W.Z. v Ireland and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr Justice Barry O'Donnell
• Judgment Date: 22 October 2024
• Neutral Citation: [2024] IEHC 595
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: RECORD NUMBER 2021 / 5391 P RECORD NUMBER 2023 / 4834 P

Between:

W.Z.

Plaintiff

and

Ireland and The Attorney General

Defendants

Between:

W.Z.

Plaintiff

and

Ireland, The Attorney General, The Chief State Solicitor and The Minister for Education

Defendants

Between:

W.Z.

Plaintiff

and

Ireland and The Attorney General, The Chief State Solicitor, The Minister for Justice and The Legal Services Regulatory Authority

Defendants

[2024] IEHC 595

RECORD NUMBER 2021 / 5391 P

RECORD NUMBER 2023 / 4833 P

RECORD NUMBER 2023 / 4834 P

THE HIGH COURT

Strike out – Bound to fail – Isaac Wunder order – Defendants seeking to have proceedings struck out – Whether the proceedings were bound to fail

Facts: The plaintiff brought three separate sets of proceedings. In each proceeding, claims were made against emanations of the State as well as the State itself in a corporate sense. Proceedings were also brought against the Legal Services Regulatory Authority (LSRA), a body that was legally separate to the State and independent in the discharge of its functions. In each set of proceedings, the State defendants brought motions seeking to have the proceedings against them struck out as frivolous or vexatious or bound to fail. As part of the relief sought in those applications, in the event that the proceedings were struck out, the State defendants also sought orders restricting the ability of the plaintiff to commence fresh proceedings against them without the plaintiff first obtaining the permission of the President of the High Court or a judge nominated by him (an Isaac Wunder order). In the third proceedings, the fifth defendant, LSRA, sought similar orders in relation to the proceedings as against that body.

Held by O'Donnell J that the first proceedings amounted to an impermissible collateral attack or attempt to relitigate issues that were disposed of in the judgment of Faherty J delivered on the 28 January, 2020. O’Donnell J held that the plaintiff’s argument that he was deprived of his entitlements to due process or fair procedures in the course of some or all of the hearings before the Circuit Family Court, this was a matter which ought to have been pursued by way of judicial review proceedings. It was clear to O’Donnell J that the action against the State which was predicated on an assertion that the State should be liable for the acts of members of the judiciary in the course of proceedings must fail. The Court struck out the first proceedings on the basis that they constituted a clear abuse of the process of the Court. Regarding the second proceedings, it was clear to O’Donnell J that the claims against the Chief State Solicitor could not proceed, as there was nothing in the pleadings or the other documents submitted by the plaintiff to ground a claim against that body. O’Donnell J found that the claims ignored the manner in which post primary education is provided for in Irish law, and imputed to the Minister for Education a responsibility that does not appear in the foundational legislation. The Court was satisfied that the second proceedings should be struck out on the basis that they had no reasonable chance of success. Regarding the third proceedings, O’Donnell J noted that there was no claim made by the plaintiff or assertion by reference to any cogent evidence that LSRA acted in bad faith and the clear operation of s. 209 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 barred the plaintiff’s claims against LSRA and the State defendants in the third proceedings.

O'Donnell J was not satisfied that the high threshold of proof required to be satisfied before an order can be made restricting the right of the plaintiff to commence further litigation against the defendants without prior permission had been met. O’Donnell J found that the plaintiff had adequate warning that further baseless proceedings against the defendants or attempts to re-litigate issues that had been determined by the courts were likely to result in a necessity for his right of access to the courts being restricted in an appropriate case.

Proceedings struck out. Isaac Wunder order refused.

Judgment of Mr Justice Barry O'Donnell delivered on the 22 ^nd day of October 2024

INTRODUCTION

1 . This is the court's judgment on four applications moved by the respective defendants in three separate sets of proceedings that were brought by the plaintiff. I will describe the proceedings with record number 2021/5391P as the First Proceedings, the proceedings with record number 2023/4833P as the Second Proceedings, and the proceedings with record number 2023/4834P as the Third Proceedings.

