XTX Markets Technologies Ltd v Aviva Investors Liquidity Funds Plc

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan
• Judgment Date: 26 November 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 651
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: Record No. HMCA 2024/567

In the Matter of An Appeal Pursuant to Section 28(3) of the Equal Status Act 2000 (As Amended)

Between

XTX Markets Technologies Limited

Appellant

and

Aviva Investors Liquidity Funds Plc

Respondent

[2025] IEHC 651

Record No. HMCA 2024/567

THE HIGH COURT

Discrimination – Locus standi – Equal Status Act 2000 – Appellant appealing on a point of law – Whether the appellant had locus standi to bring a claim under the Equal Status Act 2000

Facts: There was engagement between the parties in relation to the provision by the respondent, Aviva Investors Liquidity Funds plc, of investment services to the appellant, XTX Markets Technologies Ltd. By complaint form submitted to the Workplace Relations Commission (the WRC), the appellant initiated a claim under s. 21 of the Equal Status Act 2000. It was asserted that the respondent discriminated against the appellant by refusing to provide the appellant with a service by reason of the following: the nationality of the appellant; and the nationality of the appellant's founder, co-Chief Executive Officer and ultimate beneficial owner. The Adjudication Officer dismissed the appellant's claim on a preliminary basis, finding that the appellant, as a private limited company, did not have locus standi to a claim under the 2000 Act. The appellant appealed the decision of the WRC to the Circuit Court. In a written judgment dated 24 October 2024 ([2024] IECC 18), it was determined that the appellant did not have locus standi to bring a claim under the 2000 Act. The appellant appealed to the High Court on a point of law pursuant to s. 28(3) of the 2000 Act.

Held by Phelan J that a legal entity may have standing to bring a claim under the 2000 Acts. She held that the fact that a special definition applies in respect of the respondent class under the 2000 Act does not operate to show an intention on the part of the Oireachtas to exclude legal persons from the scope of protection provided under the 2000 Act. She held that against a background where the Oireachtas did not define potential complainants with reference to their status as natural persons only and could have easily done so, something clear would be required to support the conclusion that the protections provided under the 2000 Act may never be available to legal persons; far from suggesting a restricted field of application, however, the language, purpose and context of the legislation all support expansive provision for protection for discrimination and promotion of equality rather than the contrary. She was satisfied that a complainant under s. 21 of the 2000 Act may be a legal or natural person in accordance with the definition of a person prescribed under s. 18(c) of the Interpretation Act 2005, there being no contrary intention apparent from the language, context and purpose of the 2000 Act and interpreting the scheme in accordance with its substanceand tenor. She held that in maintaining a claim under the 2000 Act the requirement is to demonstrate a detriment arising from less favourable treatment on discriminatory grounds; it is not necessary for the claimant to possess those grounds once the claimant can establish that the discriminatory treatment meted out to them was on discriminatory grounds.

Phelan J's provisional view was that the judgment dated 24 October 2024 should be set aside and the matter should be remitted to the WRC for full hearing of the claim.

Judgment set aside.

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 26 ^th day of November, 2025.

INTRODUCTION

1 . This appeal on a point of law pursuant to s. 28(3) of the Equal Status Act, 2000 (as amended) (hereinafter “the 2000 Act”) concerns the standing of a legal as opposed to a natural person to pursue a complaint of discrimination under the 2000 Act.

2 . The Appellant's underlying complaint of discrimination contrary to the 2000 Act was determined by both the Workplace Relations Commission (hereinafter “the WRC”) and the Circuit Court on appeal based on a preliminary issue as to standing. No evidence was heard before the WRC or the Circuit Court and there has been no consideration of or adjudication on the merits of the Appellant's claim of discriminatory treatment. As with the WRC and the Circuit Court, it is now agreed that the only question properly for consideration before me relates to the preliminary issue of standing to bring a complaint.

3 . The answer to the question of law at the heart of this appeal is key to identifying the scope of protection available under the 2000 Act and the jurisdiction of the WRC under that Act to receive and determine complaints based on a claim that a legal person has been treated less favourably, on prescribed discriminatory grounds, in accessing goods and services.

