E v E

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr. Justice Mcwilliam
Judgment Date01 January 1982
Neutral Citation1977 WJSC-HC 599
CourtHigh Court
Date01 January 1982

1977 WJSC-HC 599

THE HIGH COURT

No. 542 SP. 1976
E v. E
E
v.
E
1

Mr. Justice Mcwilliamdelivered this 3rd February 1977

2

These proceedings have been brought by the Plaintiff under the provisions of the Married Women's Status Act, 1957, the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, and the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976, claiming Orders giving her sole custody of the four children of her marriage with the Defendant, and maintenance, and an Order that the Defendant be excluded from the matrimonial home.

3

The parties were married in Dublin on 30th August, 1962, The children were born on the following dates, that is to say:- John on 28th May 1963; Colm on 9th June 1965; Raymond on 5th June 1968; and Amanda on 1st June 1976.

4

The marriage appears to have been reasonably successful until after the birth of the third boy. From this time onwards, with one short interlude to which I will refer later, the relations between the parties deteriorated steadily.

5

Prior to the marriage, both parties had worked in thesame firm. After the marriage the Defendant was with a I number of firms and he appears to have moved house on an unusually large number of occasions. Some years ago, he started an electrical wholesale business of his own and has been extremely successful in it. The Plaintiff assisted him in this business in some capacity and says she frequently worked late in connection with it. She feels she should have been made a director of the company and was very aggrieved when the Defendant discontinued her employment with it. I do not know whether she had any job between the time of her marriage and the start of thisbusiness.

6

Everybody agrees that the Defendant works very hard at his job.

7

As is usual in these cases, many allegations and counter allegations were made by each party with regard to the conduct of the other, each party thereby attempting to show that the other was responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary because, once it has been established, as it has been here, that the marriage has completely broken down, I am mainly concerned with the welfare of the children and, except in so far as it gives mean insight into the attitudes of the parents to the children, am not greatly concerned with the behaviour of each to the other.

8

Having said this, however, I would add that the view I have formed of the parents from the whole of the evidence is that the Plaintiff has probably at all times been subject to depression, since she herself states that she was attending doctors and taking tranquilisers from the beginning; that the children tied her very much to the house until they went to school; that the Defendant became more and more Involved in his work; that the Plaintiff was left more and more on her own so that the lack of companionship increased her depression and, as her depression increased, communication between the parties ceased and this increased the loneliness and depression; that the Defendant started taking a drink on the way home to fortify himself for the difficulty of a situation which he could not understand and with which he simply could not cope and tended to bring the Plaintiff out to restaurants or lounges to avoid the strain of the home for both of them. I am satisfied that he tried to do his best and that he did a considerable amount of cooking and other domestic work in the home. I am also satisfied that there is substance in many of the allegations made on bothsides but that the incidents have been exaggerated in retrospect, though not necessarily deliberately.

9

Depression is a very distressing disease, both for the person suffering from it and for everybody concerned with the sufferer. Few people are able to accept it as genuine. I absolutely refuse to apportion blame between the parties.

10

Under these circumstances, it appears to me that the account given by the Defendant as to leaving the home in July, 1974, is...

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