Aldona Stulpinaite v The Residential Tenancies Board

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Barr
• Judgment Date: 23 April 2021
• Neutral Citation: [2021] IEHC 309
• Docket Number: [Record No. 2019/383 MCA]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 23 April 2021

Between

Aldona Stulpinaite

Appellant

and

The Residential Tenancies Board

Respondent

and

Michael Whelan

Notice Party

[2021] IEHC 309

[Record No. 2019/383 MCA]

THE HIGH COURT

Notice of termination – Stay – Costs – Appellant seeking an order giving her three months within which to vacate the property – Whether the appellant was entitled to an order for payment of her costs

Facts: The appellant, Ms Stulpinaite, appealed to the High Court on a point of law pursuant to s. 123 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 (as amended) against a decision of the Residential Tenancies Tribunal, which had found that the termination notice served by the notice party, Mr Whelan, on the appellant, was valid. The substantive judgment in this matter was delivered by the court on 12th March, 2021 ([2021] IEHC 178). The appellant was unsuccessful in her appeal against the decision of the Tribunal and the resulting determination order made by the respondent, the Residential Tenancies Board. Notwithstanding that she was unsuccessful in her appeal, the appellant submitted that she was entitled to the following orders: (i) an order giving her three months within which to vacate the property, so as to enable her to put her affairs in order and find alternative accommodation; and (ii) an order for payments of her costs on the basis that the matters raised in the appeal were of sufficient public importance as to constitute “public interest litigation”, such that she should be awarded her costs notwithstanding that she was unsuccessful on the hearing of the appeal. In this regard the appellant relied on the decision in Collins v Minister for Finance [2014] IEHC 79. The appellant did not specify whether she wanted her costs paid by the respondent or the notice party.

Held by Barr J that as the substantive judgment was delivered on 12th March, 2021 and in light of the undertaking given by the notice party that he would allow a period of 28 days from perfection of the court order for the applicant to vacate the premises, that combined period effectively meant that the appellant had a reasonable period of time to seek alternative accommodation, given that she was aware of the decision of the court from delivery of the judgment on 12th March, 2021. Therefore, in relation to the application on behalf of the appellant that the order should provide that she be given a period of three months within which to vacate the property, the court was of the view that it was not appropriate to make that order. Turning to the issue of costs, the court had regard to the principles set out by the divisional court of the High Court in Collins. Barr J found that the examples given therein relate primarily to issues of statutory or constitutional interpretation that were novel and were of exceptional public importance. Barr J held that the issues that were raised in this appeal cannot be seen as being in the same category. Accordingly, the court held that this appeal cannot be seen as coming within the general exception known as public interest litigation, wherein an unsuccessful party might be awarded his or her costs against the successful party. Barr J did not see that it would be just that the appellant should be saddled with debt for the rest of her life, or a significant portion thereof, so as to pay costs to the respondent, a statutory agency, and to the notice party, a wealthy landlord.

Barr J held that the justice of the case would be met by the following order: (a) dismiss the appeal; (b) each party is to bear their own costs of the appeal; (c) the parties are to file a copy of their written submissions in the Central Office of the High Court within four weeks, in compliance with Practice Direction HC 101.

Appeal dismissed.

RULING ON COSTS delivered electronically by Mr. Justice Barr on the 23rd day of April, 2021

1 This judgment deals with the issue of costs arising out of the substantive judgment in this matter delivered by the court on 12th March, 2021, reported at 2021 IEHC 178.

2 The substantive application concerned an appeal on a point of law pursuant to s.123 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 (as amended) brought by the appellant against a decision of the Residential Tenancies Tribunal, which had found that the termination notice served by the notice party on the appellant, was valid. The appellant was unsuccessful in her appeal against the decision of the Tribunal and the resulting Determination Order made by the respondent.

3 Notwithstanding that she was unsuccessful in her appeal, the appellant has submitted that she is entitled to the following orders: An order giving her three months within which to vacate the property, so as to enable her to put her affairs in order and find alternative accommodation; secondly, she seeks an order for payments of her costs on the basis that the matters raised in the appeal were of sufficient public importance as to constitute “public interest litigation”, such that she should be awarded her costs notwithstanding that she was unsuccessful on the hearing of the appeal. In this regard the appellant relied on the decision in Collins v. Minister for Finance [2014] IEHC 79. The appellant did not specify whether she wanted her costs paid by the respondent or the notice party.

4 In response, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that as the court had dismissed the appeal and had not varied the Determination Order, it had no jurisdiction to effectively vary the order at this stage by permitting the appellant to have three months within which to vacate the property.

5 It was further submitted that there was no rational or legal basis on which the appellant should be awarded her costs. She had brought an appeal against the decision of the Tribunal and had been entirely unsuccessful on all of the grounds put forward by her at the hearing of the appeal. It was denied that the appeal raised any issues of general public importance. It was submitted that the appeal merely raised grounds that were individual to the circumstances of the appellant and related to the hearing which had taken place before the Tribunal. The issues raised had no wider importance to the public generally; they solely concerned matters between the parties to the appeal.

6 It was submitted that there was no basis on which the court should depart from the general rule that was provided for in s.169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act...