Tara Hill National Park Teoranta

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeO'Donnell Donal J.,McKechnie J.,Dunne J.
Judgment Date22 July 2016
Neutral Citation[2016] IESCDET 104
CourtSupreme Court
Date22 July 2016

[2016] IESCDET 104

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

O'Donnell Donal J.

McKechnie J.

Dunne J.

In the Matter of Tara Hill National Park Teoranta

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES
RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal.
REASONS GIVEN:
1

This determination relates to an application by Mr. Flannán Ó Coileáin (‘the applicant’), the company secretary of Tara Hill National Park Teoranta (‘the Company’), who seeks leave to appeal to this Court from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Finlay Geoghegan J., Peart and Birmingham JJ.) delivered on the 25 th April, 2016 and from the resulting Order made on the 25 th April, 2016, and perfected on the 26 th April, 2016.

2

The essence of this application is that Mr. Ó Coileáin seeks to have the Court revisit the decision in Battle v Irish Art Promotion Centre Ltd [1968] I.R. 252, which decided that a limited company cannot be represented in court proceedings by its managing director or other officer or servant. The reason for his challenge is that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal held, by reference to Battle, that the applicant cannot act on behalf of the Company in these proceedings.

Jurisdiction
3

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is set out in the Constitution.

4

Article 34 of the Constitution provides for the public administration of justice; describes the courts established by the Constitution and those which may be established by law; confers full original jurisdiction on the High Court; establishes the Court of Appeal under Article 34.2; and sets out its appellate jurisdiction under Article 34.4.1°. This states that:-

‘1° The Court of Appeal shall-

i save as otherwise provided by this Article, and

ii with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law,

have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court, and also shall have appellate jurisdiction from such decisions of other courts as may be prescribed by law.’

5

Article 34.4.3° of the Constitution provides for the finality of decisions of the Court of Appeal, save for appeals that may be taken to the Supreme Court from its decisions under Article 34.5.3°.

6

Under Article 34.5.4° it is possible for a decision of the High Court to be directly appealed to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal. This type of appeal is sometimes referred to colloquially as a ‘leap-frog’ appeal. It does not feature on this application.

7

The Article relevant to this appeal, where the Court of Appeal has already given judgment in a matter, is Article 34.5.3°, which states:-

‘3° The Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the Court of Appeal if the Supreme Court is satisfied that-

i the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or

ii in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court.’

8

Article 34.5.6° states that the decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be ‘final and conclusive’.

9

Primarily, this Court is now, ‘subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law’, an appellate jurisdiction from the Court of Appeal. Such an appeal may only be exercised provided that this Court is satisfied either that the relevant decision of the Court of Appeal ‘involves a matter of general public importance’, or, alternatively, that ‘in the interests of justice’ it is necessary that there be an appeal to this Court. Thus, in order for a party to be entitled to appeal to this Court from a decision of the Court of Appeal, it must demonstrate that either or both of these pre-conditions exist.

10

The statutory framework for the moving of an application seeking leave to appeal to this Court is to be found in the Court of Appeal Act 2014, and, in particular, the provisions of s. 44 of that Act, which amends, by insertion, s.7 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961.

11

The Rules of Court are set out in the amended Order 58 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

12

In summary, the Constitution has retained an entitlement of one appeal as of right from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, subject to any express statutory exception or regulation that may provide otherwise. What is sought in this case is a second appeal. As pointed out by this court in Brennan v Thomas Flannery and Ors [2015] IESCDET 32, ‘…it is a general principle that, save in exceptional circumstances [such as those] outlined in Fox v. Mahon & Others [2015] IESCDET 2, the Court of Appeal is to provide the avenue for appeals from the High Court, and that its decision is to be final, save where there is a point of general public importance, or it is in the public interest that it should be determined further by this Court.’

High Court Proceedings
13

The applicant sought to issue a plenary summons on behalf of the Company against Ulster Bank Ireland Limited seeking a sum of just over €3,000. On the 9 th November, 2015, he made an ex parte application in the High Court seeking an order, first, that he be permitted to submit the original plenary summons in the High Court office and obtain a record number for proceedings and, secondly, that he be permitted to act on behalf of the Company in the issue of the plenary summons and, implicitly, in the proceedings that would follow.

14

The application was refused by McDermott J. on two grounds. First, having regard to the Supreme Court decision in Battle v Irish Art Promotion Centre Ltd [1968] I.R. 252 (‘ Battle’), the learned judge held that the applicant did not have locus standi, as company secretary, to act on behalf of the Company or to cause the plenary summons to be issued on behalf of the Company. Secondly, McDermott J. also ruled that there was no sufficient basis outlined in the grounding affidavit that coincided with the draft plenary summons which the applicant sought to issue, and thus there was no basis upon which to permit the proceedings to continue.

The Court of Appeal
15

Mr. Ó Coileáin appealed to the Court of Appeal. Finlay Geoghegan J., giving judgment for the Court, considered that although the applicant had stated during submissions that the only claim against Ulster Bank was for a sum of €1,709.29, which allegedly the bank had failed to account to the Company for, there appeared from a reading of the plenary summons to be a second claim also, namely that Ulster Bank had requested approximately €1,400 of outstanding loans be repaid by the Company when in fact this sum had been fully paid up and the Company was not in any such arrears. Whichever be correct, it was clear that the total sum involved was within the jurisdiction of the District Court. The learned judge also observed that the submissions made to the Court related not only to the Company's inability to proceed with the two claims just mentioned, but also to allegations that the Company was hampered in other sets of proceedings against Ulster Bank by the applicant's inability to represent the Company in lieu of...

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