Barrett v Independent Newspapers

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: FINLAY C.J.,Henchy J,GRIFFIN J.,Hederman J.,McCARTHY J.
• Judgment Date: 12 March 1986
• Neutral Citation: 1986 WJSC-SC 122
• Court: Supreme Court
• Docket Number: [S.C. No. 117 of 1985]
• Date: 12 March 1986

BARRETT v. INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS LTD

BETWEEN

MICHAEL BARRETT

Plaintiff/Respondent

and

INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS LTD.

Defendants/Appellants

1986 WJSC-SC 122

Finlay C.J.

Henchy J.

Griffin J.

Hederman J.

McCarthy J.

117/85

THE SUPREME COURT

Synopsis:

DAMAGES

Assessment

Libel - Politician plaintiff - Report of journalist - Report stating that plaintiff "plucked at my beard" - Report of incident in precincts of parliament - Report published by defendants - Held that jury's award of #65,000 damages was excessive - (117/85 - Supreme Court - 12/3/86) - [1986] IR 13; [1986] ILRM 601

|Barrett v. Independent Newspapers|

DEFAMATION

Libel

Jury - Function - Verdict on issue - Trial judge withdrawing from jury the issue of libel - Jury directed to assess damages - Jury awarding #65,000 damages to plaintiff - Plaintiff being a member of parliament - Journalist reporting that plaintiff "plucked at my beard" - Report of incident in precincts of parliament - Report published by defendants - Whether report stated that plaintiff assaulted journalist - Held that the issue of libel or no libel should not have been withdrawn from the jury - Held that the sum awarded as damages was excessive - New trial ordered - (117/85 - Supreme Court - 12/3/86) - [1986] IR 13; [1986] ILRM 601

|Barrett v. Independent Newspapers|

JURY

Function

Civil action - Libel - Verdict on issue - Trial judge withdrawing from jury the issue of libel - Jury directed to assess damages - Jury awarding #65,000 damages to plaintiff - Plaintiff being a member of parliament - Journalist reporting that plaintiff "plucked at my beard" - Report of incident in precincts of parliament - Report published by defendants - Whether report amounted to a statement that plaintiff had assaulted the journalist - Held that the issue of libel or no libel should not have been withdrawn from the jury - Held that the sum awarded as damages was excessive - New trial ordered - (117/85 - Supreme Court - 12/3/86) - [1986] IR 13; [1986] ILRM 601

|Barrett v. Independent Newspapers|

Citations:

AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPER V BENNETT 1894 AC 284

BERRY V IRISH TIMES LTD 1973 IR 368, 108 ILTR 33

BROOME V CASSELL & CO 1972 AC 1027, 1972 2 WLR 645, 1972 2 AER 187

BROOME V AGAR 138 LT 698

CONSTITUTION ART 40.3.2

DINGLE V ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS 1962 3 WLR 237

FOX'S ACT 1972

FULLAM V ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LTD 1955/56 IJ 45

GATLEY LIBEL & SLANDER 8ED PARA 1491

HENWOOD V HARRISON 26 LTR 938 7 CP 606

LOCKHART V HARRISON 139 LT 521, 44 TLR 794

MCINERNEY V CLAREMAN PRINTING & PUBLISHING CO 1903 2 IR 347

MCMAHON & BINCHY IRISH LAW OF TORTS P348

ODGERS LIBEL 5ED P119

PARMITER V COUPLAND 6 M&W 109, 151 ER 340

PYKE V HIBERNIAN BANK 1950 IR 195

QUIGLEY V CREATION LTD 1971 IR 269

R V SHIPLEY 4 DOUG 73

SAXBY V EASTERBROOK 3 CP 339

1 JUDGMENT delivered on the 12th day of March 1986by FINLAY C.J.

2 This is an appeal by the Defendants against a judgment entered against them in the High Court after a trial with a jury awarding to the Plaintiff £65,900 damages for libel.

3 There are in effect two grounds of appeal: the first is that the learned trial Judge erred in law in not leaving a question to the jury as to whether the words complained of were defamatory, but instead directing them that they were, and the second is that the damages awarded wereexcessive.

The facts

4 The Plaintiff is a Teachta Dala and a member of the Fianna Fail Party, representing a Dublin constituency. The Defendants are the publishers of The Evening Herald newspaper. In the issue of that newspaper dated the 8th February 1983 they published an article written by one of their then employees, John Feeney, describing the scene which occurred in and outside Leinster House at the conclusion of a meeting of the Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party which was concerned with the leadership of Charles Haughey, T.D. In the course of that article there occurred the followingwords:

"There were savage scenes as TDs left Leinster House early to-day. Michael Barrett, TD, a Dublin Haugheyite, leaned over and pulled at my beard and said: "You thought you'd dance on his grave.""

