Aer Rianta Cpt v Ryanair Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Hardiman,Mrs Justice McGuinness
• Judgment Date: 13 November 2001
• Neutral Citation: [2001] IESC 94
• Docket Number: No. 6/01
• Court: Supreme Court
• Date: 13 November 2001

[2001] IESC 94

The Supreme Court

Denham, J.

McGuinness J.

Hardiman J.

No. 6/01

AER RIANTA CPT v. RYANAIR LTD

BETWEEN

AER RIANTA CPT

PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

AND

RYANAIR LIMITED

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

Citations:

AIR NAVAGATION & TRANSPORT (AMDT) ACT 1998 S39

FIRST NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK PLC V ANGLIN 1996 1 IR 75

IRISH DUNLOP COMPANY LTD V RALPH 1958 95 ILTR 70

BANQUE DE PARIS V DE NARAY 1984 1 LLR 21

NATIONAL WESTMINISTER BANK PLC V DANIEL 1993 1 WLR 1453

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V YAACOUB (UNREP) 3.8.1990 CA TRANSCRIPT NO 699 OF 1990

ACC BANK PLC V ELIO MALOCCO 2000 3 IR 191

BANK OF IRELAND V EDUCATIONAL BUILDING SOCIETY 1999 1 IR 220

CRAWFORD V GILLMOR 1891 30 LRI 238

RSC O.37 r6

RSC O.37 r7

RSC O.37 r3

JUDICATURE (IRL) ACT 1877

SHEPPARDS V WILKINSON & JARVIS 6 TLR 13

RSC O.14

PRENDERGAST V BIDDLE UNREP SUPREME 31.7.1957

CRAWFORD V GILMORE 1891 IR 238

Synopsis:

CONTRACT

Estoppel

Evidence - Practice and procedure - Summary judgment -- Landing charges - Conflict of evidence - Discount scheme in operation - Aviation - Whether dispute over charges should proceed to full plenary hearing - Whether plaintiff had agreed to variation of scheme to benefit defendant - Whether there was a collateral contract - Whether defendant had credible defence to action - Air Navigation and Transport (Amendment) Act, 1998 - Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986 Order 37 (6/2001 - Supreme Court - 13/11/01) -

Aer Rianta v Ryanair - [2001] 4 IR 607 - [2002] 1 ILRM 381

Facts: The plaintiff (Aer Rianta) imposed landing charges and passenger load fees for airlines using Dublin Airport. The plaintiff operated discount schemes in respect of these landing charges to encourage traffic growth incentives. The plaintiff sought summary judgment in respect of charges which it claimed the defendant owed. It was contended by the defendant that due to discussions between the defendant company and an officer of the plaintiff that the plaintiff had agreed to vary the scheme to the benefit of the defendant. The defendant contended that there was a collateral contract giving the defendant additional benefits and due to these discussions the plaintiff was estopped from pursuing the action. The plaintiff denied any variation of the scheme. In the High Court Mr. Justice Kelly considered the affidavits of the parties and correspondence between the parties. The court concluded that the correspondence offered no support to the claims of the defendant and held that the defendant's defence was not credible. The court awarded the plaintiff summary judgment. The defendant appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court.

Held by the Supreme Court (McGuinness J and Hardiman J delivering judgments; Denham J agreeing) in allowing the appeal. McGuinness J held that the issue to decide was whether the proposed defence was so far fetched or so self contradictory as not to be credible. The probability remained open on the basis of the affidavit evidence that the defendant had a real or bona fide defence. The matters at issue between the parties required to be resolved in a full hearing. Hardiman J held that on the face of it the case turned on a stark conflict of factual evidence. The length of time and volume of paper required by the plaintiff to seek to demonstrate that the case was a clear one in itself suggested that it was not sufficiently clear for summary judgment. The action would be remitted for plenary hearing.

1 Mrs Justice McGuinnessdelivered the 13th day of November 2001

2 This is an appeal against the order of Kelly J. made in the High Court on 5th December 2000 whereby he granted summary judgment in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent Aer Rianta CPT. The Proceedings arose out of a disputed claim for the balance allegedly due by the Defendant/Appellant ("Ryanair") to the Plaintiff/Respondent ("Aer Rianta") in respect of landing charges and passenger load charges at Dublin Airport. The proceedings were heard by way of notice of motion grounded on the affidavits of the parties on 28th and 29th November 2000. The learned judge, having reserved his judgment, gave judgment on the 5th December 2000 and made an order that the Plaintiff should recover from the Defendant the sum of £356,777.00 together with interest in the sum of £76,963.00, making in total the sum of£433,740.00. The Plaintiff was also granted the costs of theproceedings.

