Castletown Foundation Ltd v Magan
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice Murray |
| Judgment Date | 06 October 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] IECA 218 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Ireland) |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeal Record No. 2019/76 |
[2022] IECA 218
Woulfe J.
Murray J.
Ní Raifeartaigh J.
Court of Appeal Record No. 2019/76
High Court Record No. 2018/5971 P
THE COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL
Summary judgment – Arrears of rent – Abuse of process – Appellant seeking orders dismissing, or placing a permanent stay on, the proceedings – Whether the proceedings were an abuse of process
Facts: The plaintiff/respondent, Castletown Foundation Ltd, sought summary judgment against the defendant/appellant, Mr Magan, in the sum of €571,893 together with interest pursuant to statute in respect of arrears of rent. In a cross motion the defendant sought orders dismissing, or placing a permanent stay on, the proceedings pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court, or pursuant to O. 19 r. 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, on the basis that there was no jurisdiction, or that they were frivolous and vexatious, or an abuse of the process and bound to fail. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal contending that the High Court (Haughton J, [2018] IEHC 653) erred in refusing to accede to the defendant’s application to dismiss or stay parts of the plaintiff’s claim and/or in granting summary judgment against the defendant in the sum of €571,893. Shortly before the hearing of the appeal the defendant issued a motion the object of which was to enable the introduction into the appeal of further evidence. He sought to make new arguments on foot of that evidence. Those further arguments dovetailed with some propositions advanced for the first time in the defendant’s legal submissions to the Court of Appeal.
Held by Murray J that as a matter of law and on the evidence before him, the trial judge was correct to find as he did, to grant liberty to enter judgment, and to reject the attempt to strike out parts of the plaintiff’s claim. Murray J held that it would not be appropriate for the Court to disrupt those findings on the basis of the materials the defendant had sought to introduce. Murray J held that if the defendant had a case against the plaintiff of the kind he had described, he remained free to agitate it. Murray J held that the real grievance the defendant had could not be with the fact that summary judgment was entered against him (he had paid it), nor with the fact that parts of the plaintiff’s claim were not dismissed (he remained free to defend those on the merits), but with the sale of the property. Murray J held that it would be wholly inappropriate for him to say whether the new materials referred to by the defendant as part of this appeal could be converted into a legal claim arising from that sale.
Murray J dismissed the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Murray delivered on the 6 th of October 2022
. The background to these proceedings is detailed in the comprehensive judgment of Haughton J. giving rise to this appeal ( [2018] IEHC 653). I will not rehearse the context here save and insofar as necessary to address the matters now before this court. Those issues arise from the defendant's contention that the High Court erred in (a) refusing to accede to the defendant's application to dismiss or stay parts of the plaintiff's claim and/or (b) in granting summary judgment against the defendant in the sum of €571,893.00. Shortly before the hearing of the appeal the defendant issued a motion the object of which was to enable the introduction into the appeal of further evidence. He sought to make new arguments on foot of that evidence. Those further arguments dovetailed with some propositions advanced for the first time in the defendant's legal submissions to this court. I will deal first with those grounds of appeal that reflect the arguments made to the High Court, and then with the new arguments and evidence. The former reduce themselves to two broad headings.
. As to the first, the plaintiff was the owner of Castletown House (also known as Castletown Cox) Co. Kilkenny (‘ Castletown’). The plaintiff was at the time of the High Court proceedings itself owned and controlled by Yew Tree Trustees Ltd. (formerly DW Trustees Ltd.), the trustee of the Eaglehill Trust. Two of the defendant's three children are the beneficiaries of the Eaglehill Trust. The trust is administered in Jersey.
. The defendant had been a tenant in Castletown. The plaintiff had purported to terminate the lease first because of an intention to sell the property, and thereafter because of the failure of the defendant to pay rent. The defendant then took steps to assert a right to a new tenancy. The plaintiff instituted these proceedings and included in the relief sought (a) a declaration that the tenancy agreement with the defendant was validly terminated because of the failure of the defendant to pay rent due and owing, and (b) a declaration that the defendant was not entitled to seek a new tenancy or other relief pursuant to Part II of the Landlord and Tenant ( Amendment) Act 1980 (‘ the 1980 Act’).
