TE v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley
• Judgment Date: 22 April 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] IEHC 248
• Docket Number: Record No. 2026/12JR

Between/

TE

Applicant

and

The International Protections Appeals Tribunal

And the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration

Respondents

[2026] IEHC 248

Record No. 2026/12JR

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

Judicial review – Leave to apply – Deportation – Applicant seeking leave to apply for judicial review – Whether an extension of time should be granted

Facts: The applicant applied to the High Court seeking leave to apply for judicial review to challenge decisions and acts of the respondents, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (the IPAT) and the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration (the Minister), which culminated in a decision to make a deportation order in relation to the applicant. The applicant sought to challenge a decision dated 20 October 2025 made by the IPAT, the proposal to deport him on 5 November 2025, the decision in relation to refoulement dated 26 November 2025 and the making of the deportation dated 26 November 2025. An extension of time was required in relation to the IPAT decision. It was contended on behalf of the applicant that insofar as the decision of the Minister dated 26 November 2025 made pursuant to s. 50 of the International Protection Act 2015 which determined that refoulement did not arise in the applicant’s case was concerned, the threshold to be applied to that challenge was the conventional judicial review standard of ‘arguability’ (rather than the statutory ‘substantial grounds’) as set out in Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, and the time limit of three months also applied. The applicant sought injunctive relief in relation to the deportation order.

Held by Bradley J that he did not consider that there was good and sufficient reason for extending the period within which to challenge the IPAT decision and he refused the application to do so. He found that the applicant had failed to establish substantial grounds for contending either that: (i) the IPAT’s decision in consideration of the applicant’s credibility as to his ministry and to have conducted a same-sex marriage ceremony was in any way inconsistent with K (Zimbabwe) v IPAT [2023] IEHC 6 and the assessment of credibility by reference to the full picture that emerges from the available evidence and information taken as a whole, when rationally analysed and fairly weighed; or (ii) that the IPAT’s decision failed to follow the principle set out in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ‘Beyond Proof: credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems’ at p. 180, as contended for. Turning to the applicant’s application seeking leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the deportation order, Bradley J noted that the applicant’s arguments were centred on the application of s. 3(4) of the Immigration Act 1999 when in fact the deportation order was made under s. 51 of the 2015 Act. Bradley J held that the applicant was mistaken in his argument that s. 3(4)(a) of the 1999 Act applied. Bradley J noted that the argument that the s. 50 decision was a separate decision to which the conventional judicial review threshold and time limits applied was rejected in ED & AD (Zimbabwe) v Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IEHC 303. He considered that ‘the default position’ described in Okunade v Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 49 applied and accordingly the applicant was not entitled to an injunction restraining his deportation.

Bradley J refused the application for leave to apply by way of judicial review to challenge the IPAT’s decision, the proposal to deport, the s. 50 decision in relation to refoulement, the s. 51 decision to deport and the injunction application.

Applications refused.

REDACTED

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 22 ^nd day of April 2026

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary

1 In this application, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review to challenge a number of decisions and acts of the Respondents which culminated in a decision to make a deportation order in relation to the Applicant.

2 In summary, the Applicant seeks to challenge a decision dated 20 ^th October 2025 made by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“the IPAT”) of which he was notified on 21 ^st October 2025 (“the IPAT decision”), the proposal to deport him on 5 ^th November 2025, the decision in relation to refoulement dated 26 ^th November 2025 and the making of the deportation dated 26 ^th November 2025.

3 In terms of sequencing, the Applicant, therefore, seeks to challenge what can be described as ex-ante or upstream administrative decisions which were made prior to the decision to make a deportation order.

4 An extension of time is required in relation to the IPAT decision.

5 Further, it is contended on behalf of the Applicant that insofar as the decision of the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration (“the Minister”) dated 26 ^th November 2025 made pursuant to s. 50 of the International Protection Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) which determined that refoulement did not arise in the Applicant's case is concerned, the threshold to be applied to this challenge is the conventional judicial review standard of ‘arguability’ (rather than the statutory ‘substantial grounds’) as set out in Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, as amended (“the RSC 1986”), and the time limit of three months also applies.

