Zadecki v DPP
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan |
| Judgment Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] IEHC 602 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | [Record No.: 2021/647 JR] |
[2022] IEHC 602
[Record No.: 2021/647 JR]
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Convictions – Possession of stolen property – Judicial review – Applicant seeking judicial review – Whether there was a complete absence of evidence
Facts: The applicant, Mr Zadecki, a Polish national, was charged with a number of offences which came before the District Court for hearing in April, 2021. While he was acquitted on some of the charges coming before the District Court, he was convicted on others. Leave to proceed by way of judicial review was granted by the High Court (Simons J) on the 25th of August, 2021 on foot of a written judgment ([2021] IEHC 553). Under the terms of the order granting leave the applicant was limited to pursuing a challenge in respect of only two of the charges which had been before the District Court in April, 2021, namely two charges of possession of stolen property contrary to s. 18 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. These convictions were challenged on the dual basis that there was no evidence the items were stolen before the District Judge thereby depriving him of jurisdiction and it was wrong to proceed to convict the applicant notwithstanding the agreement of the prosecuting guard with the applicant’s solicitor’s submissions at direction stage as to the said lack of evidence that the items were stolen.
Held by the Court that as it was satisfied that this was a case of weak evidence as opposed to no evidence, the authorities did not support any interference by the Court in judicial review proceedings where the remedy of an appeal was available. The Court held that it is well established that a District Judge is quite entitled to make a wrong decision on the law, once he retains jurisdiction to make that decision and has not erred in a manner which deprives him of jurisdiction. In circumstances where there was no consent in terms indicated to the Court to a directed acquittal in this case and where it was clear that the charges were not withdrawn, the Court was satisfied that the District Judge was entitled to proceed to make a determination on the basis of his assessment of the evidence and remained so for so long as the prosecution case remained before him. Until such time as the application for a direction and a conviction was withdrawn, it was the Court’s view that the District Judge was entitled to refuse to accept a legal submission which he considered to be incorrect even if it was agreed in by both parties before him. The Court was satisfied that the District Judge had discharged the duty on him to give reasons for his decision. The Court noted that the District Judge indicated that he was not with Mr Quinn, who represented the applicant, and that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt having engaged in the evidence immediately prior to this and explained during the directions hearing his position with regard to this evidence. As the District Judge stated there was a case to answer and the applicant put nothing further in the mix, it was clear to the Court that the reason for rejecting Mr Quinn’s application was the evidence referred to in rejecting the directions application.
The Court held that the applicant had not established an entitlement to relief by way of judicial review on the application. Accordingly, the Court made an order dismissing the proceedings.
Relief refused.
JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 1 st day of November, 2022
. The Applicant is a Polish national who was charged with a number of offences which came before the District Court for hearing in April, 2021. While he was acquitted on some of the charges coming before the District Court, he was convicted on others. A full transcript of the hearing before the District Court is available.
. Leave to proceed by way of judicial review was granted by the High Court (Simons J.) on the 25 th of August, 2021 on foot of a written judgment ( [2021] IEHC 553).
. Under the terms of the order granting leave the Applicant was limited to pursuing a challenge in respect of only two of the charges which had been before the District Court in April, 2021, namely two charges of possession of stolen property contrary to s. 18 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001 [hereinafter “the 2001 Act”]. These convictions are challenged on the dual basis that there was no evidence the items were stolen before the District Judge thereby depriving him of jurisdiction and it was wrong to proceed to convict the Applicant notwithstanding the agreement of the prosecuting guard with the Applicant's solicitor's submissions at direction stage as to the said lack of evidence that the items were stolen.
. In refusing leave to pursue a challenge in respect of other convictions handed down by the District Court, Simons J. proceeded on the basis that an application for judicial review will not normally be appropriate where an applicant has an adequate alternative remedy by way of an appeal. With reference to the Supreme Court decision in E.R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2019] IESC 86 and Sweeney v. District Judge Fahy [2014] IESC 50, Simons J. reiterated that judicial review is about process, jurisdiction and adherence to fair procedures and is not a reanalysis of the case. He pointed out that it is not enough to ground a successful application for judicial review that the trial judge might have made an error of fact or an incorrect decision of law. On an application of these principles to the case advanced on behalf of the Applicant, Simons J. found that many of the errors alleged against the District Court were precisely the types of errors in respect of which an appeal to the Circuit Court represents an appropriate remedy and, if errors at all, then they constituted errors of law within jurisdiction which are not properly amenable to judicial review.
. Despite the restricted circumstances in which judicial review is available as a remedy where the complaint relates to the evidence adduced, leave to proceed by way of judicial review was granted by Simons J. in respect of two charges related to possession of an allegedly stolen PPS (Personal Public Service) card and a Leap (public transport) card. As set out in the judgment, leave was granted because (para. 29):
“29. I am satisfied that the applicant has made out arguable grounds for judicial review in this regard, and that an appeal to the Circuit Court would not represent an adequate alternative remedy. The gravamen of the applicant's case is that the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction in purporting to convict the applicant of the offences in circumstances where the prosecuting garda did not oppose the application for the direction. If this ground is made out at the full hearing of the judicial review proceedings—and this is a matter for another day—it would appear to represent a significant breach of fair procedures in that the District Court judge might be perceived as having descended into the arena. This is enough to bring this aspect of the present proceedings within the category of cases in respect of which judicial review is appropriate notwithstanding the pending appeal to the Circuit Court.”
. In granting leave, Simons J. allowed the proceedings to be maintained on the following grounds:
-
i. Having regard to all the circumstances, including the multiple refusals by the learned Judge to apply the law to the evidence and the failures by the learned Judge to provide any or any sufficient or rational reasons for his decisions on the aforesaid matters, the Applicant's right to a trial in due course of law in which justice was seen to be done has been breached;
-
ii. The learned Judge erred in fact and in law in convicting the applicant of possession of stolen property without evidence that the property in question was stolen;
-
iii. The learned Judge erred in fact and in law in convicting the applicant of possession of stolen property when the prosecution conceded the legal arguments made on the applicant's behalf in support of a directed acquittal and;
-
iv. In all of the circumstances, the conduct of the proceedings lacked the appearance of justice and fairness required of a trail in due course of law pursuant to Article 38.1 of the Constitution.
. It appears from the grounds allowed, if not from the terms of the judgment, that leave was granted to proceed not only in relation to the failure to accede to a directed acquittal in the face of agreement from the prosecution but also in relation to the want of evidence to ground a conviction and the absence of reasons.
. By virtue of the considered judgment of Simons J. at leave stage, the issues in these proceedings are now relatively net. The essence of the Applicant's complaint is that the Learned District Court Judge erred in fact and in law in convicting the Applicant of possession of stolen property when there was no evidence that the property in question was stolen and when the prosecution conceded the legal arguments made on the Applicant's behalf in support of a directed acquittal. It is claimed that in all the circumstances, the conduct of the proceedings lacked the appearance of justice and fairness required of a trial in due course of law pursuant to Article 38.1 of the Constitution. While leave was also granted to challenge the decision to convict for want of sufficient or rational reasons, a lack of reasons was not pressed in written or oral submissions.
. The Respondent does not accept that there was no evidence before the District Court to support a conviction and relies on what is accepted to be weak circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to vest the District Judge with jurisdiction to proceed to conviction...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Callan v The Director of Public Prosecutions
...if the judge in the court below was entitled to make it, judicial review would not lie: see ER v DPP [2019] IESC 86; Zadecki v DPP [2022] IEHC 602. 23 . It was submitted that in this case, the caselaw in relation to amendment of a summons was not relevant, because it was clear from the ruli......