Y.Y. v The Minister for Justice and Equality No. 12

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr. Justice Richard Humphreys
Judgment Date01 April 2019
Neutral Citation[2019] IEHC 205
CourtHigh Court
Docket Number[2016 No. 774 J.R.]
Date01 April 2019
BETWEEN
Y.Y.
APPLICANT
AND
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
RESPONDENT

(No. 12)

[2019] IEHC 205

[2016 No. 774 J.R.]

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Immigration – Concession – Immigration Act 1999 s. 3(11) – Applicant seeking to challenge an Immigration Act 1999 s. 3(11) decision – Whether the respondent had made a concession

Facts: Before the High Court was a residual challenge to a fourth Immigration Act 1999 s. 3(11) decision of 22nd November, 2018 (the first three s. 3(11) decisions having already been quashed, the first by the Supreme Court and the second and third by Humphreys J), and secondly a challenge to a fifth s. 3(11) decision of 15th May, 2019. The ground on which the fifth s. 3(11) decision was challenged was set out in the amended statement of grounds as follows: “Taking the concession now made by the Respondent that secret detention centres exist in Algeria (p. 21 of the decision) together with all other relevant circumstances, the conclusion that deportation would not expose the Applicant to a risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in breach of Article 3 ECHR is unreasonable and/or irrational, and/or the contested decision fails to dispel all doubts as required by Article 3 and breaches Article 40.3 of the Constitution and/or s. 3(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003”. The ground as pleaded involved three elements: (i) an allegation that the respondent, the Minister for Justice and Equality, had made a concession; (ii) an allegation that the conclusion was unreasonable or irrational; and (iii) an allegation that the decision fails to dispel doubts as to the risk to the applicant.

Held by Humphreys J that there was nothing in the latest decision to suggest an acceptance by the Minister of a relevant increase in the level of risk to this applicant; thus the decision should not be read as a concession. Humphreys J held that the fifth s. 3(11) decision was not unreasonable or irrational having regard to the huge number of factors supporting the Minister’s conclusion, both in assessing the personal and individual circumstances of the applicant, and the overall country situation which has been one of continuous improvement taking a broad view over a period of recent years. Humphreys J held that the allegation that the Minister’s decision failed to dispel doubts was not a ground for judicial review. Humphreys J held that the proceedings insofar as they involved a challenge to the fourth s. 3(11) decision of 22nd November, 2018 (the challenge to which was logically dependant on that to the fifth decision), and to the fifth s. 3(11) decision of 15th March, 2019, would be dismissed.

Shortly after delivery of the foregoing judgment Mr Lynn for the applicant asked for a brief period of time to consider whether he had further submissions to make on the validity of the original deportation order, separate and distinct from those already made in the context of the s. 3(11) decisions, and, having been afforded such time, indicated that he did not. Because that was the only remaining live piece of substantive relief sought, Humphreys J simply dismissed the proceedings in toto and listed the matter for submissions on costs.

Proceedings dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys delivered on the 1st day of April, 2019
1

The history of this matter is set out in the previous judgments or determinations in the proceedings, of which the present one is the twelfth at High Court level and the fourteenth overall. Those decisions are as follows:

(i). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 1) [2017] IEHC 176 [2017] 3 JIC 1306 (Unreported, High Court, 13th March, 2017), I refused certiorari of a deportation order against the applicant and of a first decision under s. 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999.

(ii). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2017] IEHC 185 [2017] 3 JIC 2405 (Unreported, High Court, 24th March, 2017), I refused leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

(iii). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 3) [2017] IEHC 334 [2017] 3 JIC 2409 (Unreported, High Court, 24th March, 2017), I declined to continue a stay in favour of the applicant.

(iv). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESCDET 38 the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to that court on certain limited grounds.

(v). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 61 [2018] 1 I.L.R.M. 109, the Supreme Court quashed the first s. 3(11) decision and remitted the proceedings, insofar as they related to the deportation order, back to this court to be considered in conjunction with a proposed second s. 3(11) application. In due course, further submissions under s. 3(11) were made and a second adverse decision under s. 3(11) was made on 27th September, 2017.

(vi). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 4) [2017] IEHC 690 [2017] 10 JIC 1706 (Unreported, High Court, 17th November, 2017), I inter alia allowed an amendment to the proceedings to challenge the second s. 3(11) decision.

(vii). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 5) [2017] IEHC 815 [2017] 12 JIC 1907 (Unreported, High Court, 19th December, 2017), I quashed the second s. 3(11) decision.

(viii). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 6) [2017] IEHC 811 [2017] 12 JIC 2111 (Unreported, High Court, 21st December, 2017), I directed that the issue of revocation be remitted back to the Minister for fresh consideration. Following that order, fresh submissions were made and a third adverse s. 3(11) decision was made by the Minister on 11th June, 2018. Following that, I allowed a further amendment of the proceedings to encompass a challenge to that decision.

(ix). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 7) [2018] IEHC 459 [2018] 7 JIC 3134 (Unreported, High Court, 31st July, 2018), I decided that in principle there would be an order of certiorari against the third s. 3(11) decision and adjourned the matter for further submissions in respect of the appropriate relief.

(x). In Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 8) [2018] IEHC 537 [2018] 9 JIC 2505 (Unreported, High Court, 25th September, 2018), I quashed the third s. 3(11) decision and gave certain directions regarding the procedure to be adopted in the reconsideration of the matter by the Minister. Following that...

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