3 Landing charges and passenger load fees are payable by airlines using the facilities of airports, including Dublin Airport, operated by the Plaintiff, Aer Rianta. Pursuant to theprovisions of Section 39 of the Air Navigation and Transport (Amendment) Act, 1998, Aer Rianta is entitled to recover these charges as a simple contractdebt.

4 The factual background to the proceedings is set out in summary by the learned trial judge in his judgment as follows:-

"For some years now the Plaintiff has operated a discount scheme in respect of these charges. These are given under traffic growth incentives and the discounts allowable are very large, sometimes as much as 90% or even a 100%. These schemes were first introduced in 1994. The terms of the scheme involved in this action were set forth in a letter dated the 16th January 1997 and sent to all relevant airlines. The scheme has a term of five years and was notified to all of the Plaintiffs scheduled airline customers.

A dispute arose between the Plaintiff and the Defendant as to the operation of the scheme in question. In accordance with the terms of that scheme the dispute was referred to the Department of Public Enterprise. Whilst the scheme provides that the decision of that Department is final and binding it does not exclude the right of either party to have recourse to the Courts. Indeed, even though the Plaintiff contends that it was successful before the Department it does not seek in any way to argue that the view of the Department is binding on this Court and still less summarily enforceable by it. I will ignore the views of the Department for the purposes of this motion.

It is accepted by Counsel for the defence that in essence this is a single issue case. The defence which is proffered through the mouth of the Defendant's chief executive Mr Michael O'Leary on affidavit is that there were discussions between him and aMr Brian J. Byrne of the Plaintiff which resulted in either (a) a variation to the scheme for the benefit of the Defendant or (b) a collateral contract which gave the Defendant additional advantages under the scheme. It is said that in bringing this action account has not been taken of either of these matters. A third proposition is also made. It is said that the Plaintiff is estopped from pursuing this action successfully by reason of a promissory estoppel arising from representations made by Mr Byrne.

The Plaintiff denies in categoric terms that there was or indeed ever could have been such a variation as is alleged without specific Board approval on the part of the Plaintiff which was never given. The Plaintiff contends that this line of defence is, on the evidence adduced, not credible and/or that there is no fair or reasonable probability of the defendant having a real or bona fidedefence."

5 The proceedings were commenced by Aer Rianta in July 1999 to recover sums which they claimed were due by Ryanair in respect of landing charges and passenger load fees in respect of three routes operated by Ryanair during 1997 and 1998 namely:

6 (a) Dublin-Paris-London

7 (b) Dublin-Brussels-London

8 (c) Dublin-Bristol-London.

9 In November 1999 Ryanair paid an agreed sum in respect of the landing charges and passenger load fees for the Dublin-Bristol-London route, with the result that in the proceedings before the High Court and in the present appeal only the charges for the Paris and Brussels routes were in question.

10 In his judgment the learned trial judge referred to the matters set out in the affidavits of the Defendant's chief executive Mr O'Leary. He then analysed a number of items of correspondence between Mr O'Leary and Mr Byrne of Aer Rianta exchanged during the period February to March 1997. I shall refer to this correspondence later. The learned trial judge concluded, in the main on the basis of the exhibited documents, that the Defendant had not satisfied him that there was a fair or reasonable probability of it having a real or bona fide defence and he therefore held that the Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment.

11 The Defendant/Appellant has appealed against this decision. In the Defendant/Appellant's notice of appeal it seeks that in lieu of the judgment and order of the High Court, this Court should make an order granting to the Defendant/Appellant leave to defend the Plaintiff/Respondent's summary proceedings and that those proceedings should be remitted for plenary hearing before the High Court as if the proceedings has been originated by plenary summons

12 Ten grounds of appeal are set out in the Notice. Of these, the most relevant to the written and oral submissions made by counsel to this Court are as follows:-

13 a "(d) The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in failing to look at the whole situation, as disclosed by the entirety of the affidavits and exhibits, to determine whether the Defendant/Appellant had satisfied the Court that there was a fair or reasonable probability of the Defendant/Appellant having a real or bonafide defence.

14 (e) The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in failing to give appropriate evidential weight to the existence of written documents consistent with the Defendant/Appellant's defence to the Plaintiff/Respondent's proceedings, and the failure of the Plaintiff/Respondent to deny that certain specified oral variations operated in the past.

15 (f) The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in reaching the conclusion that the evidence offered by the Defendant/Appellant was not credible, bearing in...