W. v Gleeson (Appeals Officer)

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr Justice Garrett Simons
Judgment Date28 June 2019
Neutral Citation[2019] IEHC 472
CourtHigh Court
Docket Number2018 No. 45 MCA
Date28 June 2019

[2019] IEHC 472

THE HIGH COURT

Simons J.

2018 No. 45 MCA

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL PURSUANT TO SECTION 22(6) OF THE RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS STATUTORY FUND ACT 2012

BETWEEN
W.
APPELLANT
AND
GERALDINE GLEESON (APPEALS OFFICER)
RESPONDENT
RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS STATUTORY FUND BOARD
NOTICE PARTY

Medical services – Payment of a grant – Guidelines – Appellant seeking to challenge the manner in which monies were being allocated – Whether the introduction of a €15,000 limit was ultra vires

Facts: The appellant sought to challenge the manner in which monies, which had been made available by the Oireachtas to support the needs of former residents of residential institutions, were being allocated. A statutory fund in the order of 110 million euro had been established under the Residential Institutions Statutory Fund Act 2012. The fund complemented the previous statutory scheme of compensation provided for under the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002. The function of determining criteria for the allocation of those funds had been entrusted to a statutory board. That board was known as “Bord an Chiste Reachtúil Foras Cónaithe” or, in the English language, “the Residential Institutions Statutory Fund Board” (the Board). The Board had published the criteria by way of “guidelines”. In circumstances where the fund was finite, the Board made a decision in April 2016 to impose a limit on the aggregate amount which any individual can receive. This limit had been set at €15,000 or STG£12,000. The appellant had received benefits in the order of €40,000 prior to the introduction of this monetary limit. The appellant subsequently submitted a further application in or about April 2017. The application was refused. Whereas there was no question of the appellant being asked to refund the excess, the Board maintained the position that no further allocation could be made to the appellant in circumstances where he had already received benefits in excess of the monetary limit of €15,000. The appellant contended that the introduction of the €15,000 limit was ultra vires. This contention was advanced by reference to a number of alternative arguments as follows. First, the introduction of a monetary limit was said to be in breach of the appellant’s legitimate expectations. Secondly, it was said that the monetary limit cannot be applied retrospectively, and that as the appellant had made successful applications to the Board prior to the introduction of the monetary limit, all subsequent applications must be dealt with on the same basis. It was said that, at the very least, his previous benefits should be ignored when applying the monetary limit to him, i.e. the appellant should be entitled to further benefits in the amount of €15,000. Thirdly, it was said that the Board was under an obligation to have regard to the individual circumstances, including personal and financial circumstances, of former residents. The imposition of a monetary limit was said to be inconsistent with this obligation.

Held by the High Court (Simons J) that those arguments were not made out. Simons J held that the fundamental misconception underlying the appellant’s case was that the statutory fund is “an unlimited needs based fund so any purported limit to the amount an applicant can receive is unlawful” (written legal submissions, §1.5), the implication being that if a former resident can demonstrate a need for the payment of a grant or for the provision of an approved service, then the Board has no discretion to refuse those benefits to him or her. Simons J held that this was not what the legislation actually provides for, rather, the legislation has entrusted the task of distributing the fund of €110 million to the Board; in particular, the function of specifying criteria—by reference to which applications for the payment of grants or for the provision of approved services are to be determined—has been entrusted to the Board. Simons J held that it was clear from a reading of the relevant provisions of the 2012 Act that the Board enjoys a wide discretion in this regard. Simons J held that, whereas the exercise of this discretion—as with any statutory discretion—is amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court by way of judicial review, no case had been made out for challenging the guidelines published by the Board in 2016; those guidelines were well within the boundaries of the discretion afforded to the Board.

Simons J held that the appeal would be dismissed, the decision of the Appeals Officer refusing the application for the payment of a grant in respect of medical services would be affirmed and the stay restraining the Board from reducing its funds below the sum of €12,000 pending the determination of the proceedings would be discharged.

Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 28 June 2019.
SUMMARY
1

These proceedings seek to challenge the manner in which monies, which have been made available by the Oireachtas to support the needs of former residents of residential institutions, are being allocated. A statutory fund in the order of 110 million euro had been established under the Residential Institutions Statutory Fund Act 2012. The fund complements the previous statutory scheme of compensation provided for under the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002.

