Steele v Mahon

JurisdictionIreland
CourtCourt of Appeal (Ireland)
Judgment Date16 November 1909
Date16 November 1909
Steele
and
Mahon (1).

Appeal.

CASES

DETERMINED BY

THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION

OF

THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN IRELAND,

AND ON APPEAL THEREFROM IN

THE COURT OF APPEAL,

AND BY

THE COURT FOR CROWN CASES RESERVED.

1910.

Parliamentary franchise — Inhabitant householder — Dwelling-house — Easement enjoyed by another party — 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26, s. 5 — “Sole and exclusive use” — Part of a house separately occupied.

Where the franchise is claimed under 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26, s. 5, in respect of part of a house alleged to be separately occupied as a dwelling, there must be sole and exclusive use by the occupier of that statutory dwelling-house: and such sole and exclusive use is negatived by the existence of an easement, such as a right of passage enjoyed as of right by another party, over any part of the premises which constitute the statutory dwelling-house.

M'Bride v. Bryans, [1908] 2 I. R. 329, reconsidered by the full Court of Appeal and, after re-argument, adhered to and followed.

Appeal from the decision of Mr. J. S. Baxter, one of the Assistant Revising Barristers of the Borough of Londonderry.

The case stated was as follows:—

At a Court for the Revision of the Lists of Voters for the County Borough of Londonderry, held on the 16th September, 1909, and following days, the name of John Steele appeared on the Town Clerk's List (No. 21) of claimants for the West Division of the said County Borough as follows:—

“171, Steele, John, 39 Abbey Street, Inhabitant Householder, dwelling-house, being exclusive occupation of front room, ground and back room, 1st flat, and so much of a kitchen as is not occupied by a right of way, passing in a straight line from the door communicating between a common hall and the said kitchen and a common yard, 39 Abbey Street.”

The said name was duly objected to.

It was admitted that the claimant had sub-let a room upstairs to a sub-tenant named Dunn, who passed through the kitchen to the yard. The facts of the case are identical with those of Coyle v. Mahon

(1) and Green v. Mahon (1), decided last year by the Court of Appeal; and the names of the claimant and of the other persons set out in the schedule hereto were included in the schedules to Coyle v. Mahon (1) and Green v. Mahon (1); there was no change in the circumstances. It was contended that on the description in the fourth column it was open to me to hold that the case was distinguishable from Coyle v. Mahon (1).

I found as a fact that the words in the fourth column (2) accurately described the qualifying premises.

I also found that the sub-tenant could get in or out, to and from his rooms to the street, without passing through the claimant's kitchen. I was unable to distinguish the case from Coyle v. Mahon (1), and expunged the name.

The question for the Court of Appeal is—Whether I was right in law in so deciding? If not, the name is to be restored.

The cases of the persons included in the schedule hereto are identical with this case, and are to be ruled by it.

I name the objector, James A. Mahon, and Sir F. Henry Miller, Town Clerk, as respondents.

J. S. Baxter.

The arguments were opened on the 15th November, 1909, before the Lord Chief Justice, Palles, C.B., and Holmes, L.J., when A. M. Sullivan, K.C. (with him Patton), was heard for the appellant. On the close of the second day's argument (16th November) Henry, K.C. (with him Osborne), having partly opened the argument on behalf of the respondents, the Court intimated, as was afterwards held, that the case was undistinguishable on its facts from M'Bride v. Bryans (3), and that if that case was to be reviewed, it would be necessary to have a re-argument before a full Court of Appeal. Sullivan, K.C., having stated that the question raised was of exceptional importance, having regard to the great number of claimants whose rights were affected by it, and that the appeal was brought mainly to challenge the decision in M'Bride v. Bryans (3); the case stood over for the attendance of

the Master of the Rolls, and was resumed on November 15th and 16th.

