T.M. [Georgia] v The International Appeals Tribunal and Anor

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Barry O'Donnell
• Judgment Date: 10 March 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] IEHC 150
• Year: 2026
• Docket Number: [2024/1138JR]

Between:

T.M. (Georgia)

Applicant

and

The International Appeals Tribunal and The Minister for Justice

Respondents

[2026] IEHC 150

[2024/1138JR]

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial review – International protection – Country-of-origin information – Applicant seeking orders of certiorari quashing a decision affirming a recommendation that she should not be given a refugee declaration or subsidiary protection – Whether the first respondent’s reliance on country-of-origin information was unreasonable or selective

Facts: The applicant, a Georgian national, sought international protection in the State. She applied to the High Court seeking orders of certiorari quashing a decision of the first respondent, the International Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), made on 19 August 2024 (the Decision), affirming an earlier recommendation by the International Protection Office (IPO) to the second respondent, the Minister for Justice, that the applicant should not be given a refugee declaration or subsidiary protection. The applicant’s claim to international protection was rejected on the basis of a finding that Georgia operated: “an effective legal system for the prosecution and punishment of gender-based violence. The protection is effective and of a non-temporary nature. The [applicant] has access to that protection.” The applicant sought to quash the Decision on the following grounds: (a) the Tribunal failed to take account of the United States Department of State report on Human Rights 2024, which reported on events from 2023; (b) the Tribunal’s reliance on country-of-origin information (COI) was unreasonable or selective and led to an irrational conclusion; (c) the Tribunal correctly identified the test to be applied in a consideration of the question of state protection, but failed to apply the test properly; (d) the Tribunal unreasonably concluded in the particular circumstances of the case that there was effective independent oversight of the police in Georgia; (e) the Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasons as to why state protection would be effective for the applicant in her circumstances; and (f) the Tribunal failed to take sufficient account of or attach sufficient weight to s. 28(6) of the International Protection Act 2015 in making the Decision.

Held by O’Donnell J that the test to be applied by the court in a challenge of this type is to consider whether the Tribunal considered all of the relevant COI - and where differences in the analyses of state protection were identified - explained rationally why one analysis was preferred over another. He was not persuaded that the Tribunal engaged in any selectivity of the type criticised in D.V.T.S. v The Minister for Justice [2008] 3 IR 476. It seemed to him that, by analogy with the observations of Ferriter J in F.M. and R.M. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Minister for Justice [2021] IEHC 817, a Tribunal must go beyond finding that a state may be doing its best and assess whether what the state is doing reaches the threshold of effectiveness. O’Donnell J was satisfied that the Tribunal erred: (a) by reaching the conclusion that effective state protection was available to the applicant when that finding did not flow rationally from the COI; and (b) by conflating improvements with effectiveness, and thereby misdirecting itself as to the proper test in s. 31 of the 2015 Act.

O’Donnell J held that the applicant should be granted the relief sought on her second ground only. O’Donnell J quashed the Decision of the Tribunal and remitted the applicant’s appeal from the IPO decision to a differently constituted Tribunal for reconsideration.

Application granted.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O'Donnell delivered on the 10 ^th day of March 2026

INTRODUCTION

1 . The applicant in this case is a Georgian national who sought international protection in the State. In these proceedings she sought orders of certiorari quashing a decision of the first respondent ( the Tribunal) made on the 19 August 2024. The impugned decision ( the Decision) affirmed an earlier recommendation by the International Protection Office ( the IPO) to the second respondent ( the Minister) that the applicant should not be given a refugee declaration or subsidiary protection. As the case arises from matters regulated by the International Protection Act 2015 ( the 2015 Act), the identity of the applicant and matters that could identify her have been anonymised and presented in a manner which minimises the risk for the applicant to be identified.

