Carey v Mould and Donegal County Council

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr Justice Michael Peart
• Judgment Date: 20 April 2004
• Neutral Citation: [2004] IEHC 66
• Docket Number: Record Number: No. 2374P/2001
• Court: High Court
• Date: 20 April 2004

[2004] IEHC 66

THE HIGH COURT

Record Number: No. 2374P/2001

CAREY v. MOULD & DONEGAL CO COUNCIL

Between:

Colm Carey

Plaintiff

And

Warren Mould and the County Council of the County of Donegal

Defendants

Abstract:

Negligence - Liability - Apportionment of liability - Road traffic accident - Failure of motorist to see warning signs at dangerous junction - Duty of road authority to warn motorists of dangerous junction - Whether failure of road authority to place and maintain adequate warning signs at junction major contributing factor.

Facts: the plaintiff had been driving along a main road when the first defendant, who had been driving along a minor road, failed to stop at a junction with the main road and collided with the plaintiff’s car. Both defendants accepted that there was no liability attaching to the plaintiff and agreed as to the quantum of damages to be awarded. Accordingly, the only issue was as to how liability should be apportioned between the defendants inter se. The first defendant alleged that he did not see a stop sign placed by the second defendant at the junction which had been turned around and that a white line at the junction had faded dangerously. He further alleged that a yellow warning sign placed by the second defendant some distance before the junction, which he failed to notice, was insufficient to warn motorists of the junction. The second defendant alleged that the first defendant had been driving too fast and carelessly in the circumstances.

Held by Peart J in holding that the first defendant was 15% liable and the second defendant 85% liable for the accident that the junction was inherently dangerous requiring special steps to be taken to ensure, as far as possible, that very clear warnings be apparent to any road user, particularly to visitors to the area. The junction presented a greater hazard than it ought to have at the time of the accident and the second defendant, whose duty it was to ensure the safety of the road, was in a position to ensure the safety of the junction to a much greater degree than was the case.

Reporter: P.C.

Judgment of

Mr Justice Michael Peart

1 On the day of this accident the plaintiff was aged 62 years. By trade he is a builder who has worked at that trade since he left school in his teenage years.

2 The accident giving rise to these proceedings took place at a junction at Slavery, near Buncrana, Co. Donegal where the plaintiff resides. He was driving to his home on the date in question at about 1 pm. He knows the road intimately and has driven that way regularly for a great number of years.

3 As one drives along this main road from the direction of Buncrana, the road veers to the right. Another road, the minor road from the direction of Cleggan, meets this road at the point at which the main road veers to the right. The 1^st defendant was travelling along this minor road, towards the junction with that main road, in other words travelling towards the plaintiff.

4 The 2^nd defendant, Donegal County Council, ("the Council") had erected a Stop sign on the minor road close to the point at which that road meets the main road, in order to alert drivers on the minor road to stop, in order to let traffic on the main road continue along that main road, as the plaintiff was so doing on this day. However it appears that in some way, that Stop sign had been interfered with, as a result of which it was not facing in the intended direction on this date, but instead was turned 180 degrees so that it was in fact facing the direction from which the plaintiff was travelling.

5 Therefore on the date of this accident the plaintiff was travelling along the main road, and turned or veered around to the right as he was perfectly entitled to do, as he had right of way. But the 1^stdefendant was travelling towards the plaintiff on what he thought was a straight road on which he could continue, as if he had a right to proceed past the junction to his left, in the safe knowledge that any traffic coming onto that road from the left would yield, and that any oncoming traffic, such as the plaintiff, would halt before making a turn to their right, or would simply continue in a straight direction past him in the Cleggan direction..

6 On this occasion the plaintiff proceeded to veer around to his right in the knowledge that any oncoming traffic would stop at the stop sign referred to. However, because the Stop sign was facing the wrong way, the 1^st defendant continued straight ahead through the junction. A factor also is that the plaintiff had, as was his entitlement, no indicator flashing in order to indicate his intention to veer to his right because he had the right of way. Therefore the 1^st defendant was not even aware that the plaintiff was intending to travel across his path in order to continue on his way along the main road. A collision was therefore inevitable, and so it happened.

7 The evidence has been that the Stop sign at the junction, which ought to have told the 1^st defendant that he was required to stop, had been interfered with, so that he was not aware of its existence. Because of this interference the evidence has been that the 1^stdefendant assumed that he in fact was on the main road and could with impunity and in safety continue along what he thought was a straight main road. However there is also evidence that some 100 metres back from the junction there was in place on that date a yellow sign on the left with words in black informing a driver such as the 1^st defendant that there was a stop sign ahead at 100 metres. There was also a white stop line at the junction. These signs and markings had been placed at this point by the Council in order to alert drivers such as the 1^st defendant that they were required to stop in order to allow drivers such as the plaintiff to pass along the main road in front of them.

8 I am not required to decide whether the plaintiff has proven to the necessary degree that either the 1^st defendant or the Council breached the duty of care which they owed in their respective capacities to the plaintiff. The defendants have agreed a quantum of damages in respect of the plaintiff's injuries and have let the plaintiff out so to speak, in the sense that the only issue for decision by me is the question as to which of the defendants is liable to the plaintiff, or if both are liable, then to what degree each is so liable as between them.

9 The 1^st defendant has accepted that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed along the main road, and to cross in front of him in so doing. In other words, he accepts that the road on which the plaintiff...