Somers v Erskine

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: C.J.
• Judgment Date: 14 October 1960
• Neutral Citation: 1930 WJSC-HC 996
• Court: High Court
• Date: 14 October 1960

1930 WJSC-HC 996

Somers v. Erskine

ERSKINE

V.

SOMERS

SOMERS

V.

ERSKINE

1 Judgment of Court by C.J.DISMISS appeals On 14th October 1960

2 Appeals by Mr. Somers (in person) against orders of Dixon J. and Haugh J. in various proceedings arising out of mortgage suit.

3 The task of the Court in considering these five appeals has been rendered difficult by reason of the fact that it has not had the assistance of Counsel on behalf of the appellant. After three days of argument and many hours spent reading the voluminous documents in the books of appeal we feel however that we sufficiently know the history of the litigation in which the plaintiff has been involved to enable us to appreciate all the points which he made in support of his appeals.

4 The litigation out of which the actions and motions now before us arise has gone on for over 25 years.

5 Broadly speaking the statements of claim which the plaintiff has served in the various actions and the motions which he has brought have the same object, namely to set aside the primary decree in the action record no. 1935/1510 made on the 24th July, 1936.

6 Dixon J. refused an application by the plaintiff for liberty to file and deliver a statement of claim in the action 1953-440 ^P and granted an application to ???query??????the statement of claim delivered in an action record no.1956-1164 ^P on the grounds that the matters complained of comprise issues dealt with in previous actions. He also held apart from this ground that the statements of claim in so far as they purported to raise other matters for consideration were prolix, obscure, embarrassing and difficult to plead to and merited being struck out on this groundalone.

7 He came to the conclusion that the plaintiff sought to rely upon fraud, the only new ground put forward, because he realized that save on this ground he could not hope to set aside or review the result of the prior action. He found it difficult to gather what exactly was the fraud alleged and found so far as he could understand the pleadings that it was an endeavour to rely upon matters which had already been litigated in the earlier action. He furthermore came to the conclusion so far as there was anything alleged which was not raised in the prior action that there was nothing fresh which could not have been known to the appellant had he used due diligence.

8 Having listened to the plaintiff at great length we are of opinion that the...