Healy, K.C., and A. M. Sullivan, K.C. (with them Patton), for the appellant:—

The Representation of the People Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 103, sect. 3), extended to Ireland by 48 Vict. c. 3, after conferring the occupation franchise in boroughs, excludes joint occupiers of a dwelling-house. Dwelling-house is defined in section 61 as “any part of a house occupied as a separate dwelling and separately rated to the relief of the poor.” The sole question is, Was the claimant in separate occupation of a dwelling-house? He has the exclusive occupation of two rooms and the use of the kitchen. Take it either way:—First, that he is in occupation of the whole kitchen subject to a right of way; or secondly, that he is in occupation of so much of the kitchen as is not occupied by the passage. If the first alternative be adopted, we admit that it is impossible to distinguish M'Bride v. Bryans (1). But is that case good law? According to the report no authority was cited. In this numerous class of cases, who is in occupation of the kitchen? Certainly not the occupier of the upper story; therefore the claimant must be the occupier: Hardy'sCase (2). The most the person upstairs had was an easement. Does that destroy the right to the franchise, the right of way across the kitchen being an incorporeal right? The exact contrary was decided by this Court in Torish v. Love (3). See also Reg. (Callaghan) v. Justices of Donegal (4). The difference between use and easement is shown in Holywell Union and Halkyn Parish v. Halkyn Drainage Co. (5). Lord Herschell said (at p. 120), “In consequence probably of the line of argument, the case appears to have been treated by the learned Judges” (i.e., in the Court of Appeal) “as one in which the only alternative views were ownership or easement. I do not think this is so”; and (at p. 126) he says, “Where a person already in possession has given to another

possession of part of his premises, if that possession be not exclusive he does not cease to be liable to the rate, nor does the other become so. A familiar illustration of this occurs in the case of a landlord and his lodger. Both are, in a sense, in occupation; but the occupation of the landlord is paramount, that of the lodger subordinate.” And Lord Macnaghten said (p. 127), “The question in each case must be, whether there is in fact such an occupation as, according to the Statute of Elizabeth, and a course of decisions which have been recognized and established as law, carries with it liability for rating purposes.” In Cory v. Bristow (1), another case as to rateability, Lord O'Hagan said (p. 279), “The occupation to which it” (rateability) “is attached must be an actual, an exclusive, and a profitable occupation.” And Lord Blackburn (p. 283) said, “Who was the occupier? Were the plaintiffs merely persons having an easement without occupying, or were they the rightful occupiers?” Could persons here be rated for the use of the passage? See M'Laughlin v. Chambers (2), Bradley v. Baylis (3), Miller v. Horish (4) as to the distinction between separate occupation as an inhabitant occupier and occupation as a lodger. In Riddall v. Maguire (5) the eldest son of a tenant in fee-simple who died intestate was held to be in sole occupation for the purposes of the franchise, although the widow continued to reside on the qualifying premises. A similar case is Campbell v. Chambers (6): Boylands v. Lloyd and Martin (7) was the case of tenants holding separate farms, but residing together and working the farms jointly. They were held separate rated occupiers. In Magee v. Colquhoun (Evans'Case (8)), it was held that the voter was in sole occupation, although under his father's will his mother was entitled to reside in the qualifying premises “with full and free liberty of all the house,” but particularly a room described. So also in Brewer v. M'Gowen (9), the claimant was held entitled, though he had let to a lodger the exclusive use of a bedroom and the joint use of a sittingroom. See p. 245, where Brett, J., explains the object of the proviso in section 3 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102. Campbell v. Farren (1) is the converse of this case. There the occupier of the upper story was held to occupy separately, independently of the right of way. Torish v. King (2), p. 211, was a case of agistment, and M'Farland v. Torish (3) a case of conacre; the party letting the grazing or in conacre was held not disqualified.

The question arising here is, Does separate occupation mean exclusive use? A county road running through a large farm cannot kill the franchise. If a rated occupier dedicated such a road to the public, that would not destroy his right to the franchise. How much less the right to pass over, if so inclined, a square foot of ground in the use of a passage which, as the Revising Barrister found, could be dispensed with, as the party upstairs had other modes of access to front and rear: De minimis non curat lex.

Again, the statement of the qualification and the description of the qualifying premises excludes the principle of M'Bride v. Bryans (4). Coyle v. Mahon (5) merely follows M'Bride v. Bryans (4).

The 5th section of the Act of 1871 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26) is explained by Lord Justice Fitz Gibbon in Hasson v....

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