Adams v DPP

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: McGuinness J.
• Judgment Date: 06 March 2001
• Neutral Citation: [2001] IESC 27
• Court: Supreme Court
• Docket Number: [S.C. No. 116 of 2000]
• Date: 06 March 2001

ADAMS v. DPP & ORS

Between

JOHN ADAMS

Appellant/Applicant

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, JUDGE FOR DISTRICTNO.16 AND HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOMEAFFAIRS

RESPONDENTS

[2001] IESC 27

Murray, J.

McGuinness, J.

Geoghegan, J.

Record No. 116/00

THE SUPREME COURT

Synopsis

Extradition

Extradition; service of proceedings; sovereign immunity; appellant had been arrested in and extradited from Northern Ireland and subsequently prosecuted in Ireland; upon his release appellant had been re-arrested and charged with separate offences; such a prosecution had required issuance of certificate by British Home Secretary waiving specialty in matter; appellant seeks inter alia order of certiorari quashing certificate issued by British Home Secretary waiving specialty with regard to offences; whether High Court, or Supreme Court on appeal, has any jurisdiction to judicially review administrative acts or executive actions of a Minister of a foreign government carried out in his own country; whether Irish statute or statutory instrument create a power, reviewable by the courts, in the Home Secretary to provide such certificate; whether dismissal of action against British Home Secretary deprives appellant of his constitutional right of access to the courts; s. 39, Extradition Act, 1965; S.I. No. 221 of 1994.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

Adams v. D.P.P. - Supreme Court: McGuinness J., Murray J., Geoghegan J. - 06/03/2001 - [2001] 1 IR 47 - [2001] 2 ILRM 417

The applicant sought to appeal against a High Court order striking out the service of certain documents upon the British Secretary of State. The applicant appealed against the order. The Supreme Court, McGuinness J, delivering judgment, held that the proceedings in this jurisdiction as against the British Secretary of State were correctly discontinued. The appeal would be dismissed.

Citations:

LARCENY ACT 1916

FORGERY ACT 1913

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1951 S10

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

CONSTITUTION ART 29.3

CONSTITUTION ART 29

EXTRADITION (RULE OF SPECIALTY AND RE-EXTRADITION FOR PURPOSES OF PART III OF EXTRADITION ACT, 1965) ORDER, 1994 SI 221/1994

EXTRADITION ACT 1965 S39

EXTRADITION (AMDT) ACT 1987 S3(2)

1 6th day of March 2001by McGuinness J.[Nem Diss]

2 The Appellant in these judicial review proceedings has been charged with fifteen counts of rape and sixteen counts of sexual assault and is awaiting trial in the Central Criminal Court.

3 On the 27th May 1997 the Appellant, who had been serving a sentence for unrelated offences in Magilligan Prison, was extradited from Northern Ireland to this jurisdiction in respect of thirty five charges under the Larceny Act 1915, the Forgery Act 1913 and Section 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951. He consented to his extradition. On the 28th May 1997 he pleaded guilty to the charges in respect of which he had been extradited and received a sentence of three months in respect of each count, all sentences to run concurrently. He served this sentence. On his release from the Curragh Prison on the 4th August 1997 he was arrested at Newbridge Railway Station and subsequently charged with thirty one rape and sexual assault offences against three Complainants who resided in the Dundalk area. TheAppellant's Solicitor, Mr McGuill, in his affidavit grounding the judicial review proceedings avers that the Appellant had been interviewed by members of the Garda Siochana in connection with the alleged sexual offences both in Magilligan Prison prior to his extradition and in Mountjoy Prison subsequent to his sentence for the offences in respect of which he had been extradited.

4 Since the charges on which he was extradited were unrelated to the sexual offences with which he is now charged, it would not, on account of the rule of specialty, have been possible to prosecute him for the sexual offences unless an appropriate waiver was provided by the relevant authority in the requested State. On 29th July 1997 the third named Respondent, who, as the relevant authority in the United Kingdom, is correctly entitled Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Home Department (hereafter "the Home Secretary") issued the required certificate.

5 It appears that prior to the issue of the present judicial review proceedings the Appellant had brought proceedings in this jurisdiction pursuant to Article 40.4 of the Constitution and that these proceedings are still in being. It also appears that the Appellant, as a lay litigant, brought proceedings against the "Secretary ofState" in Northern Ireland. On the information given to this Court the position in regard to these proceedings is far from clear. Firstly it is not entirely clear whether the Appellant's Northern Ireland proceedings were brought against the British Home Secretary or against the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Court was told that the Appellant was refused legal aid and that it could not pursue his proceedings, but again it is not clear what stage the proceedings reached or whether they have been formally discontinued or simply left in abeyance. It appears that they may have been struck out.

6 On 7th February 2000 an application was made to O'Neill J. in the High Court for leave to commence the instant Judicial Review Proceedings. In his proceedings the Appellant seeks to prohibit the Director of Public Prosecutions from continuing the prosecution of the sexual offences now pending before the Central Criminal Court. He also seeks an Order of Certiorari in order to quash the District Judge's order returning the Appellant for trial. The relief sought against the British Home Secretary in his proceedings are as follows:

"An Order of Certiorari quashing the third named Respondent's certificate dated the 29th July 1997 purporting to waive specialty in respect of the said offences." And leave to file an additional affidavit on the constitutional position of the third namedRespondent."

7 The Appellant was granted leave to apply for these reliefs and in his order O'Neill J. also gave directions as to service. Insofar as service on the Director of Public Prosecutions was concerned, he directed service in the normal way on the Chief State Solicitor; in so far as the District Judge was concerned he directed service of the order and grounding papers on the relevant District Court Clerk. Insofar as the Home Secretary was concerned he directed service on "theBritish Ambassador in Ireland or such other person authorised to accept service on behalf of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for HomeAffairs".

8 Having obtained the order granting leave, the Appellant's solicitors sought to serve the proceedings by delivering them to the British Embassy at Merrion Road, Dublin. An official at the Embassy refused to accept this service and directed them to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London. The proceedings were then delivered by hand by an official of the Irish Embassy in London to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and also,on the 2nd March 2000, to the reception desk at the chambers of the Attorney General in London.

9 By Notice of Motion dated 14 March 2000 the third named Respondent (the Home Secretary) applied to the High Court to set aside the order of O'Neill J. and to dismiss the judicial review proceedings as against him. The Motion was heard by Kelly J., who delivered judgment on the 12th April 2000. In his order of 14th April 2000 the learned High Court judge granted the relief sought by the third named Respondent, set aside the purported service upon the third named Respondent and discharged the order of 7th February 2000 as against the third named Respondent. He also granted the costs of the motion to the third named Respondent.

10 The Appellant/Applicant has now appealed against that order.

11 The Appellant/Applicant's Notice of Appeal contains a considerable amount of what can best be described as legal argument. The main grounds of appeal as set out in the Notice are as follows:

12 2 "1. Such service as was effected was not through the Ambassador; but whether or not the said Respondent could be served in that manner was not relevant. In any event, the learned trial judge erred in concluding that in proceedings of this nature (assuming a...