4 . The 2000 Act is domestic legislation which, in part, serves to implement EU law in the State. The proper interpretation of the 2000 Act therefore requires consideration of the requirements of EU law because the question for determination arises in an area involving points of intersection between domestic and EU law. There is an obligation on the State (including this Court) to interpret and apply domestic legislation in a manner which gives effect to the obligations on the State deriving from EU law where possible.

BACKGROUND

5 . The events which led to the making of a complaint to the WRC under the 2000 Act are of limited relevance to the legal issue I must decide and do not require to be recited in detail.

6 . In short and by way of context only, the Appellant is a private limited company incorporated in the United Kingdom and the Respondent is a public limited company incorporated in Ireland. The Appellant is part of a global financial technology firm headquartered in London with over 190 employees based in London, New York, Singapore, Paris and Mumbai. The group was founded by a Russian national living in London since 2006. At the time of the alleged discriminatory treatment the said Russian national was a dual citizen, holding both British and Russian citizenship. In addition to founding the Group, the same Russian national is described in the papers before me as the Appellant's co-CEO and ultimate beneficial owner.

7 . There was some engagement between the parties during 2021 and 2022 in relation to the provision by the Respondent of investment services to the Appellant. In this context, a query was raised regarding the nationality of the ultimate beneficial owner of the Appellant giving rise to a concern that the Respondent was prohibited from selling euro denominated transferable securities issued after the 12 ^th of April, 2022, or units in collective investment undertakings with exposure to such securities to any Russian national or natural person residing in Russia or any legal person, entity or body established in Russia, by reason of the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/328 of the 25 ^th of February, 2022 and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/398 of the 9 ^th of March, 2022 (referred to as “ the Sanction Regulations”).

8 . Ultimately, it appears that the Respondent refused to provide services to the Appellant in reliance on the Sanction Regulations construed together with Regulation 833/2014 and Article 1m of Regulation 765/2006 which prohibit “ participating, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent prohibitions in the Regulation.”

9 . The Appellant has consistently maintained that the Respondent's decision to refuse to provide services was unlawful, contending that no other bank, broker or regulator (including the Central Bank of Ireland) has adopted the position that the Sanctions Regulations apply to or restrict the Appellant's trading activities.

10 . It appears from the correspondence that the Appellant contemplated a claim to the London County Court alleging discrimination contrary to s. 29(1) of the UK Equality Act, 2010 and relying of ss. 13 and 29 of that Act. Having regard to the fact that the Respondent is an Irish resident company, it was argued that the UK courts did not have jurisdiction.

11 . Against this background, a complaint was made to the WRC.

PROCEEDINGS

Complaint to Workplace Relations Commission

12 . By complaint form submitted to the WRC on the 27 ^th of February, 2023, the Appellant initiated a claim under s. 21 of the 2000 Act. In that complaint it was asserted that, contrary to the provisions ss. 2 (probably s.3 intended) and 5 of the Act, the Respondent discriminated against the Appellant by refusing to provide the Appellant with a service by reason of the following:

• A. the nationality (or imputed nationality) of the Appellant; and/

• B. the nationality (or imputed nationality) of the Appellant's founder, co-Chief Executive Officer and ultimate beneficial owner, being a person associated with the Appellant within the meaning of s. 3 (b) (presumably s. 3(1)(b) intended) of the Acts.

13 . The allegation of discrimination was based on the decision of the Respondent not to permit the Complainant (as it was at that stage) to subscribe to or invest in several funds operated by the Respondent, including a fund denominated in euro. The Appellant's claim was listed for hearing before the WRC on the 6 ^th of September, 2023, on the preliminary jurisdictional and/or locus standi issue, namely, whether a corporate entity could bring a complaint of discrimination on grounds of race contrary to s. 3(2)(h) of the 2000 Act in respect of a refusal of access to financial services by reason of the nationality or imputed nationality of the complainant's founder, co-CEO and ultimate beneficial owner being a person associated with the legal entity within the meaning of s. 3(b) (properly s.3(1)(b)) of the 2000 Act.

14 . Before the WRC, both parties presented detailed written submissions in advance of the oral hearing.

15 . In brief, the Appellant submitted, consistent with the...