2 . The Tribunal in this case had accepted that the narrative given by the applicant was credible, including her evidence of various medical conditions. The Tribunal found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution and that the applicant was a member of a particular social group for the purposes of the 2015 Act, being a woman victim of stalking and that she shares a common background that cannot be changed. The applicant's claim to international protection was rejected on the basis of a finding that Georgia operates “ an effective legal system for the prosecution and punishment of gender-based violence. The protection is effective and of a non-temporary nature. The [applicant] has access to that protection.”

3 . The applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review on the 15 November 2024, having filed her statement of grounds on the 11 September 2024. She seeks to quash the Decision on grounds set out in her Statement of Grounds, which can be summarised as:

• (a) The Tribunal failed to take account of the United States Department of State ( USDOS) report on Human Rights 2024, which reported on events from 2023;

• (b) The Tribunal's reliance on country-of-origin information (COI) was unreasonable or selective and led to an irrational conclusion;

• (c) The Tribunal correctly identified the test to be applied in a consideration of the question of state protection, but failed to apply the test properly;

• (d) The Tribunal unreasonably concluded in the particular circumstances of the case that there was effective independent oversight of the police in Georgia.

• (e) The Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasons as to why state protection would be effective for the applicant in her circumstances.

• (f) The Tribunal failed to take sufficient account of or attach sufficient weight to section 28(6) of the 2015 Act in making the Decision.

4 . For the reasons set out in this judgment I have concluded that the applicant is entitled to an order quashing the Decision of the Tribunal on the basis of the ground advanced relating to the treatment of the COI by the Tribunal and the resulting finding that there was effective state protection available to the applicant if she was returned to Georgia.

BACKGROUND

5 . As the core factual elements underpinning the international protection application essentially were accepted and the focus of this case is on the question of state protection, the facts can be dealt with relatively briefly. The facts were set out in detail in the affidavits sworn on behalf of the applicant and in the exhibits that were before the court.

6 . The applicant's claim for international protection focussed on her experiences of extensive and troubling stalking between 2018 and 2021. The person responsible for the stalking was identified by the applicant and will be described in this judgment as ‘ GA’.

7 . The applicant described that, in 2018, when she was in her early twenties, she was working in a hotel in a town in Georgia. A guest, GA, took interest in her. This began with compliments, progressed to calls, texts, and social media contacts, and developed into extensive stalking. The applicant reported that GA regularly shouted negatively at her on the street about her appearance, and he threatened that he would kill the applicant if she ever had a relationship with anyone else.

8 . The applicant reported the matter to the police in 2018, but nothing was done. Likewise, the manager at the hotel where she worked refused to take any action because the man was considered important locally. As a result of the stalking, the applicant left her job and moved to a different city in Georgia. The stalking continued in that other city. In December 2019, she moved again to evade the stalking, but she continued to receive telephone calls from GA until the pandemic lockdown began in March 2020.

9 . In April 2021, she returned to her hometown for medical reasons. The stalking started again and she was very afraid. Her family was unable to reason with GA, who regularly sat outside their family home and shouted abuse her. In August 2021, the applicant left Georgia and went to Italy. Despite the move and changing her phone number she stated that GA continued to message her. The applicant stated that GA told her that he was coming to Italy for her, and she then decided to move to Ireland. She chose Ireland because she was in a relationship with her partner, who was already here.

10 . In June 2022, the applicant arrived in Ireland and applied for protection. The applicant went through the regular process provided for under the 2015 Act including completing a questionnaire and attending for interview at the IPO on the 13 October 2023.

11 . By letter dated the 7 December 2023, the IPO issued its report declining to recommend a grant of international protection. Essentially, the IPO accepted the applicant's account and found her account of events descriptive and specific. There was a finding that she had a well-founded fear of persecution, and a finding that she may be at risk of further stalking if she returned to Georgia. There was a finding that the experiences of the applicant had a Convention nexus in that she was a member of a particular social group, being women who suffered gender-based violence. The IPO found that state protection would be available to the...