6 In seeking to challenge these ‘up-stream’ decisions, this necessarily involves an examination of the nature of the various decisions which are made in the asylum-immigration code and also points to the statutory provisions which address the time period within which various decisions can be challenged and the circumstances in which the court can grant an extension of time to do so. The Applicant also seeks injunctive relief in relation to the deportation order.

7 As is now well-settled, ‘substantial grounds’ as prescribed in s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended (“the 2000 Act”) have been described as being grounds that are reasonable, arguable and weighty and not trivial or tenuous: McNamara v An Bord Pleanála [1995] 2 ILRM 125 as approved in In Re Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] IESC 19, [2000] 2 I.R. 360 at p. 395.

8 I directed that this application for leave to apply for judicial review be made on notice to the Respondents who filed written legal submissions in response to the Applicant's submissions.

BACKGROUND

9 The Applicant was born in Nigeria on 4 ^th August 1975. He entered the State on 21 ^st November 2024 and applied for international protection on 22 ^nd November 2024.

10 The Applicant completed his questionnaire on 22 ^nd November 2024, which included his preliminary interview. The Applicant attended for interview on 16 ^th December 2024.

International Protection Office

11 By way of letter in January 2025, pursuant to s. 40 of the 2015 Act, the Applicant received a draft and also a final s. 39 report, each dated 16 ^th January 2025.

12 In its decision, dated 16 ^th January 2025, the IPO recommended that the Applicant be refused both refugee status and subsidiary protection on the basis of adverse credibility findings which went to the basis of his claimed fear of persecution. This credibility finding inter alia referred to the Applicant's claims to being a pastor and to have conducted a same-sex marriage ceremony blessing and to have been persecuted as a result.

13 The Applicant was notified of the IPO's recommendation and of the Minister's decision to refuse permission for the Applicant to remain in the State pursuant to s. 49(4) of the 2015 Act.

14 The Applicant appealed this refusal of international protection to the IPAT by Notice of Appeal dated 10 ^th February 2025.

15 An oral hearing took place before the IPAT over two days, during which the Applicant gave evidence.

International Protection Appeal Tribunal

16 By decision dated 20 ^th October 2025, communicated under letter dated 21 ^st October 2025, the IPAT dismissed the Applicant's appeal and rejected the Applicant's credibility and determined that he had not established a well-founded fear of persecution nor a real risk of serious harm if he was returned to Nigeria.

Review application and decision

17 The Applicant then made a ‘review application’ seeking to remain in the State pursuant to s. 49 of the 2015 Act and solicitors on his behalf made further submissions which included submissions dated 30 ^th October 2025 and the completion of a s. 49 review form dated 28 ^th October 2025.

18 Under cover of a letter dated 5 ^th November 2025, the Applicant was notified of the ministerial review decision made pursuant to s. 49 of the 2015 Act which refused his application by decision dated 3 ^rd November 2025.

Non-refoulement & deportation

19 On 26 ^th November 2025 the Minister determined, pursuant to s. 50 of the 2015 Act that the Applicant's removal to Nigeria (and deportation) would not contravene the prohibition on refoulement.

Deportation Order

20 On the same date – 26 ^th November 2025 – the Minister made a deportation order pursuant to s. 51 of the 2015 Act.

21 Both the non-refoulement decision and the deportation order were sent to the Applicant by post on 9 ^th December 2025, and received by him on 10 ^th December 2025.

22 The Applicant seeks to argue that this letter dated 5 ^th November 2025 did not include what was contended to be the Minister's obligation, pursuant to s. 3(4)(a) of the Immigration Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) to inform the Applicant of his right to make representations in writing to the Minister within fifteen working days of sending the notification. This argument is addressed later in this judgment.

23 In effect, the Applicant also seeks to isolate the s. 50 (non-refoulement) decision as a separate decision and further seeks to argue that he was entitled to judicially review same pursuant to O. 84 of the RSC...