Attorney General v Oldridge

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Keane C.J.
• Judgment Date: 19 December 2000
• Neutral Citation: [2000] IESC 29
• Court: Supreme Court
• Docket Number: [S.C. No. 10 of 2000]
• Date: 19 December 2000

[2000] IESC 29

THE SUPREME COURT

KEANE C.J.

DENHAM J.

McGUINNESS J.

GEOGHEGAN J.

FENNELLY J.

10/2000

AG v. OLDRIDGE

IN THE MATTER OF S. 52 OF THE COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL) PROVISIONS ACT, 1961

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION ACTS 1965–1995

BETWEEN:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Applicant

and

ALBERT JOHN OLDRIDGE

Respondent

Citations:

EXTRADITION ACT 1965 PART II

EXTRADITION ACT 1965 S8(1)

EXTRADITION ACT 1965 S8(5)

EXTRADITION ACT 1965 (PART II) (NO 22) ORDER 1987 SI 33/1987

EXTRADITION ACT 1965 S10(1)

GILLILAND, STATE V GOVERNOR OF MOUNTJOY 1986 IR 381

HANLON V FLEMING 1981 IR 489

FURLONG, STATE V KELLY 1971 IR 132

WYATT V MCLOUGHLIN 1974 IR 378

WILSON V SHEEHAN 1979 IR 423

SCOTT V METROPOLITAN POLICE COMMISSIONER 1975 AC 819

O'SULLIVAN V CONROY UNREP BARR 31.7.1997 1998/29/11761

MCCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY

MYLES V SREENAN 1999 4 IR 294

R V MURPHY 1837 8 CNP 297

R V DOOT 1973 AC 807

Synopsis

Extradition

Extradition; respondent had been charged in the United States with wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire fraud after money had been fraudulently obtained from three banks; grant of extradition had been refused by the District Court because District Judge was not satisfied that the acts complained of amounted to a criminal offence in both jurisdictions; applicant appealed to the Supreme Court on a point of law; whether there are offences in this jurisdiction corresponding with the offences in respect of which the respondent's extradition is sought; what those corresponding offences are; whether the offence with which the respondent was charged constitutes the offence of conspiracy to defraud; ss. 8(1), 8(5) & 10(1), Extradition Act 1965; Arts. I & II, Washington Treaty.

Held: Appeal allowed.

Attorney General v. Oldridge - Supreme Court: Keane C.J., Denham J., McGuinness J., Geoghegan J., Fennelly J. - 19/12/2000 - [2000] 4 IR 593 - [2001] 2 ILRM 125

The respondent had been charged with offences by prosecution authorities in the United States. The issue arose as to whether corresponding offences existed in Ireland which would enable the extradition of the respondent to proceed. In the District Court and the High Court it was held that the extradition could not proceed. In the Supreme Court Keane CJ held that there were corresponding offences and allowed the appeal.

1 JUDGMENT delivered the 19th day of December 2000by Keane C.J. [Nem diss]

2 On the 26th November 1997, the District Court (Judge Gerard J. Haughton) heard an application pursuant to Part II of the Extradition Acts, 1965– 1995, for the extradition of the respondent to the United States of America. In a written judgment, delivered on the 17th December, 1997, Judge Haughton gave it as his opinion that the respondent should not be extradited but at the request of counsel for the applicant, referred two questions of law which arose in the proceedings to the High Court for determination. Those questions were:-

3 i "(i) Having regard to the matters noted in the extradition documents and the provisions of the Washington Treaty and Part II of the Extradition Act, 1965is/are there offence(s) in this jurisdiction, corresponding with the offences in respect of which the respondent's extradition issought?

4 (ii) If the answer to (i) of this paragraph is yes - what is/are the corresponding offence(s) in this jurisdiction?"

5 The consultative case stated came on for hearing in the High Court before Kearns J. and in a reserved judgment delivered on the 10th November 1999 he decided that the first question should be answered in the negative. He rejected an alternative submission that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to state the case.

6 The applicant has appealed to this court from the determination in the High Court that the first question should be answered in the negative. The respondent has not sought to argue in this court that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to state the case.

7 The application for extradition arises out of what is alleged to have been an extraordinarily elaborate scheme by a number of persons resident in the United States and elsewhere to defraud three banks. The allegation of the prosecution in the United States is that a woman named Ilene Moses, who was engaged in the clothing industry through her company SMS Inc., was the prime mover in the fraudulent scheme. She was said to have claimed that she had a "benefactor" in the clothing industry who was a member of a secret cartel that controlled the fashion industry in Europe and Asia and that, through this benefactor, she had access to businesses controlled by the cartel and a licensee agreement to sell its fashion designs. It is alleged that, in all, the defendants in the proceedings obtained 28 million dollars in loans secured on foot of assets which did not exist or, at least, did not exist in the form that the defendants claimed theyexisted.

8 One of the main features of the alleged scheme was a mythical business relationship between two companies called Jolland and Romtex AG, as aresultof which large sums were purportedly owed by Romtex to Jolland. It was claimed by the prosecution that Romtex had no independent existence and that the alleged business transactions were wholly illusory. As a result of this, and other stratagems, it was said that the banks were induced to pay sums amounting to 28 million dollars to Moses and her associatedcompanies.

9 These frauds were alleged to have been perpetrated from about September 1982 to March 1991. The prosecution say that between 1983 and 1988, one Laurence Anderson assisted in the fraudulent scheme by holding himself out as being in contact with the mythical cartel and being wholly independent of Moses and her companies: in fact, it was claimed, he was acting on the instructions of Moses. In the period from March 1988 to April 1989, it was alleged that the respondent presented himself to the lawyers acting for Moses and other interested parties as the representative of the cartel in succession to Laurence Anderson. Again, it is said that there was no cartel and that he was not in any sense independent and in fact acted on the instructions of Moses. During this latter period - described by the prosecution as "the lullingphase" - it is said that the respondent provided assurances to lawyers and other concerned persons at a stage when Moses or her associated companies had defaulted on the loans from the banks and effectively induced them to forebear from suing. It is alleged that, in addition to using his ownname, he also used the names "J. Later" and "R. Schulz" to make it appear that Romtex AG was independent of Moses.

10 In what is described as the "supersedingindictment", the grand jury for the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan (Southern Division) chargedthat

"From about September 1982 through March 1991 defendants...