2 . In each set of proceedings, the State defendants have brought motions seeking to have the proceedings against them struck out as frivolous or vexatious or bound to fail. As part of the relief sought in those applications, in the event that the proceedings are struck out, the State defendants also are seeking orders restricting the ability of the plaintiff to commence fresh proceedings against them without the plaintiff first obtaining the permission of the President of the High Court or a judge nominated by him (described as an Isaac Wunder order). In the Third Proceedings, the fifth defendant, the Legal Services Regulatory Authority ( LSRA) has sought similar orders in relation to the proceedings as against that body.

3 . All the proceedings have their origin in family law proceedings involving the plaintiff concerning his relationship with his wife (from whom he is separated, and who I will describe as his former wife) and his child who is now in her early teens. Those proceedings were commenced in 2015 and, while an order for judicial separation has been made, there are ongoing issues, mainly in relation to questions of access and maintenance.

4 . In the First Proceedings, Mr Justice Ferriter made orders on the 15 November 2023 providing for the anonymisation of the proceedings. At the outset of the hearing of these applications, the parties agreed that similar orders should be made in the other two cases in order to protect the anonymity of the parties involved in the underlying family law proceedings, and those orders were then made by the court by consent.

5 . The proceedings with which these applications are concerned were all commenced by the plaintiff, and all involved very serious allegations made against numerous persons. The plaintiff appeared to find the process emotionally difficult and at various times he expressed a strong desire that all he sought was some element of finality to his overall legal predicament. The court accepts that the plaintiff has found the experience of litigation difficult, and the court in no way underestimates the traumatic effect of his marital breakdown and the effective breakdown of his relationship with his child. A further significant feature of the plaintiff's approach to litigation was profound suspicion of the legal process and the judiciary, combined with what appeared to the court to be a substantial inability to view matters other than through the prism of his own sense of grievance. It must, however, be noted that responsibility for much of the extent of the underlying litigation and the satellite litigation lies with the plaintiff himself and his unwillingness to accept outcomes and orders with which he disagrees.

6 . The plaintiff was represented for periods in the family law proceedings but has been representing himself for some time and represents himself in the proceedings that are the subject of these applications. While the plaintiff was fully entitled to represent himself, the approach adopted by him to the preparation and presentation of his evidence and arguments was difficult and did not assist in understanding the precise nature of his underlying claims. The court has endeavoured to do its best to understand his arguments, particularly considering the nature of the relief sought in these applications.

7 . In the course of the application, in addition to the relatively voluminous papers, I was asked to review two folders of materials that the plaintiff presented by way of “ Exhibits to the Plaintiff's Replies to Particulars” in the First Proceedings. Those materials ran to 923 pages of densely prepared materials relating to the underlying family law proceedings. I reviewed all of the documents with the exception of certain materials. Those materials were not considered because, while orders had been obtained from the Circuit Family Court permitting the release of most papers, the plaintiff had also included materials which had not been the subject of application permitting their use in these proceedings. I did not consider those documents.

8 . Having reviewed the documents, the court has decided that it would not be appropriate or necessary to set them out or rely on them in this judgment. This is for the following reasons:

• a. The primary reason was that the materials appear to have been created for the purposes of the underlying family law proceedings or by way of commentary on those proceedings. The role of the court in this application is not to hear any appeal from those proceedings or, even less, to carry out a general review of the manner in which those proceedings progressed (or did not progress). As such, the overwhelming bulk of the materials are not relevant.

• b. Second, certain substantive orders regarding access that were made in the underlying family law proceedings were in fact considered by Faherty J. in the High Court on a de novo on appeal from the Circuit Family Court, and a judgment was delivered in January 2020. In that judgment, the High Court dealt with an appeal from orders that suspended the plaintiff's access and certain ancillary orders. From the perspective of this court, those determinations are final and cannot be revisited by way of a collateral challenge.

• c. Third, much of the material was directed towards agitating the disputes that the plaintiff has with his former wife....