D G v Minister for Justice and Equality
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | MacMenamin J.,Clarke C.J. |
| Judgment Date | 17 May 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] IESCDET 77 |
| Docket Number | 2017 743 JR |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 17 May 2018 |
[2018] IESCDET 77
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
Clarke C.J.
MacMenamin J.
Dunne J.
2017 743 JR
| ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED |
| COURT: High Court |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 7th December 2017 |
| DATE OF ORDER: 7th December 2017 |
| DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 22nd December 2017 |
The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v. Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called “leapfrog appeal” direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v. Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.
Furthermore the application for leave filed and the respondents' notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.
In that context it should be noted that the respondents oppose the grant of leave.
Decision
The applicant herein seeks to appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court (Humphreys J.) delivered on the 7th December, 2017 directly to this Court. The judgment of the High Court was the second judgment in these proceedings. The first judgment of the High Court of the 27th October, 2017 was also the subject of a leapfrog application for leave to appeal to this Court. The point raised on behalf of the applicant (Ms. G.) was essentially the same as that which arose in the case of M.A.K. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESCDET 132. The Court granted leave to appeal in that case and also in a similar case, S.E. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESCDET 62. Accordingly, it followed that the Court was satisfied that the point which arose in Ms. G's first application met the constitutional threshold. Leave to appeal was granted to Ms. G. on the same grounds as were the subject of leave in M.A.K. by the determination of the 5th February, 2018. It was noted that the cases of S.E. and M.A.K. had already been before the Court at that stage and a judgment was awaited. Judgment has since been delivered but nothing turns on that point for the purpose of this application. The issue that arose in those proceedings concerned a contention that the ‘deadline for leaving’ the State should be stated in the body of deportation orders rather than the orders stating that the deadline is ‘specified in’ the notice accompanying them.
Ms. G. also sought a declaration in the following terms in these proceedings:
‘A declaration that these proceedings being certiorari in aid of habeas corpus and accordingly in substance a complaint under Article 40.4.2° of the Constitution, the provisions of s. 5(6)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended in 2004, (concerning certifying an appeal) do not apply here.
(b) A declaration that if those provisions apply here they are repugnant to the Constitution in that, inter alia, Article 40.4.2° – 5° is a self-contained code for these complaints and except for 5°...
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