. The defendant's application for an order dismissing, or placing a permanent stay on, these parts of the proceedings was made pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court and/or pursuant to Order 19 Rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. Those reliefs were dependent on the plaintiff's claims being frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process and bound to fail.
. The defendant had based his argument that the claims were bound to fail on the propositions that (a) the issue as to the validity of the termination notice had been referred to the Residential Tenancies Board (‘ RTB’) and that having regard to the provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004, as amended (‘ the 2004 Act’) it was exclusively a matter for the RTB to decide that question and (b) the Circuit Court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the defendant's entitlement to a new tenancy pursuant to the 1980 Act.
. As to the first of these claims, the trial judge concluded that because the defendant had applied to the Circuit Court for relief pursuant to the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Acts by reason of being a business user, it was arguable that the 2004 Act was disapplied and, to that extent, that the court should not strike out claims which might otherwise have fallen within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTB. This, it appears to me, must be correct. Section 3(2) of the 2004 Act identifies those tenancies to which the legislation does not apply. One of these, under s. 3(2)(i) is ‘ a dwelling … which is the subject of an application made under section 21 of the Landlord and Tenant ( Amendment) Act 1980 and the court has yet to make its determination in the matter’. The language used in this ousting section is arguably consistent with its operating whenever an undecided application has been brought under the 1980 Act.
. Here, the defendant instituted proceedings by Landlord and Tenant Civil Bill dated 19 July 2018 seeking an order declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to a new tenancy in the property and fixing the terms of same. That application was pending when the motion to dismiss was brought. There was, accordingly, no error by the trial judge in concluding that he should not strike out this claim having regard to the high burden placed on a party seeking to dismiss proceedings pursuant to the court's inherent jurisdiction and/or under Order 19 Rule 28. Once the claim was arguable, it would have been inappropriate to dismiss it on foot of an application of this kind.
. As to the second part of the motion to dismiss, the defendant's application in the Landlord and Tenant Civil Bill was for a new business tenancy said to arise under s. 13(1)(a) of the 1980 Act. In its proceedings, the plaintiff had sought a declaration that the defendant was not entitled to seek a new tenancy because the letting agreement had been terminated for non-payment of rent and breach of contract (s. 17 of the 1980 Act excluding a tenant from a new tenancy in these circumstances).
. Section 3 of the 1980 Act vests jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to determine the right to a new tenancy. Normally, therefore, it is to that court that such application should be brought. However, there are authorities suggesting that the High Court retains a residual jurisdiction to determine applications under that Act in exceptional circumstances ( Walpoles (Ireland) Ltd. v. Dixon (1935) 69 ILTR 232, Kenny Homes Co. Ltd. v. Leonard and Lecorn Ltd. Unreported, Supreme Court, Lynch J., 18 June 1998). Haughton J. deduced from these cases (themselves rooted in the jurisdiction of the High Court prescribed by Article 34.3.1° of the Constitution), the proposition that the High Court retained jurisdiction in an appropriate case to determine issues related to conditions that must be satisfied for a tenant to have an entitlement to claim a new tenancy (at para. 107). It followed that it was arguable that the High Court was not excluded in an appropriate case from determining whether a tenant is disentitled to a new tenancy by virtue of the provisions of s. 17 of the 1980 Act. This jurisdiction, Haughton J. found, could be exercised in circumstances of urgency — although he found that on the evidence before the court, circumstances of urgency had not been established by the plaintiff.
. On this basis, the High Court decided to stay but not to strike out this part of the plaintiff's claim. Haughton J.'s legal analysis and resolution of the issue was, in my view, correct. The cases show that it was arguable as a matter of law that that court retained a residual jurisdiction to entertain such a claim, so it would not have been appropriate to resolve that issue of jurisdiction in an application of this...
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