Corcoran v Governor of Castlerea Prison

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr Justice Max Barrett
• Judgment Date: 26 May 2016
• Neutral Citation: [2016] IEHC 267
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: Record No. 2016 218 SS
• Date: 26 May 2016

[2016] IEHC 267

THE HIGH COURT

Barrett J.

Record No. 2016 218 SS

IN THE MATTER OF AN ENQUIRY UNDER ARTICLE 40.4.2° OF THE CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND

BETWEEN/

THOMAS CORCORAN

APPLICANT

AND

GOVERNOR OF CASTLEREA PRISON

RESPONDENT

Constitution – Art. 40.4.2 of the Constitution – Execution of European Arrest Warrant – S. 13 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 – Execution of bench warrants – Unlawful detention

Facts: Following the return of the applicant from the United Kingdom to the jurisdiction of Ireland upon execution of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and his refusal of bail by the District Court in order to execute four bench warrants in relation to certain road traffic matters, the applicant now sought an order for his release pursuant to art. 40.4.2 of the Constitution on the basis that his detention was unlawful. The applicant alleged that his return to Ireland was premised on the prosecution of offences mentioned under EAW and he was being charged for matters other than mentioned under EAW.

Mr. Justice Max Barrett held that the detention of the applicant was lawful. The Court held that an application under art. 40.4.2 of the Constitution should be filed only in cases where there appear to be manifest procedural irregularity that would invalidate the detention of the applicant. The Court found that in the present case, there was nothing irrational or incorrect in the findings made by the District Judge and it had ample jurisdiction to refuse bail to the applicant being a flight risk as evidenced by the efforts and resources of the State expended to bring him back in the jurisdiction of Ireland and proof of his settled family life in the United Kingdom. The Court held that since the State had indicated that the applicant would be tried for the offence mentioned under EAW, the rule of specialty need not be decided in the present case.

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Max Barrett delivered on 26th May, 2016.

Part 1

Background

1 Mr Corcoran was arrested in the United Kingdom on 8th February, 2016, on foot of a European arrest warrant being issued by Ireland. The warrant related to a charge against Mr Corcoran of an offence contrary to s.15 of the Misuse of Drugs Acts 1977–84 and also an intended charge of an offence contrary to s.13 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. Mr Corcoran consented to his return to Ireland and was admitted to bail by the United Kingdom authorities on condition that he abide by a curfew, sign on at a police station, wear an electronic tag, and always have with him, and be contactable by the police at all times on, a mobile phone.

2 On 12th February last, Mr Corcoran met the United Kingdom police at Heathrow Airport, and was returned to Ireland. On his return to Ireland he was charged with the s.13 offence. The following day he was brought before a sitting of Sligo District Court. At that hearing, it was indicated to the court that the State intended to execute four bench warrants in relation to certain road traffic matters that had not been the subject of the European arrest warrant. Mr Corcoran's solicitor immediately objected to this on the basis that Mr Corcoran had been returned to Ireland in order to be dealt with in respect of certain specified matters that were the subject of the warrant. The learned District Judge ruled against Mr Corcoran's solicitor in this regard.

3 Matters then progressed to a bail application entered for Mr Corcoran by his solicitor. Upon this application being made, the State objected to bail on the basis that Mr Corcoran was a flight risk and would not show up for trial. This objection was based on Mr Corcoran's history as the repeated subject of bench warrants and his history of having absconded to the United Kingdom. The State did not accept that its concerns in this regard would be allayed by the imposition on Mr Corcoran of such conditions as a curfew and constant availability by mobile phone.

4 During the course of the application, Mr Corcoran gave evidence that he was unaware of the existence of any warrants against him other than the European arrest warrant. He also gave evidence that his move to the United Kingdom had been prompted by a belief that his life was under threat in Ireland. This evidence was not challenged in cross-examination.

5 After hearing the bail application, the learned District Judge refused bail on the basis that Mr Corcoran was a flight risk. He also observed that (a) had Mr Corcoran not consented to his return to Ireland, he would likely have been held in custody in the United Kingdom, and (b) were Mr Corcoran to be released on bail and flee to the United Kingdom, legal difficulties would present were Ireland to issue a further European arrest warrant. Objection has been taken by Mr Corcoran to the observations referred to at (a) and (b).

6 Following the District Court proceedings, this Article 40 application was brought, it being alleged that Mr Corcoran was being detained unlawfully for the following reasons: (1) because he was being prosecuted and detained, inter alia, in respect of offences which did not form the subject-matter of the European arrest warrant, and (2) because of the observations made by the learned District Judge and referred to at (a) and (b) above.

Part 2

The Doctrine of Specialty

A. Overview.

7 The doctrine of specialty is a doctrine of international law that protects a state making a surrender of an individual from abuse of the sovereign act of extradition. Violation of the doctrine of specialty occurs when, post-surrender, the requesting state charges and prosecutes, or aims to prosecute a person surrendered for a crime not agreed to during the surrender proceedings.

8 It was suggested during the course of the within proceedings that specialty is more appropriately regarded as a policy which informs the majority of extradition agreements rather than a rule as such. The court respectfully does not accept this contention. A quick historical aside explains why. In the 1870s, at a time when Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom, the status of the doctrine of specialty was a matter of high diplomatic tension between the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom insisted that the doctrine of specialty was a free-standing rule of international law whereas the United States, for a time, insisted that it had no application unless expressly included in an extradition treaty. During Disraeli's administration, extraditions between the two states even ceased for a short...