The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Henry
Jurisdiction | Ireland |
Judge | Mr. Justice Birmingham |
Judgment Date | 01 May 2015 |
Neutral Citation | [2015] IECA 219 |
Docket Number | [C.A. No. 115 of 2014] |
Court | Court of Appeal (Ireland) |
Date | 01 May 2015 |
[2015] IECA 219
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Crime & sentencing – Murder – Insanity – Appellant found not guilty by reason of insanity – Plea of diminished responsibility – Appeal – S 8 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 200
Facts: The appellant had been charged with murder, and had entered a plea of guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. This plea had been rejected and the appellant had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. He now appealed on four grounds, relating to the onus of proof and the trial judge”s alleged errors in law and fact.
Held by Mr Justice Birmingham, the other Justices concurring, that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal having considered the provisions of s 8 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the evidence before the trial judge and the directions to the jury, the Court was satisfied that the jury had possibly been confused by the directions given by the judge. On that basis, the appeal would be allowed and the matter remitted for a re-trial.
Judgment of the Court delivered on the 1st day of May 2015, by Mr. Justice Birmingham
1. On the 29 th April, 2014, the appellant stood trial for murder before the Central Criminal Court, sitting in Castlebar, and on the 1 st May, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and thereafter, following the appropriate inquiries, the appellant was committed to the Central Mental Hospital. He had faced one count of murdering his mother on the 17 th September, 2011. When arraigned, Mr, Henry had pleaded not guilty to murder, but guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. That plea was not acceptable to the prosecution and the hearing proceeded.
2. There was no real factual dispute between the parties at trial and the facts were dealt with by way of an agreed statement of facts. Instead the issue between the parties related to the mental state of the appellant at the time of the incident. The prosecution contended that he was insane and that the appropriate verdict was that of not guilty by reason of insanity, relying in that regard on the evidence of Dr. Brenda Wright, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist of the Forensic National Health Services. The defence urged that the appropriate verdict was not one of not guilty of murder by reason of insanity, but guilty of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility, and they relied on the evidence of Prof, Tom Fahy. Professor of Forensic Mental Health, at the Institute of Psychiatry, Kings Hospital London. So, in essence, the sole issue for the jury was whether the verdict should be one of not guilty by reason of insanity or one of guilty of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. Four grounds of appeal are referred to in the notice. They are as follows:-
(i) The learned trial judge erred in law in directing the jury that the onus of proof shifted from the prosecution to the defence in circumstances where the prosecution raised as an alternative verdict the defence of not guilty by reason of insanity.
(ii) The learned trial judge erred in law in failing to direct the jury that the onus was on the prosecution to prove the alternative verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and the standard applicable was beyond reasonable doubt.
(iii) That the learned trial judge erred in law in directing the jury that the onus and standard of proof was for the defence to prove the alternative verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity on the balance of probabilities, in circumstances where the prosecution raised the defence of insanity as an alternative verdict.
(iv) The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in failing to accept the requisition of the prosecution that he redirect the jury on the onus and standard of proof to be discharged by the prosecution and more particularly that he redirect the jury that the correct standard of proof to be discharged by the prosecution when the prosecution was raising the defence of insanity is beyond reasonable doubt, not on the balance of probabilities.
3. The matter before the Court raises a number of questions for consideration. These are (i) whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal where the complaint is of a misdirection by the trial judge in the course of his charge to the jury, (ii) if the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, whether the trial judge's charge amounted to a misdirection, (there is a considerable measure of agreement that there was in fact an element of misdirection) (iii) if there was a misdirection, what was the extent of the misdirection and what ought the judge have said to the jury and (iv) what, if any, consequences flow from the misdirection.
4. In summary, the case raises for determination the question of where the onus of proof lies and what the standard of proof is when it is the prosecution that is contending for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
5. This question first emerged as an issue during the opening statement by prosecution counsel when she said the following:
"Now, ultimately when you have heard all the evidence you - it seems to me likely that the issues will reduce themselves in real terms to whether or not he is entitled to the verdict of insanity of whether the appropriate verdict is diminished responsibility and that decision that you have to make is one the prosecution view, and I hope it will be seen as correct by the trial judge, is that you decide that issue on what is called the balance of probabilities. So, that is a standard essentially where if you think it is more probable than not that he was labouring under what the law calls insanity, and I know it is a pretty old fashioned and may be archaic term, but it is the word in the statute, so that is why I use it, if you are of the view, that he probably fulfils the criteria for insanity, then that is the verdict you go for. Whereas if you take the view, that he was probably labouring under diminished responsibility but not insanity then that is the verdict you would go for and it wouldn't be a question of you being satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of either of those two. It would be on the balance of probabilities."
6. However, by the time counsel came to make her closing speech, her position had evolved somewhat. On this occasion this is what she had to say:-
"Now, I said to you at the beginning of the trial, I addressed you about the burden of proof and the standard and I said to you something that in retrospect I think it may be safer if the prosecution take a different view on, although it may have been technically correct, about the standard of proof on insanity. In this case, the accused is putting forward a defence of diminished responsibility as you have heard, and the prosecution are saying it should be insanity and in those circumstances, it seems to me, and the judge will ultimately direct you on which is the correct approach, but it seems to me it may be better that the prosecution prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. It seems to me on reflection, having read some legal authorities overnight, that that may be the safer course. So, I may ultimately be corrected by his Lordship, but for the time being, I would suggest that you consider insanity on this basis, that first of all you decide did we prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the act, second of all, have we proved a beyond a reasonable doubt that he falls within the definition of insanity. Now, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of those two issues, well then it is the insanity verdict that you should go for, but if you are not satisfied, and you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he was insane, and I mean that in the legal sense, well then you go on to consider the next issue, which is diminished responsibility and I am sure my friend, Mr. Madden, will address you more about that, but as you have heard the test for that is that a person does not fall within insanity, but nonetheless the mental disorder was such as to substantially diminish his responsibility. So, if you come to the view, as I say, that we haven't proved the insanity defence because the onus is on us to prove it, if you are not satisfied that we have proved it, you then move on to consider diminished responsibility and it would only be if you ruled out diminished responsibility that you would consider that he could be guilty of murder and in reality in this case, I don't think anyone, but ultimately it is a matter for you, no one can tell you what to do, but nobody, in terms of the Barristers or the psychiatrist is suggesting to you that the psychosis was not a factor in all of this. On the contrary, everybody is agreed that this was a major factor in his mental state at the time. So, diminished responsibility then is something that the defence having raised it, have to prove on the balance of probabilities. If you remember I spoke about that at the beginning. They have to prove it is more likely than not, that he was operating, that his responsibility was substantially diminished because of the delusion that he was suffering from."
7. Naturally the issue was addressed by the trial judge in the course of his charge. He first did so by referring to ss. 5 and 6 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006, when he commented:-
"Section 5 provided for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and s. 6 provided for bringing a verdict of not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. Now these two sections are set out in very clear terms, which a...
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DPP v Heffernan
...had occasion to consider the operation of s. 5(4) of the Act of 2006 in the case of The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Henry [2015] IECA 219 (unreported, Court of Appeal, 1st of May 2015) to which further reference will be made later in this judgment. 80 More generally, the rema......