Smith v Cisco Systems Internetworking (Ireland) Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)
• Judge: Mr. Justice Binchy
• Judgment Date: 21 January 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IECA 6
• Docket Number: High Court Record No.: 2018 210 MCA

In the Matter of the Employment Equality Act 1998

And in the Matter of the Equality Act 2004

And in the Matter of the Workplace Relations Act 2015

Between/

Olumide Smith

Appellant/Plaintiff

and

Cisco Systems Internetworking (Ireland) Limited

Respondent/Defendant

[2025] IECA 6

Whelan J.

Binchy J.

Allen J.

High Court Record No.: 2018 210 MCA

Court of Appeal Record Number: 2022/67

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Employment – Dismissal – Racial discrimination – Appellant claiming that the respondent had discriminated against him on the grounds of race in dismissing him from his employment – Whether the appellant had identified any error of law on the part of the High Court judge

Facts: The appellant, Mr Smith, was formerly employed by the respondent, Cisco Systems Internetworking (Ireland) Ltd, as a software engineer pursuant to a contract of employment entered into between the parties on 11 December 2007, with effect from January 2008. He was dismissed from that employment, following a disciplinary inquiry, on 2 July 2013. In November 2013, the appellant submitted complaints to the Equality Authority pursuant to the Employment Equality Act 1998, claiming that the respondent had victimised him in his employment, had discriminated against him on the grounds of race in the amount of his remuneration, in failing to promote him and ultimately in dismissing him from his employment. The appellant was initially successful in his claims before a Rights Commissioner following an uncontested hearing (the respondent claimed it did not receive notice of the same), but on appeal to what was then the Equality Tribunal (the Workplace Relations Commission) his complaints were dismissed by an Adjudication Officer in a decision delivered on 18 February 2016. The appellant appealed that decision to the Labour Court, which handed down its decision on that appeal in a determination dated 26 April 2018. The Labour Court upheld the decision of the Adjudication Officer. The appellant then appealed the determination to the High Court pursuant to s. 90(1) of the 1998 Act. In a judgment handed down on 13 November 2020 ([2020] IEHC 714), the High Court (Meenan J) dismissed the appeal, and it was from that decision of the High Court that the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. There was a substantial overlap between the grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal and the grounds of appeal to the High Court. In general, the appellant was of the view that the High Court judge erred in more or less the same manner as the Labour Court in his consideration of the issues and in arriving at the conclusions that he did. The appellant requested the Court of Appeal to refer 33 questions to the CJEU.

Held by Binchy J that the right of appeal to the High Court available to the appellant under s. 90(1) of the 1998 Act is a right of appeal on a point of law. Binchy J held that the substance of the judgment of the High Court was that he had failed to identify a point of law. Binchy J held that the appellant had failed to identify any error of law on the part of the High Court judge. Binchy J held that the appellant had also failed to identify any facts such as would establish that the High Court judge erred as a matter of law in failing find that the Labour Court should have made findings of fact proving discrimination or from which an inference of discrimination on the part of the respondent against the appellant should have been drawn. Binchy J therefore dismissed all of the appellant’s grounds of appeal.

Binchy J reviewed all of the proposed questions, finding that none of them raised an issue of interpretation of European law or concerned the transposition of European law into the domestic law of the State. Binchy J therefore refused the request to refer the questions to the CJEU.

Appeal dismissed.

NO REDACTION NEEDED

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Binchy delivered on the 21 ^st day of January 2025

1 . The appellant herein was formerly employed by the respondent as a software engineer pursuant to a contract of employment entered into between the parties on 11 ^th December 2007, with effect from January 2008. He was dismissed from that employment, following a disciplinary inquiry (the “Disciplinary Inquiry”), on 2 ^nd July 2013. In November 2013 the appellant submitted complaints to the Equality Authority pursuant to the Employment Equality Act, 1998 (as amended) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “1998 Act”), claiming that the respondent had victimised him in his employment, had discriminated against him on the grounds of race in the amount of his remuneration, in failing to promote him and ultimately in dismissing him from his employment. The appellant was initially successful in his claims before a Rights Commissioner following an uncontested hearing (the respondent claims it did not receive notice of the same), but on appeal to what was then the Equality Tribunal (now the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”)) his complaints were dismissed by an Adjudication Officer in a decision delivered on 18 ^th February 2016. The appellant appealed that decision to the Labour Court, which handed down its decision on that appeal in a determination dated 26 ^th April 2018 (the “Determination”). The Labour Court upheld the decision of the Adjudication Officer. The appellant then appealed the Determination to the High Court pursuant to s. 90(1) of the 1998 Act. That section provides that such an appeal is on a point of law only. In a judgment handed down on 13 ^th November 2020 ( [2020] IEHC 714), the High Court (Meenan J.) dismissed the appeal, and it is from that decision of the High Court that the appellant now appeals.

Jurisdiction of the High Court on a Point of Law

2 . At paras. 5–11 of his judgment, Meenan J. addressed the jurisdiction of the High Court in an appeal on a point of law. He cited passages from Mara (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hummingbird Limited [1982] I.L.R.M. 421 and Deely v. The Information Commissioner [2001] 3 I.R. 439. It is sufficient for present purposes to cite only the latter passage taken from the judgment of McKechnie J., then in the High Court:-

“… There is no doubt but that when a court is considering only a point of law, whether by way of a restricted appeal or via a case stated, the distinction in my view being irrelevant, it is, in accordance with established principles, confined as to its remit, in the manner following:-

(a) it cannot set aside findings of primary fact unless there is no evidence to support such findings;

(b) it ought not to set aside inferences drawn from such facts unless such inferences were ones which no reasonable decision making body could draw;

(c) it can, however, reverse such inferences, if the same were based on the interpretation of documents and should do so if incorrect; and finally;

(d) if the conclusion reached by such bodies shows that they have taken an erroneous view of the law, then that also is a ground for setting aside the resulting decision….”

3 . As Meenan J. observed, it is thus clear that an appeal on a point of law is not a de novo appeal, and that the circumstances under which the High Court may interfere with findings of fact in such an appeal are limited. That observation applies equally to a further appeal from the High Court to this Court in such matters.

4 . I do not understand the appellant in this appeal to argue that the trial judge erred in failing to identify the principles applicable to such appeals. Instead, as I understand it, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in failing to apply those principles correctly, and in particular in failing to set aside certain findings of primary fact as found by the Labour Court in respect of which the appellant contends there was no evidence to support those findings. The appellant also contends that the trial judge erred in law. However, as will become apparent it is difficult to identify either the findings of primary fact as found by the Labour Court or the precise error or errors of law upon which the appellant relies.

The Determination

Preliminary Issue

5 . In the Determination, the Labour Court addressed a preliminary issue regarding the scope of the appeal before it. This issue arises out of the provisions of s. 77(5) of the 1998 Act, which, as amended by s. 83(1)(c)(ii) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 (the “2015 Act”) provides as follows:-

“(5) (a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

(b) On application by a complainant the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission or Circuit Court, as the case may be, may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.” 1

6 . Thus, as the High Court judge observed, it is clear that the act or acts alleged to constitute victimisation or discrimination for the purposes of a complaint under the 1998 Act must have occurred within six months prior to the making of a complaint, but that that six month period may be extended for a period up to twelve months where an applicant can demonstrate reasonable cause for such an extension of time.

7 . In this case, the complaint was advanced by the appellant in November 2013. The precise date in November is a matter of some disagreement as between the appellant and the Labour Court. This is recorded in the decision of the Labour Court in which it is stated that the...