The State (at the prosecution of Jennings) v J Furlong

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judgment Date: 24 January 1966
• Docket Number: (1965. No. 172 S.S.)
• Date: 24 January 1966

High Court.

(1965. No. 172 S.S.)

The State (Sumers Jennings) v. Furlong.

THE STATE (at the Prosecution of PETER SUMERS JENNINGS)

and

J. FURLONG, Governor of Mountjoy Prison. In the Matter of the Extradition Act, 1965, and in the Matter of the Constitution (1)

Constitution of Ireland - Statute - Validity - Extradition - Rule of speciality - Whether portion of statute repugnant to Constitution because of failure to implement the rule - Constitution of Ireland, Article 29, sect. 3 - Extradition Act, 1965 (No. 17 of 1965), Part III.

Motion on Notice.

The prosecutor, Peter Sumers Jennings, was arrested and remanded in custody in Ireland pursuant to the provisions of Part III of the Extradition Act, 1965, on foot of a warrant which had been issued by a judicial authority in England for the purpose of having the prosecutor conveyed in custody to that country. On the 6th December, 1965, the prosecutor, while in custody, obtained in the High Court a conditional order of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum on the ground that Part III of the Act was in conflict with the terms of section 3 of Article 29 of the Constitution in as much as the rule of speciality, recognised in Part II of the Act and particularly

applied by s. 20 thereof, was not referred to or included in Part III thereof. The conditional order was addressed to, and served on, the respondents, the Governor of Mountjoy Prison and the Attorney General, and they showed cause jointly against the conditional order by a notice dated the 21st December, 1965. The prosecutor applied by motion on notice to have the conditional order made absolute, notwithstanding the cause shown. The rule of speciality, as stated in Article 14 of the European Convention on Extradition, appears in the judgment of Henchy J., post.

Pursuant to the provisions contained in Part III of the Extradition Act, 1965, the prosecutor was arrested and remanded in custody in Ireland on foot of a warrant which had been issued by a judicial authority in England for the purpose of having the prosecutor conveyed to that country. The prosecutor obtained a conditional order of habeas corpus on the ground, in effect, that Part III of the said Act was repugnant to the terms of section 3 of Article 29 of the Constitution as that Part of the Act did not implement a generally recognised principle of international law, namely, the rule of speciality. The prosecutor applied to the High Court for an order making the conditional order absolute notwithstanding the cause shown by the respondents. At the hearing of that application it was submitted on behalf of the prosecutor that the rule of speciality was a generally recognised principle of international law and, as such, was accepted in Ireland by the express terms of section 3 of Article 29 of the Constitution as a rule of conduct in Ireland's relations with other states and that, accordingly, the failure of Part III of the Act to implement that rule rendered the provisions of that Part of the Act repugnant to the terms of section 3 of Article 29 of the Constitution.

Held by the High Court (Davitt P., Teevan and Henchy JJ.), that even if it be assumed that the rule of speciality (as stated in Article 14 of the European Convention on Extradition) is a generally recognised principle of international law, the omission from the enactments contained in Part III of the Extradition Act, 1965, of a provision giving effect to that rule does not make those enactments repugnant to the terms of section 3 of Article 29 of the Constitution since that rule does not form part of the domestic law of Ireland and the terms of section 3 of the said Article do not confer any rights upon individuals.

In re Ó Laighléis ó laighléis [1960] I. R. 93 applied.

Accordingly, the cause shown against the conditional order was allowed and the said order was discharged.

Cur. adv. vult.

Davitt P.:—

The only question for decision in this matter is whether Part III of the Extradition Act, 1965, is repugnant to Article 29, section 3, of the Constitution.

Part II of the Act deals with the surrender by this state of persons wanted for prosecution or punishment by another state with which this state has an extradition agreement, or by a state which, our Government is satisfied, will afford reciprocal facilities. Part III of the Act deals with the surrender by this state of persons in respect of whom warrants of arrest have been issued by judicial authorities in Northern Ireland, England and Wales, Scotland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. Counsel for the prosecutor submits that a principle known as the principle of speciality is a generally recognised principle of international law in relation to extradition. Stated shortly and very generally, its purport is that any state requesting a person's extradition is under a duty not to punish him for any offence other than that for which his extradition is requested. He pointed out that this principle is recognised in Part II of the Act and applied to cases coming within its provisions by s. 20; but that there is no such recognition and no such application in Part III in respect of cases coming within...