 17 January 2023, and by a judgment delivered on 30 July 2024, dismissed the appeal. The question of costs (in the High Court and in this Court) remains to be addressed, and for that reason, no order has yet been drawn or perfected. This ruling is not part of the judgment but should be read with it. This ruling concerns an application to review the judgment and subsequent rulings of this Court.

Constitutional Framework

2 . Article 34.4.3° provides that “ the decision of the Court of Appeal shall be final and conclusive, save as otherwise provided by this Article”. Article 34.5.3° provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the Court of Appeal if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or it is necessary in the interests of justice that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court. It is accepted that in most matters which come before the Court of Appeal, its decisions are final and conclusive, given that relatively few matters are granted leave to appeal pursuant to Article 34.5.3°.

3 . The Supreme Court, in the matter of Greendale Developments Ltd [2000] 2 IR 514, LP v MP [2002] 1 IR 219, and DPP v McKevitt [2009] IESC 29, identified the exceptional potential jurisdiction which exists where injustice would be suffered if a final judgment of the Supreme Court could never be altered or amended, notwithstanding an error of fact identified in the judgment. The jurisdiction was founded upon the primary role of the Supreme Court to administer justice, and it recognised that there could be very exceptional cases where, in order to fulfil that constitutional role, it would be necessary to review a judgment which was otherwise final and conclusive.

4 . There have been a considerable number of cases identifying and discussing the parameters and limitations of the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has adopted a Practice Direction for dealing with applications invoking the exceptional jurisdiction, as has the Court of Appeal, initially in a Practice Direction dated 15 February 2023, and subsequently, in a revised Practice Direction dated 5 December 2024. The latter was the applicable Practice Direction at the time the appellant made his application. It provides:

“1. (1) An intending applicant must lodge in the Office of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal (in this practice direction “the Office”) in hard copy –

(a) a copy of the notice of motion sought to be issued in the proceedings seeking a review,

(b) an affidavit (not to exceed 2,000 words), duly sworn, verifying any facts sought to be relied on in support of the intended application,

(c) any exhibits referred to in that affidavit, and

(d) a short submission (not exceeding 1000 words) stating how it is said the intended application satisfies the criteria for review and arises in ‘the most exceptional circumstances’.

(2) Such lodgement by an intending applicant should be made before the expiry of 28 days (or such extended period as the panel of judges hereinafter mentioned in paragraph 2 may permit) from the date of perfection of the order of the Court.

2. The papers referred to in paragraph 1 shall be considered by the panel of judges that heard the appeal, or, in the discretion of the President of the Court, by such other panel as the President may direct for that purpose.

3. The panel of judges referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine on the papers referred to in paragraph 1, and on any papers in reply furnished in accordance with paragraph 4, whether or not, having regard to the principles referred to in the relevant case-law including the case-law referred to in the recitals to this practice direction, the application intended to be made is one in respect of which a hearing on the merits is justified.

4. The panel of judges referred to in paragraph 2 may, in its absolute discretion, direct that the papers referred to in paragraph 1 be served on any party to the original proceedings and on any other person for the purpose of affording that party or person an opportunity to furnish to the Court a reply in writing, supported where appropriate by a replying affidavit, to the allegations of the intending applicant.

5. The papers in reply referred to in paragraph 4 shall be lodged at the Office within such time from the date of service of the intending applicant's papers as the panel of judges referred to in paragraph 2 shall direct.

6. If not satisfied in accordance with paragraph 3 that the application intended to be made is one in respect of which a hearing on the merits is justified, the panel of judges referred to in paragraph 2 shall refuse leave to make the application, in which event the intending applicant shall be notified of such refusal by the Registrar in writing or by email.

7. If satisfied in accordance with paragraph 3 that the application intended to be made is one in respect of which a hearing on the merits is justified, the panel of judges referred to in paragraph 2 shall give leave to the intending applicant to issue a motion on notice for a specified initial return date, in which event notification of such leave and of that return date shall be given by the Registrar to the intending applicant in writing or by email.

8. On the initial return date of the motion the Court shall give such directions as it considers appropriate for the hearing of the motion. Save where the President of the Court in his/her discretion otherwise directs the motion shall be heard and determined by the panel of judges referred to in paragraph 2.”

5 . The principles the Court will apply to applications of this nature have been analysed in Bailey v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2018] IECA 63, Bates v Minister for Agriculture [2019] IESC 35, Student Transport Scheme v Bus Eireann [2021] IESC 22 and IESC 35, Scotchstone Capital Fund Ltd v Ireland [2022] IECA 275, Dowling & Ors v Minister for Finance [2022] IECA 285, and Launceston Property Finance DAC v Wright [2020] IECA 146, and I do not propose to repeat the analysis set out in those cases. In Dowling, the Court accepted that the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal was correctly set out in Friends First Managed Pension Funds Ltd v Paul Smithwick [2019] IECA 197, and that the position had been correctly summarised in Launceston Property Finance DAC. The Court stated at paras. 29 and 30 of its judgment:

“29. The...