5 On the day following this publication the Plaintiff wrote, himself, to the editor of The Evening Herald newspaper a letter in which he complained that the report stated that he, the Plaintiff, had assaulted Mr. Feeney on the previous evening, denying the truth of that, but making no claim for either an apology or for damages. In evidence hestatedthat what he intended was that the Defendants would have published this letter of refutation in their newspaper. To that letter the editor replied, on the 11th February of 1983, stating that he had spoken to the writer of the article, John Feeney, that he was adamant that the incident as reported by him took place, that the report was factual and correct and that he had several witnesses to the incident. The letter from the Plaintiff was not published.

6 The Plaintiff then consulted a solicitor who, on the 14th February 1983, wrote a letter to the Defendants alleging that the Plaintiff had been defamed, denying that the Plaintiff had assaulted or touched Mr. Feeney in any way and seeking the publication of an apology and damages to be paid to a charity of the Plaintiff's nomination. To that letter there was no reply.

7 These proceedings were then instituted and the Defence, apart from a denial that the words complained of were defamatory and denial of damages, constituted in effect a plea of justification.

8 Tragically, the author of the article, Mr. John Feeney,and the editor of the newspaper at the time, Mr. Niall Hanley, were killed in an aircraft accident before the proceedings came to trial and were, by consent, struck out of the proceedings before trial.

9 The plea of justification was not withdrawn by the Defendants at any stage up to and including the trial and the verdict, and the Plaintiff was cross-examined to test the accuracy of his account of what occurred in Leinster House. The Judge, at the conclusion of the evidence for the Plaintiff, no evidence having been called by the Defendants, refused to leave a question as to whether the words were defamatory or not, but directed the jury that the words were defamatory in that they constituted an accusation of assault by the Plaintiff.

Submissions on behalf of the Defendants

10 On the issue of liability the Defendants firstly submitted that the learned trial Judge being satisfied, as they conceded he was correctly satisfied, that the words were capable of a defamatory meaning, was obliged to leave a specific question to the jury as to whether the wordsweredefamatory or not. They contended that this obligation existed on the authorities, irrespective of a properly held view that the words were incapable of any meaning other than a defamatory meaning.

11 In the alternative, it was argued that if there was a right in a trial judge, in a defemation action tried with a jury, to direct the jury that the words were defamatory and ask them to assess damages only, that it was a right confined to a case where a jury could not reasonably have reached any conclusion other than that the words complained of were defamatory and that this was not such a case.

12 On the issue of damages, the Defendants submitted that the damages awardable in respect of the defamation were compensatory only and that even bearing in mind the matters and factors properly relevant, such as the conduct of the Defendants after the publication of the libel and up to and including the trial, the amount awarded was grosslyexcessive.

The law

13 I reject the first submission made on behalf of the Defendants. There does not appear to me to be either logicor justice in a principle which would prevent a judge of trial satisfied that words complained of could not possibly be understood otherwise than to be dafamatory, from so directing a jury. It is clear from all the authorities that if a jury enters a verdict holding that words complained of and published were not defamatory, that that verdict can, in exceptional and rare cases, it is stated, be set aside, on appeal, on the grounds that the words were incapable of an innocent interpretation and that a jury could not reasonably have reached the conclusion that they did (of. Lockhart v.Harrisson 139 L.T.R.). This principle clearly formed the basis of the dissenting judgments of FitzGerald J. and McLoughlin J. in Berry v. The Irish Times 1972 I.R., where their view was, not only that the appeal against the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim should be allowed, but that the order should be that the case should be remitted for a new trial confined to an assessment of damages only. Furthermore, the majority decision of the Court, being the judgment of O Dalaigh C.J., does not appear to be inconsistent with that situation, but is based on a conclusion differing from FitzGerald J. andMcLoughlin J., that the words complained of must, as a matter of law, be held defamatory.

14 I am satisfied that if an appellate court can set aside a verdict of a jury finding words not to be defamatory on the basis that it was perverse and unreasonable, that it is an inevitable consequence that a trial judge has not only a right but, in my opinion, a duty in an appropriate case to prevent such a perverse or unreasonable verdict by directing the jury.

15 I am, therefore, satisfied that the real issue on liability in this case is as to whether it would be possible for a reasonable jury to conclude that the words complained of had a meaning other than a defamatorymeaning.

16 Counsel for the Defendants has stated that it was, and that such a meaning, for example, could have been that the Plaintiff had on this occasion in "pulling at" Mr. Feeney's beard and saying the words: "You thought you'd jump on his grave" merely have been adopting a gesture of emphasis such as the prodding of a person on the shoulder or the slapping of a...