2

The function of determining criteria for the allocation of these funds has been entrusted to a statutory board. This board is known as ‘Bord an Chiste Reachtúil Foras Cónaithe’ or, in the English language, ‘the Residential Institutions Statutory Fund Board’. The statutory board is referred to colloquially as ‘Caranua’. The shorthand ‘the Board’ will be used throughout this judgment when referring to this statutory board.

3

The Board has published the criteria by way of ‘guidelines’. In circumstances where the fund is finite, the Board made a decision in April 2016 to impose a limit on the aggregate amount which any individual can receive. This limit has been set at €15,000 or STG£12,000.

4

The Appellant in these proceedings had received benefits in the order of €40,000 prior to the introduction of this monetary limit. The Appellant subsequently submitted a further application in or about April 2017. The refusal of this application is the subject-matter of these proceedings. Whereas there is no question of the Appellant being asked to refund the excess, the Board maintains the position that no further allocation can be made to the Appellant in circumstances where he has already received benefits in excess of the monetary limit of €15,000.

5

The Appellant contends that the introduction of the €15,000 limit was ultra vires. This contention is advanced by reference to a number of alternative arguments as follows. First, the introduction of a monetary limit is said to be in breach of the Appellant's legitimate expectations. Secondly, it is said that the monetary limit cannot be applied retrospectively, and that as the Appellant had made successful applications to the Board prior to the introduction of the monetary limit, all subsequent applications must be dealt with on the same basis. It is said that, at the very least, his previous benefits should be ignored when applying the monetary limit to him, i.e. the Appellant should be entitled to further benefits in the amount of €15,000. Thirdly, it is said that the Board is under an obligation to have regard to the individual circumstances, including personal and financial circumstances, of former residents. The imposition of a monetary limit is said to be inconsistent with this obligation.

6

For the reasons set out in detail in this judgment, I have concluded that these arguments are not made out. The fundamental misconception underlying the Appellant's case is that the statutory fund is ‘an unlimited needs based fund so any purported limit to the amount an applicant can receive is unlawful’ (written legal submissions, §1.5). The implication being that if a former resident can demonstrate a need for the payment of a grant or for the provision of an approved service, then the Board has no discretion to refuse those benefits to him or her. With respect, this is not what the legislation actually provides for. Rather, the legislation has entrusted the task of distributing the fund of 110 million euro to the Board. In particular, the function of specifying criteria—by reference to which applications for the payment of grants or for the provision of approved services are to be determined—has been entrusted to the Board. It is clear from a reading of the relevant provisions of the Residential Institutions Statutory Fund Act 2012 (‘the Act’) that the Board enjoys a wide discretion in this regard. Whereas the exercise of this discretion—as with any statutory discretion—is amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court by way of judicial review, no case has been made out for challenging the guidelines published by the Board in 2016. These guidelines are well within the boundaries of the discretion afforded to the Board.

7

The administration of a finite fund will necessitate the making of decisions as to what is the most equitable basis for the allocation of the fund. The Board has explained, on affidavit, that it decided to introduce a monetary limit in June 2016 to address a concern that the demand on the scheme might be such that the fund would be substantially depleted before all eligible applicants had been given a fair opportunity to make an application.

8

There might well be different opinions as to whether this is the most appropriate approach to the allocation of the fund. The Appellant, for one, appears to think that the fund should be administered on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. The question for this court is not, however, whether the court would have adopted the same approach as chosen by the Board, but rather whether...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • A.D.L.R v The Minister for Health
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • February 23, 2021
    ...[1992] 2 I.R. 333; (vii) Andaloc v. Iarnród Éireann/Irish Rail & Ors [2014] 3 I.R. 516 and (viii) W. v. Gleeson (Appeals Officer) [2019] IEHC 472. The Court was also referred to the legal text book, Dodd, Statutory Interpretation in Ireland (Bloomsbury, 2008) at para. 5.89 all of which has ......
  • W. v Geraldine Gleeson (Appeals Officer)
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • July 30, 2019
    ...made under s 22 of that Act but was dismissed. The matter now came before the Court in respect of the costs of the earlier proceedings ([2019] IEHC 472). Held by Simons J, that the Court was satisfied that the matter did not justify a costs award against the appellant, but he in turn was no......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT